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Understanding the human faculty for speech presents a fundamental and complex problem. We
do not know how humans decode the rapid speech signal and the origins and evolution of speech
remain shrouded in mystery. Speakers generate a continuous stream of sounds apparently
devoid of any specifying invariant features. Despite this absence, we can effortlessly decode
this stream and comprehend the utterances of others. Moreover, the form of these utterances
is shared and mutually understood by a large population of speakers. In this thesis, we present
a multi-agent model that simulates the emergence of a system with shared auditory features
and articulatory tokens. Based upon notions of intentionality and the absence of specifying
invariants, each agent produces and perceives speech, learning to control an articulatory model
of the vocal tract and perceiving the resulting signal through a biologically plausible artiﬁcial
auditory system. By ﬁrmly establishing each aspect of our model in current phonetic theory, we
are able to make useful claims and justify our inevitable abstractions. For example, Lindblom’s
theory of hyper- and hypo-articulation, where speakers seek maximum auditory distinction for
minimal articulatory effort, justiﬁes our choice of an articulatory vocal tract coupled with a
direct measure of effort. By removing the abstractions of previous phonetic models we have
been able to reconsider the current assumption that specifying invariants, in either the auditory
or articulatory domain, must indicate the presence of auditory or articulatory symbolic tokens
in the cognitive domain. Rather we consider speech perception to proceed through Gibsonian
direct realism where the signal is manipulated by the speaker to enable the perception of the
affordances within speech. We conclude that the speech signal is constrained by the intention
of the speaker and the structure of the vocal tract and decoded through an interaction of the
peripheral auditory system and complex pattern recognition of multiple acoustic cues. Far from
passive ‘variance mopping’, this recognition proceeds through the constant reﬁnement of an
unbroken loop between production and perception.Contents
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Introduction
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) has followed two avenues of scientiﬁc research, the produc-
tion of intelligent behaviour by artiﬁcial systems through any means possible and the
discovery of underlying biological causes of intelligence through the implementation of
theories found in the natural world. This thesis will take the second approach. We will
investigate through computer simulation current theories of phonetic emergence and
perception and in doing so we hope to contribute to our understanding of the evolution
of language.
When faced with multiple competing theories, AI can make a valid contribution by
testing their implications through simulation. Thus, we are able to apply a level of
implementational rigour to existing, purely philosophical, theories. To exploit fully this
advantage we must be cautious; every model contains abstractions and assumptions
and a poor choice of either will invalidate the results and undermine the conclusions.
By implementing these approaches carefully and properly, we can conﬁdently progress
from the underlying philosophy to speciﬁc phonetic questions. Accordingly, once we
have tested the resulting models we will consider notions of cultural evolution and
phonetic theory. These include H&H (hypo- and hyper-articulation) theory — the
theory that speakers will maximise auditory distinctiveness and minimise articulatory
effort (Lindblom 1990), and dispersion/focalisation theory — speakers not only seek
auditory distinctivenessbut they also seek acoustic stability (Schwartz, Bo¨ e, Vallee, and
Abry 1997) and we will justify the embodiment of these theories through the adaptation
of symbol grounding.
Within symbol grounding, atomic symbols are formed through the perception of and
interaction with the surrounding environment so as to give meaning to the symbols
and their combinations. Previously, abstract models faced a formidable problem,
1Chapter 1 Introduction 2
famously articulated by Harnad (1990): “How can the semantic interpretation of a
formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on
the meanings in our heads?” (p.335). Harnad characterises this problem as the symbol
grounding problem. In light of its importance, various solutions have been proposed—
see Belpaeme, Cowley, and MacDorman (2007) for some recent work—and within
speech we propose that communicative systems can become grounded through ‘signal
grounding’, where productionand perceptionbecome embodiedthroughthe application
of H&H theory.
According to H&H theory, speakers “tune their performance according to communica-
tive and situation demands ... to vary their output along a continuum of hyper- and
hypospeech” (Lindblom 1990, p.403). That is, in difﬁcult communication conditions,
speakers hyper-articulate in order to be understood, even though this requires additional
energy be expended. In less demanding situations energy can be conserved and
successful communication maintained by hypo-articulation. The ‘setting’ on the
hyper-/hypo- continuum is determined by an on-line process in which the speaker
continuously infers success of communication by monitoring linguistic and para-
linguistic feedback from the listener. We assume that similar forces are at work in
the process of vowel formation among a collection of communicating agents; that is,
there is not only a drive towards distinctive sound categories (loosely corresponding to
‘hyper’), but also an inbuilt desire to minimise energy expended by the agent (loosely
corresponding to ‘hypo’).
A full consideration of the above will equip us with the necessary models (cognitive,
articulatory and auditory) to consider the role of real speech and its implications for
current fundamental phonetic theories. Such theories have long been divided by the
question: ‘What do we perceive when we perceive speech?’ Do we perceive symbolic
phonetic tokens or do we perceive symbolic vocal tract gestures? Can we in fact do
away with symbolic notions of perception altogether and take a more direct realist
approach (Gibson 1979)? To guide our own work within this potential mineﬁeld, we
will take the classiﬁcation framework due to Nearey (1997), dividing phonetic theories
according to the specifying invariance that each believes lies in the signal and gesture.
This framework is useful because it highlights the assumed link between specifying
invariance, and the hypothetical cognitive tokens of speech. By taking the modelling
approach, this thesis will reconsider this link in a new light and question symbolic
assumptions. Finally, we will speculate on the implications of applying this approach
to the wider ﬁeld of language and embodied cognition.Chapter 1 Introduction 3
1.1 Problem statement
We are faced with two interrelated problems. Firstly, how does a shared understanding
emerge within a population of speakers? Does a culture’s language arise through a
constrained, innate, biological process or does it follow from the cultural evolution of
communicative intent? Secondly, how does the individual achieve phonetic perception
and production? Do we perceive articulatory idealisations, symbolic phonetic tokens
derived from the auditory signal or neither? These two questions are related because
the emergence of a shared conversational system among a population of speakers is
dependent upon the individual human capacity for phonetic production and perception.
This crucial interdependence has been overlooked by previous modelling approaches
and, frequently, phonetic challenges are abstracted away. We hope to correct this
oversight in this thesis.
1.2 Contributions
We will now list the major and minor claims of the thesis giving brief references to
supporting sections and results.
1.2.1 Major claims
• We have built a simulation of vowel system evolution among a population of
intercommunicating agents that produces systems which are more like human
vowel systems than have been produced by previous studies.
• We have shown how simulations of stop consonant perception, which exhibit the
characteristic VOT boundary shift with place seen in human listeners, are reliant
on particular ﬁltering characteristics of hte peripheral auditory system, a result
which helps to explain the outcomes of earlier modeling studies.
• We have shown that an artiﬁcial agent, exposed to synthetic initial stops and
equipped with physiologically-based auditory and articulatory models, is able to
converge on a set of acoustic features and articulatory tokens, reproducing the
relevant features of a set of initial stop consonants.Chapter 1 Introduction 4
1.2.2 Subsidiary claims
• We have shown that a population of agents, producing and perceiving utterances
without strong constraints, can converge to a shared set of auditory features
coupled with articulatory tokens. By comparison, previous work has converged
to a set of shared phonetic symbols.
• We have shown that the introduction of symbol grounding results in Gaussian
models that are increasingly robust to parameter variation reducing the Euclidean
distance, summed over an adjustment in Gaussian width from 0.02 to 0.15, from
21.8 vowels to 11.2 vowels , when compared to the human distribution of vowel
systems, with a signiﬁcance of   = 0.043.
• We have shown that an abstract simulation of articulatory effort, coupled with the
forces of dispersion focalisation theory, can produce vowel systems that are more
plausible than those produced by models of dispersion focalisation theory alone.
Combining these claims we offer the opinion that speech should be viewed as the
direct perception of interaction affordances, where the listener is aware of the speaker’s
intentionality and reﬁnes their perception appropriately. Current population models of
speakers andlistenersconsiderspeech tobesimplythe transmissionofabstract phonetic
tokens. We argue that speech should be viewed, and modelled, as an unbroken loop of
recursive perception and production.
1.3 Publications
This thesis presents a detailed body of work addressing current phonetic challenges and
lending support to the cultural evolution of a shared system of communication. During
the work a number of academic papers have been prepared for publication, listed below,
and where appropriate these have been incorporated into the ﬁnal thesis.
• Worgan, S. F. and Moore, R. K. (2009) Spoken language processing as an aspect
of human behaviour. Distributed Language Group Symposium, Wenham, MA
• Worgan, S. F. and Damper, R. I. (2009) Symbolism and enactivism: An
experimental test of conﬂicting approaches to artiﬁcial intelligence Journal of
Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 21 (1). pp. 1–18.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
• Worgan, S. F. and Damper, R. I. (2008) Removing ‘mind-reading’ from the
iterated learning model. Evolang 2008, 7th Evolution of Language Conference,
Barcelona, Spain. pp. 378–386.
• Worgan, S. F. and Mills R. (2008) Initial modelling of the alternative phenotypes
hypothesis Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Artiﬁcial
Life. pp. 717–724
• Worgan, S. F. and Damper, R. I. (2007) Grounding symbols in the physics of
speech communication. Interaction Studies, 8 (1). pp. 7–30.
• Worgan, S. F. and Damper, R. I. (2007) Speech perception as non-symbolic
pattern recognition. Symposium on Language and Robotics, Aveira, Portugal.
pp. 99–100
• Worgan, S. F. and Damper, R. I. (2006) Grounding symbols in the physics of
speech communication. External Symbol Grounding Workshop 2006, Plymouth,
UK.
1.4 Outline of thesis
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows.
First considering symbol grounding, in Section 2.2, we set out our conception of
physical symbol grounding, which we call signal grounding, and relate this to more
traditional views. Then, as a baseline for later discussion of our own work, we brieﬂy
describe Oudeyer’s (2005c) simulations of the emergence of vowel systems shared
between a population of agents in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 introduces our extension to
these simulations in the form of ‘contour spaces’. Section 2.6 illustrates the beneﬁcial
effects of this extension in terms of emergence of more realistic vowel systems.
Section 2.7 discusses the implication of these ﬁndings and concludes by arguing for
the use of more realistic articulatory/auditory modelling as necessary to move beyond
production of static vowel systems and account for the dynamic consonant-vowel
patterning of speech.
In Chapter 3, we move towards this more realistic articulatory/auditory modelling by
justifying and constructing a muscle model to extend an existing vocal tract simulation
(Cook 1993), providingus with a direct measure of articulatoryeffort. We then compare
this model to existing approaches, previously detailed in Chapter 2, and analyse ourChapter 1 Introduction 6
results in Section 3.4, concluding with an outline of how the production of real speech
coupled with a direct measure of the effort of production will be used in the rest of
the thesis.
In Chapter 4 we will then develop, in Section 4.2, a model of the peripheral auditory
system. Detailed in Section 4.3, the importance of the peripheral auditory system in the
perception of real speech will be highlighted. This model will be used to investigate
the interaction of place and voice in the perception of initial stops, a long standing
perceptual puzzle.
In Chapter 5, we will outline a model of phonetic emergence in Section 5.1. Then,
we will construct and analyse the complete model in Section 5.3. This model will ﬁrst
focus upon the abilities of an individual agent before considering questions of phonetic
emergence among a population of speakers. Section 5.4 develops this work’s wider
implications for grounding and speech.
After developing our ﬁnal model we proceed, in Chapter 6, to speculate about the
consequences of these results and we will conclude this chapter by highlighting the
damaging abstractions present in existing phonetic models. These abstractions are
considered as such due to their neglect of current challenges within the ﬁeld of
phonetics. Speciﬁcally, we will speculatively question the assumption that specifying
invariants in either the acoustic signal or articulatory gesture provide evidence for the
perception of symbolic articulatory or auditory idealisations. We then conclude in
Chapter 7, considering the limitations and implications of this work.Chapter 2
Grounding symbols in the physics of
speech communication
We will ﬁrst consider the role of symbol grounding in the modelling of speech. The
traditionalviewofsymbolgroundingseekstoconnectanaprioriinternalrepresentation
or ‘form’ to its external referent. But such a ‘form’ is usually itself systematically
composed out of more primitive parts (i.e., it is ‘symbolic’), so this view ignores
its grounding in the physics of the world. Some previous work simulating multiple
talking/listening agents has effectively taken this stance, and shown how a shared
discrete speech code (i.e., vowel system) can emerge. Taking the earlier work of
Oudeyer (2005c), we have extended his model to include a dispersive force intended
to account broadly for a speaker’s motivation to increase auditory distinctiveness. New
simulations show that vowel systems result that are more representative of the range
seen in human languages. These simulations make many profound abstractions and
assumptions. Relaxing these by including more physically and physiologically realistic
mechanisms for talking and listening is seen as the key to replicating more complex and
dynamic aspects of speech, such as consonant-vowel patterning.
2.1 Overview
The computational metaphor that underpins cognitive science, and much of artiﬁcial
intelligence and functionalist philosophy of mind also, sees intelligent behaviour as
the product of the workings of a formal symbol manipulation system (e.g., Newell
1973; Minsky 1974; Fodor 1975; Newell and Simon 1976; Newell 1980; Newell
1990; Pylyshyn 1984; Dietrich 1990). But this view faces a formidable problem,
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famously articulated by Harnad (1990) as: “How can the semantic interpretation of
a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on
the meanings in our heads?” Harnad calls this the symbol grounding problem (SGP)
and comments: “The handicap has been noticed in various forms since the advent
of computing”. The earliest reference that we know is that of Mays (1951), who
writes “if we grant that these machines [i.e., digital computers] are complex pieces
of symbolism, ... it is clear that in order to acquire a signiﬁcance the symbols need to
be linked with a set of referents” (p.249). So if the computational metaphor is to offer
any purchase in modelling and understanding cognition, the SGP poses a challenge that
cannot be neglected (Cangelosi, Greco, and Harnad 2000). Since the long-term goal of
our research is to understand via computer modelling and simulation how speech sound
categories (broadly, ‘phonemes’) could have emerged during language evolution, and
then how these could be combined systematically to lead to utterances with semantic
content, we take this challenge seriously.
To some, the SGP is symptomatic of an incorrect view of AI and cognitive science,
famously parodied as “good old-fashioned AI”, or GOFAI, by Haugeland (1985).
For instance, as Pfeifer and Scheirer (1999, p.71) write: “... the symbol grounding
problemis reallyan artifact of symbolicsystemsand ‘disappears’ if a different approach
is used”. The different approach they have in mind is, of course, embodied or
nouvelle AI as spearheaded by Brooks (1990, 1991, 1999), which seeks to replace
the central role played by symbolic representation by non-symbolic interfacing to the
physical world through cycles of perception and action, usually conceived as based on
some connectionist or statistical machine learning principles. However, the complete
banishment of symbolism from the scene is rather too radical for most AI scientists
and cognitive psychologists, who continue to see a role for formal symbol systems,
albeit in combination with some sort of connectionist component (e.g., Minsky 1990;
Harnad1990, 1993)inmodellingand explainingthe highercognitivefunctionsinvolved
in using language, doing mathematics, decision making under uncertainty, etc., where
nouvelle AI has arguably promised more than it has delivered.
A new view of the SGP has recently arisen in which the physics of the external world
plays an important and simplifying role (Sun 2000; Vogt 2002). Vogt (2002) coins
the term physical symbol grounding problem and writes, “It is based on the idea that
symbols should be grounded (cf. Harnad 1990) and ... they should be grounded by
physical agents that interact with the world (cf. Brooks 1990)” (p.435). Our thesis is
broadlyconsonantwiththisview, treatingthe SGP (as does Vogt) as a technical problem
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Quite apart from the intrinsic scientiﬁc interest in studying the emergence of human
speech and language for its own sake (Damper 2000), it makes an excellent context in
which to consider the SGP. First and foremost, we believe human communication to
be the clearest, certainly best-developed, example of externally-grounded cognition. As
Vogt (2002, p.431) writes, “language through its conventionsoffers a basis for invariant
labeling of the real world.” Since human communication is a social phenomenon,
we pursue an approach of multi-agent simulation, not unlike much previous work in
‘language games’ but with one important difference (see below).
In particular in this chapter, we argue that the emergence of speech sound categories
can and should be grounded in the physics of speech communication between agents,
recognising that the human’s contact with the external world of sound is via their
articulatory and auditory systems. Important previous work along these lines is that
of Steels (1997, 1998, 1999, 2003), de Boer (2000a, 2001, 2005), and Oudeyer (2005a,
2005b, 2005c), who have explored grounded speech-category formation by computer
simulation of multi-agent systems, with agents equipped with rudimentary articulatory
and auditory systems and associated ‘neural’ processing. Broadly speaking, this line
of work had its beginnings in the early and inﬂuential efforts of Lindblom (1986a)
and his colleagues to explain the origins of vowel systems in the world’s languages
(LiljencrantzandLindblom1972; Lindblom,MacNeilage, and Studdert-Kennedy1984;
Lindblom 2000) based on “adaptive dispersion theory.” In their numerical simulations,
the clustering of vowels in some metric space was predicted by minimising an energy
function designed to reﬂect perceptual distinctiveness. An important question is exactly
how realistic the simulations have to be (e.g., in terms of faithfully modelling the
articulatory/auditory systems and brain mechanisms). A subsidiary goal of all work
of the kind described in the thesis is to answer this question, although for this chapter
we will restrict ourselves to relatively simple simulations such as have been used in
other previous work.
Although Steels (1997) argues for a “limited rationality constraint” in multi-agent
simulations (i.e., agents should not have access to each other’s internal states), this
constraint is typically violated in language games where nonlinguistic feedback ﬁgures
importantly. For instance, de Boer (2001) writes, “the initiator then communicates the
success or failure to the imitator using nonlinguistic communication” (p.52). In our
view, this amounts to a form of ‘mind-reading,’ seriously undermining the credibility
of the simulations. Hence, we wish to avoid this aspect of language games, and favour
Oudeyer’s alternative approach where he dispenses with nonlinguistic feedback. As
he writes, “it is crucial to note that agents do not imitate each other ... The only
consequence of hearing a vocalization is that it increases the probability, for the agentChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 10
that hears it, of vocalizations ... similar to those of the heard vocalization” (Oudeyer
2005c, p.443). In spite of the absence of structured, coordinated interactions between
agents, he achieves two results in his simulations which mirror important aspects of
real language: “on the one hand discreteness and compositionality arise thanks to the
coupling between perception and production within agents, on the other hand shared
systems of phonemic categories arise thanks to the coupling across agents” (Oudeyer
2005c, p.445).
A related line of investigation is that of Kirby (2001) and Kirby and Hurford (2002)
who describe the iterated learning model (ILM), see Appendix A for an elaboration
of this approach. This, however, operates at the syntactic level, that is, learning agents
receive from adult agents “meaning-signalpairs” (p.103) that act as trainingdata. Thus,
the ILM already tacitly assumesthe emergence of phonetic distinctiveness. Whereas the
language-game style of simulations are concerned with language change once the basic
mechanisms are in place, by contrast, Oudeyer (2005c) is concerned with the earliest
origins of a phonemic sound system, as are we. Further, Oudeyer’s model is based
on horizontal cultural interaction between agents of the same generation, following
the works of Steels and colleagues, whereas the ILM is based on iterated learning
among agents of one generation and agents of the previous generation (so this is more
vertical learning).
However, Oudeyer’s work has its own drawback in that he ignores the tenets of
dispersion theory. “There are no internal forces which act as a pressure to have a
repertoire of different discrete sounds,” he writes (p.443). But to cite de Boer (2001,
p.61), a successful vowel system has “its vowel clusters ... dispersed (for low energy)
and compact (for high imitative success).” These ideas are broadly consistent with
notions of H&H theory (Lindblom 1990), chapter 1, and the dispersion-focalisation
theory (DFT) of Schwartz, Bo¨ e, Vallee, and Abry (1997). Although Oudeyer (2005c)
triestoargue thatthelackof adispersionforce isa virtueof hissimulations(itisone less
assumption), he also seems to recognise that it causes problems for the emergence of
sound systems with realistically large numbers of vowels, writing, “Functional pressure
to develop efﬁcient communication systems might be necessary here” (p.447).
Accordingly, the principal purpose of the present chapter is to introduce ideas of
H&H theory and DFT into Oudeyer-style simulations in the belief that more realistic
vowel systems (i.e., more representative of those seen in a variety of human languages)
will result, providing a ﬁrst step towards the rigorous modelling of current phonetic
theory. We will do this by extending the topological spaces in the neural maps used to
couple auditory and articulatory processing as a vastly-simpliﬁed form of brain. WeChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 11
FIGURE 2.1: The traditional view of symbol grounding links an a priori internal
representation (cup) to its external referent cup. Reproduced from Pfeifer and
Scheirer (1999, Fig. 3.4, p.70).
call these extensions contour spaces. The work is intended to form a baseline for
the remainder of the thesis in which we will study the impact of increased realism of
the agents’ articulatory and auditory capabilities, as well as extending our simulations
beyond prediction of static vowel systems to the emergence of connected speech sounds
with appropriate consonant-vowel patterning.
2.2 Signal and symbol grounding
Before proceeding, it is necessary to discuss our relatively wide view of ‘symbol
grounding’ and how it relates to the traditional, rather-narrower symbol grounding
paradigm. Traditionally, the SGP has been seen as the problem of linking an internal
symbolic representation like cat to the external (distal) object cat. For instance,
Figure 2.1 (reproduced from the inﬂuential text of Pfeifer and Scheirer 1999) depicts
a scenario linking the symbol cup with its external referent cup. But this traditional
view already assumes the existence of some sort of internal representation, which is
more or less symbolic (or at least compositional). In our view, any solution to the SGP
mustalsoexplainhowthisinternalrepresentationgetscomposedfrom elementaryparts,
which we take tobe close to thenotionof ‘icons’ inthe terminologyof Harnad (1990) or
‘perceptual symbols’ in the terminology of Barsalou (1999). Because these elementary
parts result from sensory-motor interaction, we cannot ignore the physics of the world.
This leads us to the idea of signal grounding.
Symbol grounding is often discussed in the context of the semiotic triangle as inChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 12
MEANING
REFERENT FORM
(a)
MEANING
REFERENT
PHYSICAL
SIGNAL
FORM
`ICON’
(b)
FIGURE 2.2: (a) The ‘semiotic triangle’, reproduced fromVogt (2002, Fig. 1, p.433).
(b) A more complete picture of symbol grounding in which the FORM in (a) is
grounded by interaction with the physical signal.
Figure 2.2(a), reproduced from Vogt (2002). But as just stated, we believethis picture to
be incomplete, since the form is itselfsymbolicand ungrounded. A more complete view
is depicted in Figure 2.2(b), where interaction with the physical world now grounds the
form. In the case of interest here, this interaction is with the speech signal, hence
the term ‘signal grounding,’ which can be seen either as a component part of symbol
grounding, or as a speciﬁc instance of the SGP, albeit at a lower level than is usually
considered. However it is viewed, we believe signal grounding is an indispensable part
of symbol grounding.
For example, consider Figure 2.3. In this particular case of signal grounding, the
distal object takes the form of an acoustic speech signal, produced by a vocal tract and
perceived through the ear of a listener, linked to an arbitrary and iconic phoneme token
(e.g., /æ/ using the notation of the International Phonetic Association 1999). The form
cat (or, equivalently,/kæt/) is then composedin a way that is systematic,but nonetheless
arbitrary, from these phonemic primitives. Signal grounding then presents numerous
challenges when considering the practicalities of forming an equivalence class for the
phoneme /æ/. We need to map a wide range of varied signals onto the same phoneme
symbol; the system needs to adapt to linguistic change over time; and the grounding
of these arbitrary tokens needs to be shared among a population of speakers. These
challenges will be taken up in the remainder of the chapter.
To conclude this section, we remark that the ideas of signal and symbol grounding
developedhere are stronglyrelated to notionsofdoublearticulation,stemmingfromthe
work of de Saussure (1983), which views a linguisticsystem as a series of differences ofChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 13
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FIGURE 2.3: Illustration of signal grounding as a sub-problem of symbol grounding.
soundcombinedwitha seriesof differencesof ideas. Atthelevelof theﬁrstarticulation,
meaningful units (morphemes, words) are combined syntactically to convey ideas. At
the level of the second articulation, primitive or elementary sound units (phonemes) are
combined to form the meaningful units of the ﬁrst articulation. The level of the second
articulation is vital to human language as a fully productive system, because it is the
key (loosely quoting Wilhelm von Humboldt) to achieving inﬁnite generativity from
ﬁnite machinery. Yet this is the level that is typically ignored by the traditional view of
the SGP as characterised in Figure 2.1.
2.3 Review of previous vowel system evolution models
Work by Vogt and de Boer (2009) summarises the current state of the art and highlights
how computer modelling can help us understand the complex interactions between
cultural and biological evolution. This approach is required as we cannot conduct our
own empirical studies or historical review, as stated by Vogt and de Boer ‘The problem
with both biological and cultural evolution is that they are historical processes, and
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Faced with such problems the importance of computational modelling is in providing a
predictive formalism, ‘scientists carry out computer simulations and then need to assess
whether the yielded predictions are in line with the empirical observations.’
Within computational modelling Vogt and de Boer (2009) identiﬁes three frameworks:
• Analytical models (AM): ‘are mathematical models that typically describe an
evolving system using a limited set of mathematical equations, so that the
evolution can only be described at a meta-level.’
• Agent based analytical models (ABAM): ‘are models that deﬁne the dynamics
and interactions within one or more populations of individuals (or agents) who
are themselves deﬁned by a mathematical equation.’
• Agent based cognitive models (ABCM): ‘are models that also describe the
dynamic processes of a population, but where each individual is designed by a
computer program that implements the production, interpretation and learning of
linguistic elements.’
This chapter will take the Agent based cognitive models (ABCM) approach and ‘it
is clear that the level of detail in ABCM is much higher than in AM. The level of
detail regarding the empirical data that should be involved is likewise more complex
for ABCM that for AM.’ As a result this chapter will consider the fundamental forces
behind the production and perception of speech and test our model’s results against
existing human vowel systems.
de Boer (2000b) further motivates the position of this chapter. Speciﬁcally, we
need to test whether ‘innate predispositions are probably not necessary to explain the
universal tendencies of human vowel systems.’ As an alternative it is proposed that that
these structural regularities arise through self-organisation. Underlying this emergent
behaviour it has been argued that human vowel systems seek to optimise maximum
auditory distinctiveness and minimise articulatory effort.
In studying this approach de Boer (2000b) presents a population system where each
agent possesses an articulatory and auditory model coupled with explicit imitation
mechanisms and non-verbal feedback between participants. As de Boer himself
acknowledges ‘direct nonverbal feedback might be considered unrealistic, as human
children, when learning a language hardly get any direct feedback about the sounds
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However, this work does ‘shown that due to the interactions between the agents and
due to self-organization, realistic vowel repertoires emerge. This happens under a
large number of different parameter settings and therefore seems to be a very robust
phenomenon. The emerged vowel systems show remarkable similarities with the vowel
systems found in human languages’ Results suggest a similar, but not exact, match to
the distribution of human vowel systems with a simulated frequency peak of 4 vowels
instead of 5 for human systems.
In a development of this work Oudeyer (2005c) removes the ‘co-ordinated interactions’
of de Boer’s model. Instead, ‘The mechanism is based on a low-level model of
sensory-motor interactions. We show that the integration of certain very simple and
non-language-speciﬁc neural devices leads to the formation of a speech code that has
properties similar to the human speech code.’ He presents an articulatory model that
relies on the three major articulatory parameters: lip rounding, tongue height and
tongue position. This is connected to the auditory system which is mapped to a two
dimensional space consisting of the ﬁrst formant and the second effective formant.
Convergence within this neural model consists of two fully connected self organising
maps which update according to a Gaussian activation function. While connections
between auditory and articulatory spaces are updated according to hebbian learning.
Perception of each agents own utterances allows for the formation of an accurate
mapping from auditory to articulatory spaces and perception of other agents utterances
causes the auditory space to converge towards the populations agreed vowel inventory.
Results suggest that there is a very strong dependence on the width of the Gaussian
function but the resulting systems show a strong similarity to human vowel systems
with both peaking at 5 vowels. Unfortunately, for Oudeyer’s work detailed results and
statistical tests were not presented, accordingly we are unable to judge the signiﬁcance
of his claims and results against our own.
2.4 Basic agent architecture and its operation
The kind of signal grounding just described, and argued to be fundamental to human
speech and language as a fully generative system, is a feature of the multi-agent
simulation work of Oudeyer (2005c). We will take his work as the basis for extensions
aimed at producing more realistic sound systems, by deﬁning a contour space which
acts as an objective function embodying measures of both articulatory effort and
phonetic distinctiveness, broadly in line with both H&H theory (Lindblom 1990) and
dispersion-focalisation theory (Schwartz, Bo¨ e, Vallee, and Abry 1997).Chapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 16
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FIGURE 2.4: Architecture of the communicating multi-agent system, illustrated here
for two agents. Redrawn fromOudeyer (2005c, Fig. 2, p.439).
Figure 2.4 shows the basic agent architecture as used by Oudeyer (2005c) and in this
work. Each agent has an artiﬁcial ear (cochlear model), an artiﬁcial vocal tract, and in
Oudeyer’s words an artiﬁcial ‘brain’. Following Guenther and Gjaja (1996), the ‘brain’
features two coupled self-organising maps (SOMs, see Kohonen 1990) — a perceptual
map taking input from the auditory system and a motor map driving the articulatory
system. Each agent perceives sounds produced by other agents as well as by itself.
Appendix B.1.2 sets out details of the cochlear, vocal tract and neural models used
by Oudeyer (2005c), and in our replications of his work. Note that we have used the
“realistic” non-linear articulatory/acoustic mapping (Oudeyer’s Section 6.2) rather than
the “abstract” linear mapping (Oudeyer’s Section 6.1) throughout.
Our simulations use 10 agents (as compared to the 20 used by Oudeyer 2005c). But
as he says of the number of agents, “This is a noncritical parameter of the simulations
since nothing changes when we tune this parameter, except the speed of convergence
of the system” (p.443). Each ‘speaking’ agent is ‘heard’ by just one ‘listening’ agent
picked at random. Oudeyer (2005c) states that “nothing changes” (p.443) if a speaking
agent is heard by more than one listener.
Initially, each agent produces utterances as dictated by its randomly-initialised ‘brain’
and also perceives the utterances of others. This, over some iterations, causes its
SOMs to move from an unstable random conﬁguration to a stable, converged, state
of equilibrium. This process of convergence is driven by positive feedback (the basic
self-organisation mechanism of the SOM), as each agent becomes increasingly likely to
repeat the utterances that it has heard. Eventually,each SOM becomes partitioned into aChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 17
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
F
2
’
 
(
B
a
r
k
s
)
F1 (Barks)
FIGURE 2.5: Convergence of Oudeyer’s model to a ﬁve-vowel system with 10 agents,
  = 0.05 and 2,000 iterations. Each cross represents a vector in auditory space;
multiple vectors in the same region of space represent an equivalence class, or
vowel. For a given equivalence class, individual vectors frequently overlay, giving
the appearance of a single cross.
variable number of basins of attraction as the nodes cluster around points of stability—
determined by the utterances of the whole population. Any utterance which falls within
the range of one of these basins of attraction is perceived by strong activation of the
nodes around the centre point, so classifying a wide range of utterances.
The width of each SOM’s gaussian function (  in equation B.1 of Appendix B.1.3)
determines the size of the basin of attraction and, therefore, in the case of the auditory
map, the variety of stimuli perceived as the ‘same’ utterance. In Oudeyer’s simulations,
there is no dispersive force and, thus, as   increases, convergence is to a single point.
To quote Oudeyer (2005c, p.445), “if two neuron clusters ... get too close, then the
summation of tuning functions in the iterative process of coding/decoding smooths
their distribution locally and only one attractor appears.” This is not realistic behaviour
within a language. However, it is clear that, with the right parameter settings, it is
perfectly possibleto cause the emergence of a feasible, shared, multi-vowelsystem. See
for instance Figure 2.5, which depicts a typical result from our replication of Oudeyer’s
simulation. Here, 500 points initially distributed randomly in F1-F2  space, where F2 
is deﬁned as the second formant modiﬁed by the third formant, have converged to just
ﬁve clusters. In fact, in the absence of a dispersive force, the ‘clusters’ have actually
converged (almost) to overlay at the centre of their respective basin of attraction. In the
remainder of this chapter, we will introduce a dispersive force and study its effect on
convergence to linguistically-realistic vowel systems.Chapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 18
2.5 Contour spaces
In this section, we incorporate the basic ideas behind H&H theory (Lindblom 1990)
and dispersion-focalisation theory (DFT) (Schwartz, Bo¨ e, Vallee, and Abry 1997) into
our simulations. DFT encompasses more or less the same principles as H&H theory,
but is formulated in the auditory (rather than articulatory) domain. This theory seeks to
explain the formation of vowel inventories not so much in terms of energy expended
by a speaker as via competing forces of “global dispersion based on inter-vowel
distances; and local focalization, which is based on intra-vowel spectral salience”
(Schwartz, Bo¨ e, Vallee, and Abry 1997, p.255). The dispersive force thus seeks to
maintain distinctiveness between sound categories. The focalisation force in DFT is
a little harder to visualise and justify. Is is based on the ‘compactness’ of formant
frequencies, formants being the resonant frequencies of the vocal tract that correspond
to “concentration of acoustic energy, reﬂecting the way that air from the lungs vibrates
inthevocaltract, asitchangesitsshape”(Crystal1980, p.150). Theseconcentrationsof
energy are reﬂected in peaks in the frequency spectrum; the one occurring at the lowest
frequency is called the ﬁrst formant, F1; that occurring at the next highest frequency is
called the second formant, F2, and so on.
In the words of Schwartz, Bo¨ e, Vallee, and Abry (1997) (note the minor difference in
notation for formant frequencies):
“a discrimination experiment involving stimuli with various F2-F3-F4 pat-
terns ... demonstrated that patterns with the greatest formant convergence
(namely with F3 close to either F2 or F4) were more stable in auditory
memory ... while patterns with less convergence, namely with F3 at an
equal distance from both F2 and F4, were more difﬁcult to memorize
(Schwartz and Escudier 1989).” (p.259)
Schwartz, Bo¨ e, Vallee, and Abry (1997) further note, “the perceptual demonstration
that formant convergence in the F2-F3-F4 pattern produced more stable patterns in
discrimination experiments, led us to propose that formant convergence could result in
an increased ‘perceptual value’ ... because of ‘acoustic salience’” (p.259). Hence, the
focalisation force is designed to favour vowels in which the formants are close together
in frequency.Chapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 19
2.5.1 Introducing dispersive forces
In the long term, we are seeking to minimise the articulatory effort of an utterance, at
the same time maximising its perceptual distinctiveness to other agents. At this stage,
however, we have no direct way to quantify articulatory effort; hence, we address the
problem by using the established ideas of dispersion-focalisationtheory (working in the
auditory domain as opposed to the articulatory domain), as just discussed. In grounding
terms, the drive for perceptual distinctiveness is important in shaping the coupled
production-perceptual system. The higher the perceptual distinctiveness, the clearer the
meaning of the utterance. When the topological space of our self-organising maps is
augmented with dispersion based on inter-vowel differences (in addition to focalisation
based on intra-vowel attraction), we refer to it as a contour space. By introducing the
proposed contour spaces, we hope to achieve a greater robustness to parameter variation
and a greater level of realism in the vowel systems that are produced.
We now describe how a repulsive force acting on the perceptual neurons of the agent
is introduced. For each node i of the auditory map, at time t, we deﬁne an energy
functional given by
E
 
vi(t),vj(t)
 
=
N  
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j  = i
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d2
ij
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where dij =
 
 
F1i   F1j
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In equation (2.1), j is an index over all N nodes in the auditory map, vi = (F1i, F2 
i)
and similarly vj = (F1j, F2 
j). (See Appendix B.1.2 for discussion of F2 .) This
amounts to a measure of distance between the i and j vowels in the F1-F2  auditory-
map space.
Updating occurs as follows. At time t, for each neuron i in the auditory space, we
generate eight ‘test positions’ around that neuron. These are spaced on a rectangular
grid of side   centred on i. The update equation is:
vi(t + 1) = vi(t) +  vmax (2.2)
where vmax is the vk(t) vector for which the energy E (vi(t),vk(t)) is maximised, withChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 20
k being an index over the eight neighbours of vi(t), and   is a step size or learning rate.
Thus, maximisation is performed by gradient ascent. In this way, we are moving the
ith vowel in the direction that maximises the acoustic distinctiveness between it and all
other vowels in the space.
2.5.2 Attractive force: focalisation
The articulatory space is three-dimensional, deﬁned in terms of lip rounding r, tongue
position p and tongue height h. As previously discussed, focalisation in our model
follows Schwartz et al. (1997) in seeking to favour vowels with compact F2-F3-F4
formant patterns by deﬁning and minimising an energy functional.
The speciﬁc energy functional used is similar to that of Schwartz et al. (1997) (see their
equations (4) to (7)) modiﬁed to ﬁt our simulations using a self-organising map:
E
 
vl(t) = (rl, pl,hl)
 
= E12 + E23 + E34 (2.3)
where E12 = 
 
1
(F2l   F1l)2
 
E23 = 
 
1
(F3l   F2l)2
 
E34 = 
 
1
(F4l   F3l)2
 
In (2.3), each neuron l has its associated (rl, pl,hl) values, which allow computation of
formant values via the vocal tract model (Appendix B.1.1). At time t, each such neuron
has its vector vl(t) updated according to:
vl(t + 1) = vl(t) +  vmin (2.4)
where vmin is the vm(t) vector for which E (vm(t)) is minimised, m is an index over the
26 neighbours of vl(t) (on a grid of size   in 3-D space), and   is a step size or learning
rate. Hence, we are minimising by gradient descent.
Note that although this mechanism of attraction is ﬁrmly based in perception, we are in
fact minimising in (r, p,h) space. Hence, we view this as, effectively, a mechanism forChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 21
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FIGURE 2.6: Typical plot of auditory dispersion versus number of iterations, showing
convergence well before 2,000 steps.
reducing (if not actually minimising) articulatory effort in line with H&H theory.
2.6 Results of simulations
In this section, we ﬁrst show some typical illustrative results obtained using Oudeyer’s
model to act as a benchmark before presenting typical results from the new model
based on DFT. Thereafter, more thorough results (averaged over 500 runs) are
given comparing the sensitivity of the two models to variation in the gaussian width
parameter,  . The two models are also compared with respect to the emergence of
realistic vowel systems (i.e., their similarity to those observed in human languages). In
all simulations, the nodes of the self-organising maps are initially randomised, that is,
placed at uniformly-distributed positions in the appropriate space.
In these simulations, the optimisation step size,   of equations (2.2) and (2.4), is set
equal to the gaussian width,   of equation (B.1) in Appendix B.1.3, enabling all
three forces (i.e., dispersion, focalisation, self-organisation) to maintain their intended,
relative level of inﬂuence. The gaussian width in the auditory space was scaled up
to take account of the different range of the two maps [0,1]3 for the motor map and
0..8 Bark,0..15 Bark for the auditory map). All SOMs have 500 nodes, and simulations
are stopped after 2,000 iterations of two-agent interaction. This stopping criterion was
decided after examining how auditory dispersion (measured from the energy functional
of eqn. (2.1)) varied during a few trials of the simulation. Figure 2.6 depicts a typical
example. Although dispersion does not reduce monotonically, convergence is achieved
well before 2,000 iterations.Chapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 22
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(a) No convergence, with   = 0.02
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(b) Convergence to a ﬁve-vowel system, with   = 0.05
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(c) Convergence to a single point, with   = 0.1
FIGURE 2.7: Composite of typical results from our replication of Oudeyer’s simulation
as   varies.
2.6.1 Reproduction of Oudeyer’s results
We have already shown an example of how the initial model can converge to a
reasonable ﬁve-vowel system with   = 0.05 (Figure 2.5 earlier). Figure 2.7 shows a
composite of typical results as   varies. It is seen that realistic vowel systems emerge
only for a restricted range of   values.Chapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 23
2.6.2 Effect of the contour space
To assess the role of symbol grounding we will test the following null hypotheses,
returning to them in Section 2.6.4:
Hypothesis 2.6.1. We hypothesise that the addition of dispersive and focalisation forces
into the simulation will create vowel systems of a size more consistent with human
vowel spaces. We will test this by comparing the distribution of vowel system size for
many runs of the simulation against the distributions for human languages and for the
baseline (Oudeyer 2005c) model.
Hypothesis 2.6.2. We state the null hypothesisthat the introductionof signal grounding,
a computationalmodelof H&Htheory, willhave no effect on the observedaccuracy and
robustness of the self-organising vowel space simulations.
Hypothesis 2.6.3. The introduction of signal grounding, will increase the observed
realism and robustness of the self-organising vowel space simulations. We will test
this by varying the model parameters and measuring the realism of the resulting vowel
systems.
Figure 2.8 shows a composite of typical results from simulations of the new model with
contour spaces with the same   values as in Figure 2.7. As can be clearly seen, realistic
vowel systems emerge over a much wider range of   values. There is also, we think,
less tendency for the converged points to overlay exactly than in the original work (i.e.,
there is more of a ‘cluster’).
2.6.3 Further comparison of the two systems
To test further the assertion that the new system featuring dispersive forces (i.e., contour
spaces) will possess a greater robustness to parameter variation than Oudeyer’s original,
500 repeated runs were made for different values of the gaussian width  . The number
of vowels present after convergence was then recorded for both systems. If convergence
did not occur, results were discarded. Figure 2.9 shows the results averaged over the
500 runs; the error bars depict the standard deviation.
For the new system, a high level of variation in the number of vowels observed at
convergence is seen across the whole range of   values. We take this to be a positive
feature of the new system, since human languages display a wide variety of vowel
inventories (Maddieson 1984; Ladefoged and Maddieson 1996). By contrast, the
Oudeyer (2005c) system (as replicated by us) shows unrealistic convergence to a singleChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 24
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(a) Convergence to a four-vowel system, with   = 0.02
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(b) Convergence to a ﬁve-vowel system, with   = 0.05
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(c) Convergence to a ﬁve-vowel system, with   = 0.1
FIGURE 2.8: Composite of typical results from simulations of the new model with
contour spaces withthe same   values as inFigure2.7. Realistic vowel systems emerge
over a much wider range of   values.
‘vowel’ with zero variability for  > 0.07 and a total lack of convergence (to a sensibly
smallnumber of clusters) for < 0.05. Realistic convergence is maintainedfor the new
system up to parameter values of 0.15. No simulations were performed for  > 0.15.
Following Oudeyer (2005c, Figure 10, p.446), we have also compared the two
systems with data for human languages, taking vowel frequencies from Ladefoged and
Maddieson (1996). For the new computer model,   was set to 0.05 and 500 simulations
were run. Comparative data for Oudeyer’s system for the same value of   and number
of iterations were taken from his original paper, rather than the simulations beingChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 25
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FIGURE 2.9: Comparison of our replication of Oudeyer’s simulation with the new
model based on DFT, illustrating the robustness to parameter variation resulting from
inclusion of a dispersive force. Error bars are standard deviations over 500 runs.
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FIGURE 2.10: Comparison of vowel systems observed in human languages and
those produced by computer simulation with and without DFT (i.e., with and without
dispersive forces).
replicated here. Figure 2.10 shows the comparison, which reveals that the system
with contour spaces has a slight preference for simpler vowel systems but is able to
capture the emergence of the more complex systems, which is a problem for Oudeyer.
Quantitatively, the mean square error (MSE) between the vowel frequency curve for
Oudeyer’s data (labelled “without DFT”) and the human data is 91.28, whereas the
corresponding MSE for our simulations (labelled “with DFT”) is 29.94. All three
systems share a peak of ﬁve vowels. We emphasise that this comparison is made under
conditions (namely,   set at 0.05) which are maximally favourable to Oudeyer’s model.
This is necessary because of the sensitivity of his model to the setting of  .Chapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 26
2.6.4 Statistical hypothesis test
In hypothesis 2.6.1 we stated that: the introduction of signal grounding, will not
reduce the Euclidean distance between simulated and real vowel space conﬁgurations.
We ﬁnd that the Euclidean distance is reduced from 60.5 to 28.39 when comparing
the results of Oudeyer (2005c) (without signal grounding) with our own (with signal
grounding). Unfortunately, the standard deviations were not provided with Oudeyer’s
results, consequently we were unable measure their signiﬁcance.
In hypothesis 2.6.2 we stated that: the introduction of ‘Signal Grounding’, a
computational model of H&H theory, will have no effect on the observed accuracy
and robustness of the self-organising vowel space simulations. Deﬁning accuracy as the
total Euclidean distance between the simulations and human results we ﬁnd that this
distance is reduced from 21.8 to 11.2 summed over an adjustment in Gaussian width
from 0.02 to 0.15 with a signiﬁcance of   = 0.043 for a standard two tailed t-test, with
mean and standard deviation values presented in Figure 2.9. We can therefore reject
hypothesis 2.6.2 and support the alternative hypothesis 2.6.3.
2.7 Discussion and conclusions
The tension introduced by the addition of a dispersive force has clearly had a beneﬁcial
effect. This extension achieves an increased level of robustness to parameter variation
and captures the emergence of some of the more complex vowel systems observed in
human languages, in a way which Oudeyer (2005c) was unable to do. Despite a slight
preference for the simpler vowel systems, the distribution is more representative of that
seen in real languages, as conﬁrmed by the much lower mean square error (see previous
section).
How have these beneﬁcial effects come about? Bo¨ e, Schwartz, and Vall´ ee (1995) have
already shown, although not in a multi-agent setting, how DFT can produce a range
of vowel systems. (Rather, starting with a full set of vowel ‘prototypes,’ they show
how DFT can be used to select realistic subsets typical of different languages.) In the
present setting, the three forces of dispersion, focalisation and self-organisation act to
produce convergence to attractors in the contour space. These attractors correspond to
a physical grounding of the speech signals produced by the agents, as in Figure 2.2(b).
The gradual, progressive nature of the convergence, over many interactions, ensures
the ﬁnal set of signal-grounded forms is shared among the population. So the physicsChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 27
governing a population not only potentially accounts for a wide variety of human vowel
systems but also allows for this set to become established within the population.
In our work, grounding of the external world is via these attractors in contour space. So,
rather than connecting an arbitrary a priori abstraction (as when cat in the environment
is miraculously labelled cat in one bound), we are connecting a more complete
representation of the distal object, built on the physics of the situation. Through the
formation of attractors, we have both a clear shared abstraction, its centre point, and a
basin of attraction capturing the ambiguity and differences present in the real world. We
feel that this view can answer some of the current criticisms of the symbol grounding
paradigm (e.g., Lakoff 1993), just because the attractors capture the ambiguities and
‘shades of grey’ that challenge more traditional views of grounding (Davidsson 1993).
This has similarities to previous work which has sought to explain grounding using
connectionist models (e.g., Harnad 1993; Cangelosi, Greco, and Harnad 2000; Damper
and Harnad 2000). These have been successful in displaying various aspects of human
cognition. But, by considering grounding at the (sub-form) level of physical signals
(Figures 2.2(b) and 2.3), we have developed a new framework in which this interplay
between symbol grounding and connectionist systems can be further explored.
At present, agents do not exactly ‘hear’ sounds; rather, they have direct access to
formant values. From F1, F2, F3 and F4 values specifying a vocalisation, they
perceive F1 directly and compute a perceived F2 . This is a very high level of
abstraction, implicitly making many assumptions (e.g., about the role of formants in
speech perception, and how the auditory system can extract them from the speech
signal). First and foremost, therefore, this work must move to using actual sounds
as the medium of interchange between agents. This move will make it necessary to use
more physically realistic vocal tract and cochlear models and these will be detailed in
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. It is then a matter of some importance and interest to
investigate how much increased realism/complexityimpacts on the emergence of sound
systems. We know from Oudeyer (2005c) and the present work that very simple, highly
abstract models are adequate for the production of shared (static) vowel systems, but
under rather strong assumptions. Furthermore, speech sounds do not consist entirely of
vowels, but of dynamic consonant-vowel patterns forming syllables. Unfortunately,
although there is general agreement among phoneticians and speech scientists that
vowels can be reasonably well speciﬁed by formant values, there is no corresponding
understanding of how consonant sounds can be similarly speciﬁed and distinguished.
Although Oudeyer (2005b) has extended his “abstract” linear model in the direction
of “the formation of ... and patterns of sound combination” (p.328), this is doneChapter 2 Grounding symbols in the physics of speech communication 28
without any acoustic, perceptual space, but with agents given direct access to the
relevant parameters in what we believe to be an unsatisfactory (‘mind-reading’) manner.
By moving to simulations in which actual, physical speech sounds are exchanged
between agents, this thesis will now explore the emergence of speech as a dynamic
phenomenon in a more realistic and satisfactory way by ﬁrst developing a direct
measure of articulatory effort.Chapter 3
Direct measure of articulatory effort
Historically there have been a number of computational models that attempt to account
for the formation of discrete vowel inventories in human speech. Often these models
are loosely based upon H&H theory, as detailed in Chapter 1, where speakers seek
to achieve an optimum between maximum auditory distinctiveness and minimum
articulatory effort. Given the importance of energy conservation in this theory, it is
surprising that no direct measure of vocal tract muscular effort has yet been modelled.
Instead, current work attempts to capture the forces behind vowel formation within the
auditory domain alone, e.g., dispersion-focalisation theory. We believe that without a
direct measure of articulatory effort such theories will remain incomplete. This chapter
seeks to rectify this oversightby adding a muscle model to an existingarticulatory vocal
tract simulation. Equipped with this system, we advance dispersion-focalisation theory
by integrating articulatory effort into this existing approach. Our results show that the
directmodellingof articulatoryeffortresultsina widerange of plausiblevowelsystems.
Furthermore, it illustrates two subtleties within H&H theory. First, auditory dispersion
and articulatory effort are not necessarily in direct opposition to each other; certain
key vowels can produce an optimisation of both forces and secondly that articulatory
optimisation is possible within each vowel’s corresponding auditory region. Having
established the validity of this muscle model the way is now clear to study the role of
hyper- and hypo-articulation in real speech.
3.1 Overview
Despite a highly ﬂexible vocal tract, human vowel systems appear to be selected from
only a limited range of conﬁgurations. To account for this, there have been a number
29Chapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 30
of investigations into the forces behind the formation and continuing cultural evolution
of phonetic tokens. Accordingly, researchers have proposed a number of explanatory
accounts, for example Stevens’ quantal theory of speech, where articulatory stable
acoustic regions are favoured by speakers, or Lindblom’s H&H theory.
Comparing these two theories, we see that in quantal theory (Stevens 1978, 1981,
2002) speakers are driven towards regions of acoustic stability. Speciﬁcally, these
regions ensure that small changes in articulatory conﬁgurations are not reﬂected in the
speech signal, leading to a robustness in the ﬁnal utterance. Theoretically, these regions
correspond to areas of specifying invariance allowing for the perception of acoustic
cues.
Historically, these theories have been tested in a variety of ways and means and one
useful contribution has been from the ﬁeld of computational modelling (Liljencrantz
and Lindblom 1972; de Boer 2000a, 2003; Oudeyer 2005c). Using this approach,
we can simulate the forces behind a theory and observe the resulting phonetic system,
validating or refuting the initial account. In this chapter we will be continuing this
tradition by constructing a complete model of H&H theory that captures both auditory
distinctiveness and articulatory effort. The minimisation of effort is a crucial part of
H&H theory. Accordingly, this chapter will address this oversight.
Previous work has neglected the articulatory domain in favour of the auditory domain.
For example, Schwartz et al.’s (1997) dispersion-focalisationtheory concentrates on the
auditorydispersionandthe acoustic stability(or focalisation)of the utterance toaccount
for the formation of a variety of vowel systems. Focalisation captures the fact that
“convergence in the F2–F3–F4 pattern produced more stable patterns in discrimination
experiments” (p.259), this lead to the conclusion that utterances with high focalisation
would have greater acoustic salience, and accordingly, robustness to interference. By
varying the emphasis on dispersion and stability a variety of vowel conﬁgurations
emerge. We argue that although this is a reasonable ﬁrst step, the role of articulation
cannot be discounted.
In the work of Schwartz et al., analysis of the speech signal is used as a replacement
for Lindblom, MacNeilage, and Studdert-Kennedy’s notion of articulatory effort. In
addition to abstracting away from this fundamental motivating force, both quantal
theory (Stevens 2002) and Lindblom’s (1998) own work also hypothesise that there
are regions of acoustic output that remain stable despite articulatory variation providing
regions of articulatory optimisation distinct from the auditory signal. Therefore, to
complement signal-based measurements of stability we require an accurate measure of
articulatory effort to capture three key phenomena: the weighting between effort andChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 31
distinctiveness, articulatory optimisation within quantal regions and the discovery of
local optima where these two forces are not necessarily in opposition to each other. We
will now consider each of these points in turn.
3.1.1 Weighting effort and distinctiveness
Schwartz et al. contend that the variety of observed human vowel systems could
have arisen through different weightings on dispersion and focalisation. Varying the
emphasis on one or the other leads to either an increasingly dispersed or increasingly
compact solution. We will take a similar approach and assess the effect of different
weightings on effort and dispersion. In doing so, however, we are mindful that we are
abstracting away from a complex interplay between cultural and individual timescales.
Aside from the glossogenetic ﬁxing of parameters, the individual themselves will place
varying emphasis on effort and dispersion in their daily use of language, compensating
for ambient noise and the perceptual abilities of the listener. Abstracting away from
the cumulative effect of these day-to-day decisions is an unfotunate reality of this
simulation.
3.1.2 Optimising quantal regions
In accordance with Stevens (2002), we agree that there are quantal, acoustically stable
regions but we believe that the interplay between perceptual contrast and articulatory
effort forms the main motivation for the creation of vowel inventories. This is in
opposition to the tenet of quantal theory, which postulates acoustic stability as the
main driving force. We propose that within these acoustically stable regions there
remains a motivation to minimise articulatory effort and the presence of these quantal
regions drives the theoretical need for an anatomical, articulatory effort function. By
constructing a system that directly measures the effort of vocal tract motion, we hope
that our new model of speech sound emergence will obtain a greater degree of realism
as we are no longer inferring effort indirectly from the auditory signal.
Previous attempts to capture articulatory effort have been hampered by an inability to
simulate the effort expended by human muscle. However, thanks to a combination of
research (Cook 1993; Umberger, Karin, and Philip 2003; Lucero, Maciel, Johns, and
Munhall 2005) developing muscle models and mapping out the structure of the vocal
tract and facial musculature, the time is right to make an initial attempt at the simulation
of articulatory effort. Once this approach has been established we can explore a numberChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 32
of previously inaccessible subtleties within H&H theory, for example co-articulation
and syllable formation.
3.1.3 Finding local optima
At the individual timescale, there is an implicit assumption that the two forces of
H&H theory are in direct opposition to each other. In the daily use of a language,
speakers compensate for ambient noise by over-articulating, requiring greater effort to
enable the perception of vowelsthathave been already establishedby cultural evolution.
However, when we consider the cultural timescale, the conﬁguration of the vowel space
becomes pliable. Freed from the necessity of over-articulating ﬁxed vowels, the two
forces of H&H theory are no longer in direct opposition to each other. The ability to
reconﬁgure the vowel space enables the discovery of candidate vowels that satisfy the
requirements of both effort and dispersion. We propose that by ﬁnding the same vowels
across multiple conﬁgurations, we can identify the regions of local optima that satisfy
these constraints.
3.2 Capturing effort and dispersion
This chapter’s computational model consists of two parts: a conﬁguration of muscles
attached tothe articulatoryparameters of thevocal tract anda neural modeltoenable the
vocal tract to produce the desired formant values for each candidate vowel. By moving
the vocal tract from a neutral position into the required conﬁguration, a measure of
effort can be obtained.
3.2.1 Hill’s muscle model
To developa measure of articulatory effort, we willuse the muscle modelof Hill (1938).
Widely considered as the most accurate model of energy expended by skeletal muscle,
it captures a number of essential features. These include an accurate measure of the heat
of shortening, the role of the fast twitch and slow twitch muscle ﬁbres and, of course,
the muscular composition of the vocal tract.
These muscle models have been used in a variety of work ranging from estimating
dinosaur running speeds (Sellers and Manning 2007) to simulations of bipedal
locomotion (Nagano, Umberger, Marzke, and Gerritsen 2005). There have also beenChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 33
a number of adaptations and improvements to the Hill muscle model (Lichtwark and
Wilson 2005) but we feel that our current level of abstraction, derived from Umberger,
Karin, and Philip (2003), is sufﬁcient for this initial work. For details of Umberger,
Karin, and Philip’s muscle model, see Appendix B.3.
To proceed we need to capture the ‘stylised’ physical constraints of the vocal tract. Any
physically possible articulatory gesture should be possible in our model. At the same
time, any physically impossible gesture needs to be disallowed.
One way of doing this is to create an anatomically accurate model of the vocal tract.
When this model produces utterances, there are no preconceptions about their nature
and any resulting sounds that occur through the manipulation of various vocal tract
components. This gives us two advantages; ﬁrst, there are no signal abstractions to
undermine the model; and second, real speech-like utterances are produced, ensuring
that the validity of any associated auditory system can be maintained.
Accordingly, a number of existing vocal tract models become worthy of consideration
(Mermelstein 1973; Maeda 1982b; Maeda 1982a; Cook 1993; de Boer 1999). Cook’s
model is capable of producing a wide range of utterances; examples can be heard at
http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/ simon/samples/. It forms a uniﬁed model
of both the vocal tract and nasal tract idealised as an abstract set of ﬁlters. Eight control
parameters then adjust the vocal tract shape to determine the acoustic output from a
glottalpulse. Similararticulatorymodelshavebeenusedbeforeinthestudyofemergent
phonology, e.g., Oudeyer (2002) has used this approach to model the emergence of
syllable systems within a multi-agent framework. We will be taking a similar agent-
system approach in later chapters but will be focussing on speciﬁc phonetic theories
instead.
We should not delude ourselves that these models represent a perfect reproduction of
the human vocal tract. Faundez-Zanuy and McLaughlin (2002) illustrate a number of
problems when deﬁning an accurate model of the airﬂow within the vocal tract and this
leads to a call for greater accuracy in synthesis. However, to be useful, a balance has to
be struck between accuracy and computational efﬁciency.
Previous work (Sanguineti, Laboissiere, and Ostry 1998) details the various muscle
groupsandtheirroleinspeech production,see Table 3.1. These groupshavebeen linked
to the control parameters of the existing vocal tract model. Missing values that are
required to calculated muscle energy expenditure have then been obtained from other
sources (Sanguineti, Laboissiere, and Payan 1997), whereas the muscular properties of
the lips were obtained from Lucero and Munhall (1999). By coupling this new muscleChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 34
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FIGURE 3.1: Auditory spectrograms of a sample of vowels produced by a combination
of the articulatory vocal tract andGuenther’s neural model, with CF corresponding to
a particular ‘centre’ frequency. In each case the model has captured the appropriate
formant values.
model with our artiﬁcial vocal tract, we can determine the muscular effort required to
generate each phoneme from a neutral initial position.
3.2.2 Guenther’s neural model
Reproduced from Guenther (1995), the abilities of the controlling neural model have
been demonstrated in a number of publications (Guenther and Gjaja 1996; Guenther
2004). After a babbling phase in which a phonetic-to-orosensory mapping is acquired,
the systemthenlearns the appropriate vocal tract conﬁgurationfor each candidate vowel
in the auditory space. In Figure 3.1 we present a sample of the vowels produced by the
vocal tract after training on the auditory prototypes presented in Figure 3.2. In training
we followed the details in Guenther (1995). In accordance with Guenther’s work the
formant values for each vowel were obtained succesfully, forming valid articulatory
prototypes for our effort calculations. Each of the vowels in Figure 3.1 has been plotted
on a spectrogram produced by Lyon’s cochlear model, the details of which can be found
in Chapter 4.Chapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 35
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
M
u
s
c
l
e
F
m
a
x
(
N
)
 
(
N
/
m
)
m
(
k
g
)
A
c
t
i
o
n
T
o
n
g
u
e
b
o
d
y
G
e
n
i
o
g
l
o
s
s
u
s
6
7
.
8
0
0
.
1
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
e
s
t
h
e
t
o
n
g
u
e
H
y
o
g
l
o
s
s
u
s
6
5
.
1
0
0
.
1
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
e
s
t
h
e
t
o
n
g
u
e
S
t
y
l
o
g
l
o
s
s
u
s
2
4
.
2
0
0
.
1
R
e
t
r
a
c
t
s
a
n
d
e
l
e
v
a
t
e
s
t
h
e
t
o
n
g
u
e
T
o
n
g
u
e
t
i
p
S
u
p
e
r
i
o
r
l
o
n
g
i
t
u
d
i
n
a
l
i
s
1
4
.
3
0
0
R
a
i
s
e
s
t
h
e
t
i
p
I
n
f
e
r
i
o
r
l
o
n
g
i
t
u
d
i
n
a
l
i
s
1
9
.
4
0
0
L
o
w
e
r
s
t
h
e
t
i
p
V
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
i
s
1
4
.
5
0
0
F
l
a
t
t
e
n
s
t
h
e
t
i
p
J
a
w
J
a
w
o
p
e
n
e
r
1
1
5
3
4
.
7
1
L
o
w
e
r
s
j
a
w
J
a
w
c
l
o
s
e
r
6
3
9
1
9
2
1
R
a
i
s
e
s
j
a
w
H
y
o
i
d
M
y
l
o
h
y
o
i
d
4
0
.
9
3
2
.
2
0
.
1
R
a
i
s
e
s
h
y
o
i
d
H
y
o
i
d
/
l
a
r
y
n
x
T
h
y
r
o
h
y
o
i
d
2
8
.
7
8
.
6
5
0
.
1
L
o
w
e
r
s
h
y
o
i
d
/
e
l
e
v
a
t
e
s
l
a
r
y
n
x
S
t
e
r
n
o
h
y
o
i
d
2
8
.
7
8
.
6
5
0
.
1
L
o
w
e
r
s
h
y
o
i
d
a
n
d
l
a
r
y
n
x
S
t
e
r
n
o
t
h
y
r
o
i
d
2
8
.
7
8
.
6
5
0
.
1
L
o
w
e
r
s
l
a
r
y
n
x
L
i
p
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
/
p
r
o
t
u
s
i
o
n
Z
y
g
o
m
a
t
i
c
m
a
j
o
r
0
.
0
0
0
1
7
3
0
.
0
0
0
1
7
3
0
R
a
i
s
e
s
u
p
p
e
r
l
i
p
L
e
v
a
t
o
r
l
a
b
i
i
s
u
p
e
r
i
o
r
i
s
0
.
0
0
0
3
8
9
2
5
0
.
0
0
0
2
5
9
5
0
R
a
i
s
e
s
u
p
p
e
r
l
i
p
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
o
r
a
n
g
u
l
i
o
r
i
s
0
.
0
0
2
7
6
8
0
.
0
0
0
6
9
2
0
0
L
o
w
e
r
s
b
o
t
t
o
m
l
i
p
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
o
r
l
a
b
b
i
i
n
f
e
r
i
o
r
i
s
0
.
0
0
0
2
0
9
3
3
0
.
0
0
0
1
9
0
3
0
L
o
w
e
r
s
b
o
t
t
o
m
l
i
p
M
e
n
t
a
l
i
s
0
.
0
0
0
0
8
4
7
7
0
.
0
0
0
1
2
1
1
0
P
r
o
t
u
d
e
s
L
o
w
e
r
l
i
p
L
e
v
a
t
o
r
a
n
g
u
l
i
o
r
i
s
0
.
0
0
0
1
7
3
0
0
.
0
0
0
1
7
3
0
0
R
a
i
s
e
s
c
o
r
n
e
r
s
o
f
u
p
p
e
r
L
i
p
O
r
b
i
c
u
l
a
r
i
s
o
r
i
s
s
u
p
e
r
i
o
r
0
.
0
0
6
2
2
8
0
.
0
0
1
0
3
8
0
0
P
r
o
t
u
d
e
s
l
i
p
s
O
r
b
i
c
u
l
a
r
i
s
o
r
i
s
i
n
f
e
r
i
o
r
0
.
0
0
6
2
2
8
0
.
0
0
1
0
3
8
0
0
P
r
o
t
u
d
e
s
l
i
p
s
T
A
B
L
E
3
.
1
:
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
m
u
s
c
l
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
v
o
c
a
l
t
r
a
c
t
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
r
r
o
l
e
i
n
s
p
e
e
c
h
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
.
F
m
a
x
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
t
h
e
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
e
x
e
r
t
e
d
f
o
r
c
e
,
 
t
h
e
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
m
u
s
c
l
e
a
n
d
m
t
h
e
m
a
s
s
.
V
a
l
u
e
s
w
e
r
e
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
f
r
o
m
(
S
a
n
g
u
i
n
e
t
i
,
L
a
b
o
i
s
s
i
e
r
e
,
a
n
d
O
s
t
r
y
1
9
9
8
)
a
n
d
(
L
u
c
e
r
o
a
n
d
M
u
n
h
a
l
l
1
9
9
9
)
.Chapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 36
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
F1
(barks)
F 
2 (barks)
i y V1 u
Y m m
e o
‘e’ ‘ ’‘ ’ V2 ‘o’
œ
æ m
al
a
FIGURE 3.2: Plotted from data obtained from Schwartz et al., a wide number of
candidates provide coverage of the space of possible vowels. Expanding on data from
the IPA, candidate auditory prototypes were selected to provide adequate coverage of
the vowel space.
3.3 Applying the model to H&H theory
Having constructed the system, we will now test whether it suitable for inclusion in our
ﬁnal agent system. For this to be the case, our muscle model must capture the effort of
production for each articulatory prototype. Due to the novelty of this approach we are
unable to make a direct comparison to recorded effort measurements. Accordingly, we
will conduct two indirect tests. In Section 3.3.2, we will compare the simulated vowels
systems to recorded human data and in Section 3.3.1 we will measure the effect on
the vowel space of an increasing emphasis on effort. Accordingly, we will ﬁrst adjust
the weighting on effort and dispersion and judge the extent to which plausible vowel
systems emerge by judging them against the observed human vowel systems. Second,
we will directly compare the effects of focalisation and effort by measuring the total
Euclidean distance among all vowels within the vowel space under different parameter
settings. If the Euclidean distance reduces with greater emphasis on effort it is clear that
we have captured some aspect of the opposing forces within H&H theory.
3.3.1 Developing emergent vowel systems
Having established the need for a new approach to the modelling of articulatory
constraints and by constructing a muscle model to extend the selected vocal tract, weChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 37
can now seek to study directly the conﬂict between maximum auditory distinctiveness
and minimum articulatory effort. In testing this model, we will establish optimal vowel
systems, for a lexicon of a given size. This will allow for a direct comparison with
human vowel systems and previous modelling approaches.
Deﬁning each vowel according to its formant values, we can see in Figure 3.2 a number
of auditory prototypes that provide complete coverage of the vowel triangle. These
auditory prototypes then form the training data for the articulatory prototypes that we
then use to calculate the effort of production. Having been reproduced from Schwartz
et al., some of the notation is inconsistent with the IPA and certain vowels (V1, V2)
cannot be found in normal speech but have been created for the sake of completeness.
Then by generating the effort of production for each, we have a number of candidates
that can be used to form a range of vowel systems. The auditory distance between each
pair of these candidates V i(F1i, F2i, F3i) and V j(F1j, F2j, F3j) is determined,
according to Schwartz et al., by:
dij =
 
(F1i   F1j)2 +  2(F2 ,i   F2 ,j)2
 1
2
(3.1)
where   represents an adjustable weight in the model and F2  is computed from the
method put forward by Carlson, Fant, and Granstr¨ om (1975). The ﬁnal systems are
then formed by altering the emphasis on auditory dispersion and articulatory effort by
adjusting   and  , according to:
EDF = ED +  EE (3.2)
with 0       1 weighting the emphasis on the dispersion term and 0       1 deﬁning
the effort term 1. Dispersion is then calculated according to:
ED =
n 1  
i=1
n  
j=(i+1)
 
1
dij
 2
(3.3)
whereas articulatory effort is generated by the articulatory muscle model.
By directly measuring the effort of producing each phoneme from a neutral vocal tract
position, we can see the relative effort of each. We observe that with the exception
1Although EDF = (1  )ED+ EE might be more appropriate,we decided to maintain consistency
with Schwartz et al.’s original workChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 38
Formant frequencies in Bark
Vowel F1 F 
2 F3 F4 F 
2 EF EE.
i 2.90 13.56 15.82 16.81 16.15 1225 10.5
y 2.90 12.68 13.63 16.81 13.00 1217 3.1
2.90 11.10 13.86 16.81 11.85 261 7.7
2.90 9.70 14.40 16.81 9.70 239 19.9
V1 2.90 7.55 14.29 16.81 7.55 226 10.4
u 2.90 5.40 14.18 16.81 5.40 318 2.7
3.55 13.44 14.82 16.81 13.90 788 9.0
Y 3.55 12.09 13.63 16.81 12.60 534 9.2
m 3.55 11.04 14.09 16.81 11.60 261 9.0
m 3.55 9.75 14.40 16.81 9.75 239 19.9
3.55 6.05 14.16 16.81 6.05 318 18.1
e 4.20 13.11 14.58 16.81 13.60 676 9.7
4.20 11.46 13.69 16.81 12.20 323 3.8
4.20 11.08 14.40 16.81 11.35 284 6.7
4.20 9.80 14.40 16.81 9.80 251 13.4
o 4.20 6.70 14.14 16.81 6.70 318 13.9
‘e’ 4.85 12.65 14.61 16.81 13.30 483 5.7
‘ ’ 4.85 10.98 14.41 16.81 11.10 285 1.1
‘ ’ 4.85 9.85 14.40 16.81 9.85 260 4.5
V2 4.85 8.60 14.26 16.81 8.60 256 7.2
‘o’ 4.85 8.60 14.26 16.81 8.60 318 12.0
5.50 12.27 14.47 16.81 13.00 411 7.0
œ 5.50 11.10 14.40 16.81 11.40 296 7.2
5.50 10.85 14.40 16.81 10.85 286 12.0
5.50 9.90 14.40 16.81 9.90 273 5.4
5.50 8.00 14.04 16.81 8.00 318 9.9
æ 6.15 11.87 14.37 16.81 12.70 359 6.4
6.15 10.60 14.40 16.81 10.60 292 8.2
m 6.15 8.65 14.40 16.81 8.65 318 5.0
al 6.80 11.00 14.50 16.81 11.00 326 13.5
6.80 10.00 14.40 16.81 10.00 321 8.6
6.80 9.30 13.77 16.81 9.30 318 5.0
a 7.25 9.75 14.40 16.81 9.75 336 5.6
TABLE 3.2: Vowel acoustic prototypes. Formats F1, F2, F3, F4 in Hz and in Bark,
second perceptual formant F 
2 in Bark, and individual focalisation costs EF for   = 1.
See Schwartz et al. (1997) for details of vowels not from the IPA.Chapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 39
of ‘schwa’ and /o/, the central vowels require a greater degree of exertion to produce.
Similarly, the vowels with higher F 
2 require less effort than vowels with lower F 
2.
Accordingly, we would expect the emergent vowel systems to favour peripheral vowels
even without an emphasis on auditory dispersion. The one anomaly that would lead to
a preference for a more central vowel is where /i/ requires slightly more effort than /y/.
Table 3.2 displays the formant values generated by the vocal tract, the individual
focalisation costs, EF, and the individual energy costs, EE. Taken from Bo¨ e, Schwartz,
and Vall´ ee (1995), these formant values form the targets that the vocal tract needs
to produce from a neutral initial vocal tract conﬁguration. Using the neural network
detailed in Guenter, Husain, Cohen, and Shin-Cunningham (1999), the model acquired
the mapping between articulatory gesture and resulting formant frequencies. Having
reproduced these vowel sounds using our vocal tract model, we were able to calculate
the required effort and by changing the emphasis placed on articulatory effort and
auditory distinctiveness we caused various vowel systems to emerge.
Systematically, we can use this variation to test the following null hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3.3.1. We hypothesise that the introduction of a model of articulatory effort
will not improve the realism of the observed vowel spaces. Speciﬁcally, we will test
this by comparing the conﬁguration of the resulting vowel spaces with and without the
addition of articulatory effort.
Hypothesis3.3.2. Totest the validityof H&Htheory we hypothesisthatthe introduction
of a model of articulatory effort will not reduce the level of auditory dispersion. This
will allow for further study of the interactions between articulatory effort and auditory
distinctiveness.
Hypothesis 3.3.3. The introduction of a model of articulatory effort will not introduce
a number of persistent local optima across vowel conﬁgurations. The presence of
local optima would suggest that articulatory effort and auditory dispersion are not
nesssecarily in direct oppisition to each other.
By varying the parameters governing the relative weight of effort and dispersion, in
the range [0–1], we can compare the frequency of occurrence of artiﬁcial vowel spaces
with human vowel spaces. Because of some extreme vowel system conﬁgurations, for
example, extreme emphasis on effort instead of dispersion or vice versa, coupled with
effort being measured without consideration of co-articulation within a syllable system,
we did not expect our emergent vowel systems to match perfectly with observed human
vowel systems. However, the model does display certain similarities to human vowel
inventories. For example, the two most frequent artiﬁcial seven-vowel systems match
the ﬁrst and second most frequent human vowel systems.Chapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 40
Number of Vowels Common Vowel Systems and Frequency of Occurrences (%)
3 Human 100
Simulation 57 26 17
4 Human 56 20 16 8
Simulation 32 28 24 8
5 Human 97 3
Simulation 32 12 12 8
6 Human 48 22 22 7
Simulation 36 12 12 12 12
7 Human 53 14 12 10 7
Simulation 20 16 16 12
TABLE 3.3: A comparison of human and simulated vowel systems, obtained from the
UCLA Phonological Segment Inventory Database (UPSID). Each of these simpliﬁed
vowel spaces corresponds to the auditory prototypes presented in Figure3.2. For
clarity, central vowels are represented as white dots and vowels on the edge are black.Chapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 41
Clearly there are other factors that determine vowel formation and, as with any model,
the difference between abstraction and reality is apparent. That is not to say that this
model does not serve any purpose. By capturing the fundamentals of H&H theory, we
have illustrated itsplausibilityas an account of vowel system formation. Furthermore, it
is clear that even with a high emphasis on minimising articulatory effort, systems with
a high level of auditory dispersion still form suggesting the presence of local optima
where effort and dispersion are not in direct opposition. For example, certain vowels on
the periphery of the auditory triangle require a relatively low energy to produce.
Looking in detail at Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2, certain features are worthy of note. We
have to ask why in the fairly simple three-vowel system /i/ is consistently ignored in
favour of /y/ in our model. As /y/ requires less effort to produce, as shown in Table 3.3,
we would expect it to be favoured in human vowel systems. This could be caused by
a number of factors that are removed in the abstraction of our model. For example,
we have not considered the articulatory effort of our vowel systems under conditions of
co-articulation. Additionally the notion of acoustic or articulatory robustness has not
been taken into account. It could be that /i/ can be produced and perceived consistently
under a variety of conditions, whereas /y/ is more likely to deteriorate when faced with
a noisy environment.
Clearly certain features, such as the clustering in the top left of more complex vowel
systems, are a result of effort optimisation taking precedence over auditory dispersion.
It is, however, interesting to note the extent to which this happens in both human and
simulated systems. It seems that the introduction of central vowels, for example in
the ﬁve and six vowel system, can cause the peripheral vowels to be pushed into the
corner to maximise the level of auditory distinction. This ‘central vowel pressure’ is
absent in the simpler vowel systemscausing the ﬁnal conﬁguration to drift from /i/ to /y/
as the considered optimum, suggesting that in many cases auditory dispersion takes
precedence over articulatory effort.
In hypothesis 3.3.1 we stated the null position that: the introduction of a model of
articulatory effort will not improve the realism of the observed vowel spaces. To test
this statement we have deﬁned realism as the Euclidean distance between the simulated
and human vowel spaces. We ﬁnd that the introduction of an effort factor to DFT
reduces the Euclidean distance from 4.67 to 4.09, averaged across F1 and F 
2 and all
weightings of the various simulated forces.
In hypothesis 3.3.2 we stated that: the introduction of a model of articulatory effort will
not reduce the level of auditory dispersion. We have deﬁned auditory dispersion as the
level of variance within the auditory space and found that the introduction of an effortChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 42
factor reduced the level of variance from 8.95 to 6.99.
In hypothesis 3.3.3 we stated that the: introduction of a model of articulatory effort
will not introduce a number of persistent local optima across vowel conﬁgurations.
Analysis of the data reveals that the total Euclidean distance, between vowel spaces
across parameter variation, is reduced from 641.9 to 607.3 when an effort function is
introduced. Additionally, subjective assessment of the data reveals that certain vowels,
e.g., /y/ persist as the weightings on various parameters change.
In all cases no variance measures were taken and no signiﬁcance tests performed as the
model is deterministic with respect to parameter variation. In spite of this, we believe it
is reasonable to reject hull hypotheses 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
3.3.2 Comparing effort and focalisation
To compare effort and focalisation, we deﬁne focalisation as follows:
EF =  (E12 + E23 + E34) (3.4)
E12 =
 
i···1
1
(Fi
2   Fi
1)2 (3.5)
E23 =
 
i···1
1
(Fi
3   Fi
2)2 (3.6)
E34 =
 
i···1
1
(Fi
4   Fi
3)2 (3.7)
where   determines the level of emphasis on focalisation and i represents each
candidate vowel in the space.
In Figure 3.3 we present the resulting Euclidean distance within a vowel space under
different parameter conﬁgurations in order to gain a clearer picture of the forces at
work within H&H theory. For example, Figure 3.3(a) shows that an increased emphasis
on articulatory effort causes a decrease in the dispersion of the ﬁnal vowel systems.
This effect seems to disappear when our effort function is replaced by Schwartz et al.’s
focalisation function, i.e., Figure 3.3(b). Note that this effect is not dramatic, when
all of the emphasis is placed on minimising effort, the level of dispersion does not
drop to zero. This is because, within vowel systems, dispersion and effort are not
necessarily directly opposed to each other and it is clearly possible to ﬁnd an optimumChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 43
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(a) The effect of effort and dispersion on vowel inventories
(  represents effort and   represents dispersion).
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(b) The effect of dispersion and focalisation (  represents
focalisation and   represents dispersion).
FIGURE 3.3: Both ﬁgures show the effect of varying parameters ( , , ) on the
resulting Euclidean distance within the vowel space – deﬁned as the total distance
between vowels. Clearly an increasing level of effort leads to a reduced total euclidean
distance between vowels within the auditory space.
point for both. This suggests that other forces are at play to account for the level of
variation amongst human vowel systems. Potentially, the role of co-articulation and the
interaction of an entire phonetic lexicon can account for the variation witnessed within
vowel systems. Now that we are equipped with this plausible articulatory model, we
are able to investigate these phenomena in future work.
A slight drop in distance as the level of dispersion increases can be seen with or without
the focalisationparameter inFigure 3.3(b). However,in both cases it isnot large enough
to be signiﬁcant. This suggests that although the focalisation of a vowel might have a
role to play within the auditory system, it is not useful when attempting to infer the
effort of an utterance, justifying the need for a direct measure of articulatory effort
when constructing these models.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have argued for the necessity of a direct simulation of articulatory
effort when modelling phonetic theories like H&H. We have constructed a plausible
vocal tract muscle model based upon established work from existing muscle models,
and facial modelling. The utility of this model has then been underlined by the
emergence of a number of plausible vowel systems. These have raised a number of
interesting points within H&H theory and illustrated the fact that only by combining a
direct measure of articulatory effort with a model of an entire phonetic inventory can aChapter 3 Direct measure of articulatory effort 44
complete account of H&H theory be rendered.
This complete account shows that articulatory effort and auditory dispersion are not
necessarily in direct opposition to each other. Given that the resulting vowel systems do
not entirely match existing human systems, we can also conclude that other factors are
at work in their ﬁnal formation.
We believe that the work reported in this chapter has captured two key features. First,
we have demonstrated that this articulatory model is capable of producing speech and
calculating the effort behind each utterance. This will become crucial in later chapters.
Second, the persistence of certain key vowels across a variety of conﬁgurations suggests
the presence of local optima within the auditory/articulatory space deﬁned by H&H
theory.
The decrease in the auditory distance of the vowel systemgivenan increasing weighting
of articulatory effort and the similarity to the DFT results (Schwartz et al. 1997)
establishes that our method of an anatomical vocal tract coupled with a muscle model is
a valid approach, suitable for further experimentation. We are constrained only by what
is physically possible and only motivated by the desire to reduce articulatory effort in
accordance with H&H theory.
An additional advantage of directly considering articulatory effort is the fact that we
can now consider the selection of consonants and, ultimately, the formation of syllable
structures. Work by Huckvale and Howard (2005) is encouraging in this regard as it
demonstrates that an artiﬁcial vocal tract can learn to imitate stop consonants. However,
this is only possible if we are able to obtain a measure of consonant distinctiveness
and we will be approaching this challenge in future work. Having investigated the
production of speech we will now turn our attention to the perception of speech by
investigating the role and importance of the peripheral auditory system.
It is clear however that for both DFT and our own approach, it is not sufﬁcient to simply
project H&H, which has been found to be operating at the time scale of an individual,
onto a cultural level. Rather, we propose that H&H theory does have an effect on the
evolution of language but that this effect is expressed through a complex interaction
between phylogeny, ontogeny and glossogeny.
By developing both production and perceptual models we can eventually return, in
Chapter 5, to the population models proposed by Oudeyer. By marrying these systems
to detailed phonetic considerations, we hope to gain new insights into the cultural
evolution of speech.Chapter 4
Interaction of place and voicing in the
perception of initial stops
Having considered the role of articulatory effort in our population models we will now
turn to the auditory system. We will argue that the mapping from signal to perception
is far from trivial and illustrate this point by studying the role of the peripheral auditory
system on the perception of initial stops. At this stage, we will consider a single
individual agent as a step on the way to a ﬁnal population model.
Extensive work on the perception of syllable-initial English stops over many years
has established, in the words of Patricia Kuhl, an “unexplained perceptual interaction
between ... voicing and place” (Kuhl 1988), in that the boundary between voiced
and unvoiced token categories shifts systematically with place of articulation. In the
same vein, Terry Nearey refers to stop consonant identiﬁcation as a “long-standing
perceptual puzzle” (Nearey 1997). Putative explanations of this phenomenon include
an aeroacoustic account based on the inertia of the articulators involved, and the
notion that the effect is an essentially uninteresting artifact of the particular (synthetic)
stimuli used. In this chapter, we present a computational auditory/neural model of
the perception of syllable-initial stops that replicates the observed interaction between
place and voicing for two series of stimuli: one synthetic and the other real speech.
Results with real speech are interpreted as denying that the effect is artifactual. One
outstandingly advantageous aspect of computational modelling as an experimental
paradigm in phonetics research is that the software model can be easily modiﬁed to
explore and understand each stage of the perceptual process, in a way that is simply
not possible with human or animal subjects. Analysis of the model developed here
(by varying its component parts) leads to an explanation of voicing/place interaction
in terms of localisation of auditory nerve activity at a particular low-frequency
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region near the consonant-vowel border. This is argued to be more satisfying than
an aeroacoustic ‘explanation’, since the latter must assume that ‘perception follows
production’ in some sense.
4.1 Overview
In the middle part of the last century, researchers at Haskins Laboratories started to
develop a highly distinctive, gesturally-oriented approach to the scientiﬁc study of
speech perception to set againstthe more engineering-oriented work at Bell Telephones:
see Liberman (1996) for personal, ﬁrst-hand recollections of the history of this work.
One particular—and, as it turned out, controversial—thread was the prominence given
to so-called categorical perception (CP) and the ‘motor theory’ put forward to explain
it. The experimental study of CP was especially inﬂuenced by the series of stimuli
developed by Lisker and Abramson (1970), in which the voice onset time (VOT) of
synthetic syllable-initial stops was varied. As stated by Lisker (1986), these stimuli
have been extensively used in speech perception studies over many years (Lisker 1975;
Kuhl and Miller 1978; Lisker 1986; Soli 1983) as well as in subsequent modelling
work (Damper, Pont, and Elenius 1990; Darling, Huckvale, Rosen, and Faulkner 1992;
Damper 1997; Damper, Gunn, and Gore 2000; Damper and Harnad 2000).
Early work at Haskins Labs. by Liberman and colleagues (Liberman, Harris, Hoffman,
and Grifﬁth 1957; Liberman, Delattre, and Cooper 1958; Liberman, Cooper,
Shankweiler, and Studdert-Kennedy 1967) showed that English-speaking human
listeners categorised synthetic initial stops varying in VOT into voiced and unvoiced
classes. This categorisation was seen at the time as something of a ‘violation’ of
known perceptual laws (cf. Weber’s law) calling for a special explanation. This was
one of several lines of thought leading to the “speech is special” theoretical position
with which the Haskins researchers have long been associated. An important ﬁnding
of Liberman, Delattre, and Cooper (1958) was that the voicing boundary between the
two classes depended systematically on place of articulation. In subsequent work,
Lisker and Abramson (1970) found that, as the place of articulation moves back in the
vocal tract from bilabial (for a /ba–pa/ VOT ‘continuum’) through alveolar (/da–ta/) to
velar (/ga–ka/), so the boundary moves from about 25ms VOT through about 35ms
to approximately 42ms. Why this should happen is uncertain. For instance, Kuhl
(1987, p.365) writes that “we simply do not know why the boundary ‘moves’” and
refers to this as “an unexplained perceptual interaction between ... voicing and place”
(Kuhl 1988, p.33). In the same vein, Nearey (1997, p.3251) refers to stop consonantChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 47
identiﬁcation as a “long-standing perceptual puzzle”.
Putative explanations of this ‘puzzle’ include an aeroacoustic account based on the
inertia of the articulators involved, and the notion that the effect is an essentially
uninteresting artifact of the particular Lisker and Abramson stimuli used. However, as
expanded in the remainder of chapter, we lean towards an account based on general
auditory mechanisms, and contra the “speech is special” thesis. As MacWhinney
(1998) writes: “It now appears that the ability to discriminate the sounds of language
is grounded on raw perceptual abilities of the mammalian auditory system” (p.202).
This position is consistent with the arguments of a number of inﬂuential and respected
speech scientists (Kuhl and Miller 1978; Kuhl 1988; Diehl and Kluender 1989;
Sussman, McCaffrey, and Matthews 1991; Kingston and Diehl 1994; Ohala 1996).
Yet there is a difﬁculty inherent in attempting such an account. In the words
of Summerﬁeld (1982, p.51): “... the relationship between acoustical structure
and perceived phonetic structure is complex and not obviously explained by known
properties of the mammalian auditory system.”
How then are we to proceed? We believe that valuable insights into this complex
relationship can be obtained by building computer models of the auditory system,
and studying their ability to replicate perceptual data. Indeed, Kirby (2002, p.185)
has written: “Computational simulation, informed by theoretical linguistics, is an
appropriate response to the challenge of explaining real linguistic data in terms of
processes that underpin human language”. As stated by Kuhl and Miller (1978, p.906):
“Ideally, [one would like] experimental methods that somehow allow one to intervene
at various stages of the processing of sound to observe the restructuring of information
that has occurred at each stage.”
Traditional experimental methods based on human or animal psychophysics and
neurophysiological investigations using animal models fall well short of this ideal. By
contrast, the very nature of software means that a computationalmodelbased on general
auditory principles, and which proves capable of replicating the data of interest, can be
interrogated at “various stages of the processing of sound” to discover its operating
principles. Additionally, or alternatively, we can simplify or exclude component parts
of the model in order to discover the part that they play in “the restructuring of
information”.
Hence, the approach taken in this chapter is to build a computational auditory/neural
model of the categorical perception of syllable-initial stops. We show that this model
is able to replicate the observed interaction between place and voicing (i.e., the
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stimuli. It follows that an explanation of the natural phenomenon of boundary shift
need be no more complicated than the model itself. It is important to emphasise
that the model is not designed to replicate the data. Rather, it is designed to
embody basic principles of auditory function; the replication of the boundary-shift
phenomenonis consequential, followingtraining on example stimulifrom end-pointsof
the voiced/unvoiced continuum. Further, we show that the shift occurs for a real speech
‘continuum’ (part of the dataset collected by Nossair and Zahorian 1991), so validating
the model’s results for the synthetic data also.
Regarding ‘empiricist’ models of speech perception, Kluender and Lotto (1999, p.508)
write: “The occasional demonstration of similar patterns of response data for speech
and nonspeech analogs ... may no longer be sufﬁcient. Instead, hypotheses about
speciﬁc auditory processes must be generated”. In light of this concern, computational
modelling has the distinct advantage of facilitating the formation of such hypotheses.
We show that analysis and manipulation of our model then allows us to explain the
boundary-shift effect in terms of the restructuring of information by the auditory system
so as to emphasise a particular region of the time-frequency spectrum.
4.2 Modeling the categorisation of speech sounds
In previous work over many years (Damper, Pont, and Elenius 1990; Damper 1997;
Damper, Gunn, andGore 2000; DamperandHarnad2000),researchers attheUniversity
of Southampton have studied extensively the emergence of phonetic categories in a
variety of related computational models. We next consider a number of current models
and describe the version used in this work.
In conducting this review we will highlight the advantages and pitfalls of the
computationalmethodologyand motivateour own approach. Previous work by Damper
and Harnad (2000) presents a comprehensive overview of neural network models of
categorical perception and argues ‘that a variety of neural mechanisms is capable of
generating the characteristics of categorical perception. Hence, CP may not be a special
mode of perception but an emergent property of any sufﬁciently powerful general
learning system.’ In our own work this argument will be tested by our focus on the
peripheral auditory system and selection of a general neural network architecture. As
‘an advantage of such computational models is that, unlike real subjects, they can be
“systematically manipulated” to uncover their operational principles’. In considering
previous work Damper and Harnad (2000) highlighta clear distinctionbetween real and
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inputs from artiﬁcial or novel dimensions, whereas the vast majority of real CP studies
have used speech stimuli — most often stop consonants (or, more correctly, simpliﬁed
analogs of such sounds).’ In an attempt to rectify this ﬂaw, they have used the synthetic
Lisker and Abramson stimuli from Haskins Laboratory. To expand upon this work we
will be using not only this data but also real speech from Nossair and Zahorian.
Following this paper we will be focussing on a detailed computational model of the
peripheral auditory system as ‘there has long been a view in the speech research
literature that CP reﬂects some kind of “restructuring of information” by the auditory
system in the form of processing non-linearities.’ In addition to this, certain
methodological considerations will be taken into account in our own model. For
example, the input to our neural network will be formed from 10ms time bins as ‘The
10ms width of the time bin corresponds approximately to one pitch period.’ Moving on
to the cognitive model ‘there was a distinct net for each of the (bilabial, alveolar, velar)
stimulus series.’ and initially, in their brain-state-in-a-box model, all of the training data
was attracted to the same classiﬁcation, indicating that the categorical perception of
auditory training data is a non-trivial task. Classiﬁcation was only successful when
‘the most important time-frequency cells were identiﬁed by averaging the endpoint
responses and taking their difference.’ Accordingly, this chapter will produce novel
research by attempting to reproduce CP by using a single network on the entire set of
stimulus data before focussing on the most important regions of the signal. In Damper
and Harnad’sownworktheyshowthat‘Classical categorizationisobservedwitha steep
labellingcurve and an ABX discriminationpeak at the category boundary. Althoughthe
labeling curve is rather too steep and the actual boundary values obtained are slightly
low (by about 5 or 10ms), the shift with place of articulation is qualitatively correct.
Further work in this paper was developed through the use of a multi-layer perceptron
and ‘it is apparent that the multi-layer perceptron is a rather better model of labeling
behavior than is the brain-state-in-a-box.’ Accordingly, our own neural architecture
will take the form of a multi-layer perceptron.
A key component of the Damper and Harnad’s approach is the Pont-Damper auditory
system which we will now consider in more detail. This model consists of ‘a
computational model of low-level neural processing which includes explicit details of
dorsal cochlear nucleus (DCN) structure and function, based on recent anatomical and
physiological ﬁndings.’ Consisting of two separate stages ‘simulating afferent activity
in:
• the cochlea and auditory nerve
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In total the model consists of an array of 512 neurons organised into 128 columns
with each neuron acting ‘as a ‘leaky integrator’, summing its synaptic inputs at each
time instant and adding these to a decayed version of the potential from the previous
instant’ ﬁring according to a probability value over some threshold function. Their
results on bilabial, alveolar and velar stops show that ‘At auditory nerve (AN) level,
the model’s spatio-temporal patterns of neural ﬁring correspond well with available
physiological data.’ Furthermore, in response to varying VOT from the Lisker and
Abramson stimuli it was shown that there was no ‘obvious visible evidence that some
feature (or features) changes abruptly at the boundary value of 30–40ms in a way that
could underlie the observed labelling behaviour.’ Suggesting a clear motivation for
an abstract neural component, one that is able to exploit large classiﬁcation features.
Similar to the work by Damper and Harnad this paper shows ‘that a composite model,
consisting of the computational auditory model feeding an artiﬁcial neural network
(ANN) trained by back-propagation, is able to reproduce the non-uniform identiﬁcation
and non-monotonic discrimination behaviour of listeners with these stimuli.’
Further consideration of the neural correlates behind categorical perception is presented
by Damper, Gunn, and Gore (2000) who studied three learning systems: ‘single-layer
perceptions, support vector machines and Fisher linear discriminants.’ Of particular
signiﬁcance to our choice of peripheral auditory system is the result ‘that the phonetic
percept of voicing is easily and directly recoverable from auditory (but not acoustic)
representations.’ In greater detail ‘This work has revealed very clearly that any
reasonably general learning system (i.e. ‘neural network’) – acting as a ‘synthetic
listener’ – is able to categorize the patterns of simulated auditory nerve activation in a
way which mimics the psychophysical behaviour of real listeners.’ Given this strong
conclusion we can proceed with conﬁdence and consider the acoustic properties of
real speech in this chapter. Accordingly we will expand upon the methodology of this
work speciﬁcally ‘we seek (1) to see if a learning system is capable of mimicking the
behaviour of real listeners and then (2) to analyse the system to see what it has learned.’
However, in following this method the work of Darling, Huckvale, Rosen, and Faulkner
(1992) sounds a note of caution, as it is clear from their comparisons that not all models
of the peripheral auditory system are functionally equivalent. Certain changes in the
choice of representation for the peripheral auditory system lead to the removal of the
boundary shift effect under consideration. However, we still feel that it remains the
most ﬂexible tool for analysing the perception of initial stops. As stated by Damper
(1998)“While thisinterventionisdifﬁcultorimpossibletoachievein experimentsusing
human or animal listeners, it is immeasurably easier ‘to observe the restructuring of
information’ in a software model of auditory processing.”Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 51
auditory
preproc essor
sound pressure
w ave input
c ategory
la bel
le arning
(‘neural network’)
system
training d ata
FIGURE 4.1: Two-stage (auditory/neural) computational model for the categorisation
of speech sounds.
4.2.1 Computational auditory/neural model
Previous work has used computational models having the general, two-stage form
shown in Figure 4.1 in which an auditory preprocessor mimics restructuring of
information by the listener’s peripheral auditory system, and a ‘neural network’
component simulates processing by the central auditory system. Since the operating
principles of the central auditory system are very poorly understood, if at all, it is
convenient (perhaps mandatory) to train this second stage to categorise clear exemplars
of the voiced and unvoiced distinction, for which we use end-point stimuli from the
continuum. This mimics the operant training used in animal studies by, e.g., Kuhl
and Miller (1978) in which chinchillas were trained on end-points from the Lisker and
Abramson stimuli and tested on the entire continuum, including generalisation testing
on unseen, intermediate points.
In this work, for the auditory preprocessor we use Lyon’s ‘passive long-wave cochlear
model’ described by Slaney (1998). By virtue of its availabilityin MATLAB’s Auditory
Toolbox, this model has been widely used in the work of others (Aleksandrovsky et al.
1996). It strikes a good balance between abstractionand biologicalaccuracy. It captures
important properties of the auditory system, for example the role of outer hair cells
in loudness recruitment, but through necessity abstracts away from “factors such as
displacement of the stereocilia due to the inﬂuence of Brownian motion and stochastic
resonance” (Ara´ ujo, Magalhaes, Souza, Yehia, and Loureiro 2005).
Lyon’s cochlear model represents the probability of auditory nerve ﬁring at a particular
time. For comparability with most of our earlier work using a different auditory
preprocessor (e.g., Damper, Gunn, and Gore 2000; Damper and Harnad 2000),
and because it effects a good compromise between computational efﬁciency and
neurophysiological realism, we have employed 128 cochlear ﬁlter channels. In this
study, we use both synthetic and real speech stimuli: those of Lisker and Abramson
(1970) and the child part of the dataset collected by Nossair and Zahorian (1991),
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stimuli, and 16kHz for the Nossair and Zahorian real-speech data.
It is not very explicitly stated in Slaney (1998) how the centre frequencies (CFs) of
the auditory ﬁlters are spaced. It appears that “the center frequency of each channel
decreases by EarStepFactor of the bandwidth at the previous stage” (p.19) where
EarStepFactor was 0.25 in this work. This means that frequency channel indices
reduce as frequency increases, so that a CF index of 128 corresponds to the Nyquist
frequency (sampling frequency divided by 2), i.e., 5kHz for the Lisker and Abramson
stimuli and 8kHz for the Nossair and Zahorian data, and a CF index of 1 corresponds
to a frequency close to zero hertz.
Figure 4.2(a) shows the time-frequency spectrogram produced by this auditory
preprocessor for the Lisker and Abramson bilabial stimulus with VOT of 40ms. For the
second-stage neural network, trained to convert the auditory time-frequency patterns of
ﬁring into a category label, it would not be possible to train this component successfully
(i.e., estimate statistically stable connection weights) on such a rich representation as
this without dramatic data reduction. As in earlier work, this is done by aggregating
outputs over the time range 25ms before onset to 95ms after onset in a small number
of time-frequency bins. Accordingly, a 12   16 = 192-element matrix of inputs is
produced, as shown in Figure 4.2(b), and is then presented as input to the second-stage
neural network.
Thespeciﬁc networkusedinthisworkwasa multilayerperceptron (MLP)with5hidden
nodes and a single sigmoidal output node, trained to output an activation of 0 on the
unvoiced endpoint stimuli and 1 on the voiced endpoint stimuli. Training was from
initial random weight settings over 2000 training epochs using Levenberg-Marquardt
back-propagation (Marquardt 1963; Hagan and Menhaj 1994) using MATLAB function
trainlm. This function adjusts the training rate (starting from initial value 0.001)
according to the mean squared error over all inputs; there is no momentum term.
Categorisation of these stimuli (at least, the Lisker and Abramson synthetic tokens)
by neural network is known not to be especially sensitive to network architecture and/or
parameter settings (Damper and Harnad 2000).
4.2.2 Categorisation of synthetic Lisker and Abramson stimuli
To validate the auditory/neural model, we compare our labelling results obtained under
the same conditions with those for human and chinchilla listeners from Kuhl and
Miller (1978) using the Lisker and Abramson stimuli, consisting of three synthetic
series—bilabial (/ba/–/pa/), alveolar (/da/–/ta/) and velar (/ga/–/ta/)—varying in placeChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 53
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FIGURE 4.2: Time-frequency representations of Lisker and Abramson’s bilabial
stimulus withVOTof 40msinthe formof anauditory spectrogram produced byLyon’s
cochlear model: (a) is the full-data version produced with a sampling rate of 10kHz;
(b) is the reduced-data version produced by aggregating outputs into 12   16 time-
frequency bins for input to the second-stage neural network model. Note that in (a),
the centre frequency (CF) index reduces with increasing frequency (see text).
of articulation of the stop consonant. Although we would like to be able to
give a quantitative measure of agreement between the labelling results from the
auditory/neural model and the human and nonhuman animal results, unfortunately we
cannotdothis,because the KuhlandMiller rawdatapoints(asopposedtothesmoothed,
ﬁtted data that they present in their paper) are not available.
Figure 4.3 shows Kuhl and Miller’s labelling curves for the Lisker and Abramson
stimuli. A key characteristic of these results is the movement of category boundary
with place of articulation: as the constriction in the vocal tract moves back from
bilabial through alveolar to velar, so the boundary moves to longer VOTs. Kuhl (1988,
p.33) describes this as “an unexplained perceptual interaction between ... voicing
and place”. Broadly similar results on the ability to form phoneme-like equivalence
classes have been found in studies with other animal species, including macaquesChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 54
FIGURE 4.3: Labellings of the Lisker and Abramson continuum produced by human
and chinchilla subjects. FromKuhl and Miller (1978).
(Kuhl and Padden 1982, 1983), Japanese quail (Kluender, Diehl, and Killeen 1987) and
budgerigars(Dooling,Soli,Kline, Park, Hue, andBunnell1987; Dooling,Okanoya, and
Brown 1989). However, differences in the auditory physiology of birds and mammals
apparently lead to differences in the exact boundary values obtained. Of course, none
of these animal listeners is likely to possess a specialisation for speech perception.
Figure 4.4 shows corresponding labelling results obtained by the computational model,
in the form of average activation against VOT. In this plot, presentation of the stimuli
to the neural network has been repeated 10 times, with the network retrained each time
from a different, random initialisation of the connection weights. Error bars are shown
in the form of plus and minus the standard deviation across the 10 repetitions, but
note that the actual activation of the output node could not go above 1 or below 0.
As in Kuhl and Miller (1978), smooth curves have been ﬁtted to the raw data for
presentational purposes. In this work, we have used least squares to ﬁt sigmoids to raw
data points. The labelling curves produced by the model clearly replicate the movement
of the category boundary with place of articulation seen in Kuhl and Miller’s data,
although the separation of the bilabial and alveolar curves is perhaps less convincing.
It is worth noting, however, that the results of Fig. 4.4 are obtained on really quite
sparse data. The Lisker and Abramson stimuli consist of 3 series (bilabial, alveolar,
velar) each of 9 points (0 to 80 ms VOT), 27 tokens in all. Of these, 6 endpoint
tokens are used for training and the remaining 21 are used for generalisation testing.
The paucity of data may be one reason why the bilabial and velar labelling curves
for the computational model are less well separated than those of Kuhl and Miller forChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 55
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FIGURE 4.4: Labelling of the Lisker and Abramson stimuli by the computational
auditory/neural model. Activations shown are averages across 10 presentations of the
stimuli with the neural network trained from a different set of initial random weights
on each presentation. Error bars are standard deviations.
real (chinchilla and human) listeners.
4.2.3 Categorisation of real speech
One concern in the work described thus far is that the (single set of) stimuli used are
synthetic, and are very few in number. Hence, we cannot be sure that they are truly
representativeofreal speechanditsvariability. In particular, otherresearchers (e.g., Soli
1983) have reported discontinuities in the acoustics of these stimuli or (e.g., Kluender
1991) have reported different effects for other voicing series. Hence, it is important to
examinethe model’sperformance on other VOT series, and preferably on large numbers
of real tokens rather than small numbers of synthetic tokens. This should eliminate a
long-standing concern in the ﬁeld that the Lisker and Abramson stimuli may not be
perfectly acoustically-equated across series steps from blemishing the interpretation of
the model’s capacity to predict category boundaries. To this end, we have chosen to use
syllable initial stop tokens (/b/, /d/, /g/, /p/, /t/, /k/) collected by Nossair and Zahorian
(1991), and hand-labelled with their VOT, for the purpose of studying the automatic
recognition of initial stops. With these data we can test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.2.1. A computational model combining an artiﬁcial peripheral auditory
system, with a simple neural abstraction will be sufﬁcient to reproduce the observed
boundary shift effect in the perception of initial stops.Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 56
Initialexploratoryworkwiththedatabasesuppliedtousby NossairandZahorian(1991)
revealed that the single neural network was unable to replicate the boundary shift across
all speakers and continua. We feel we were possibly asking too much of the model to
learn to classify such extensive and variable real speech data. Accordingly, to make the
problem more tractable we formed our data set from the 9 child speakers only, reducing
the data set from 2481 stop consonants to 634 and making the set of speakers the
model has to cope with more homogeneous. However, even this subset of the complete
database is a vast improvement on the sparse Lisker and Abramson stimuli, consisting
of just 27 tokens.
A very obvious difference between Lisker and Abramson’s synthetic tokens and these
ecological data is that there is no external control of the VOT in the latter case. One
of the strong reasons for using synthetic data in our previous work has been the serious
concern that real speakers will avoid productions in the ‘ambiguous’, boundary region,
so leading to a paucity of data for generalisation testing. In the event, the distribution of
VOT across the productions was as shown in Figure 4.5. Although there are relatively
fewer productions in the ambiguous zone, we are conﬁdent that these are sufﬁcient for
our purposes. Another very obvious and welcome difference is that the real speech has
variability typical of actual intra- and inter-speaker differences, albeit within the subset
of child speakers.
Figure 4.5 also depicts the breakdown of the Nossair and Zahorian data into training
and test tokens. The criteria for selection of tokens for training was as follows. For each
of the three places of articulation, the means and standard deviations of the productions
labelled as unvoiced by Nossair and Zahorian were computed, similarly the means and
standard deviations for the voiced tokens. These are shown in Table 4.1, where the
ﬁgures are consistent with Nossair and Zahorian’s Table I (p.2980). For the voiced
case, those tokens with VOT less than the relevant mean plus the relevant standard
deviation were taken as ‘endpoint’ (voiced) training data. For the unvoiced case, those
tokens with VOT greater than the relevant mean minus the relevant standard deviation
were similarly taken as training examples of the unvoiced class. All the remaining
tokens were considered to lie in the ambiguous zone and were taken as test data. The
labellings given by Nossair and Zahorian were conﬁrmed by listening.
Thespeech datawere ‘trimmed’for presentationtothemodelasfollows. Themaximum
VOT for any of the tokens was 137.9ms, so the data were cut to encompass the range
 25ms (i.e., 25ms before initial burst) to 140ms. This gave a time bin width of
165/16 = 10.3ms, close to the 10ms used for the Lisker and Abramson stimuli.
Figure 4.6(a) shows the auditory spectrogram produced for a /b / token (child speaker,Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 57
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FIGURE 4.5: Histograms showing the distribution of VOT(ms) for the (a) bilabial,
(b) alveolar and (c) velar tokens in theNossair and Zahorianspeech database. Training
data were formed from the means and standard deviations of voiced and unvoiced data,
occasionally leaving overlapping test data, all three continua were then combined into
two training sets (voiced/unvoiced) and one test set and presented to a single neural
network.
(a) voiced
mean SD
bilabial /b/ 10.8 12.3
alveolar /d/ 16.6 6.3
velar /g/ 25.1 13.5
(b) voiceless
mean SD
bilabial /p/ 81.5 25.9
alveolar /t/ 91.7 27.5
velar /k/ 101.9 30.2
TABLE 4.1: Mean and standard deviation of voice onset time (in ms) for theNossair
and Zahorian data used in this study.Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 58
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FIGURE 4.6: (a) Auditory spectrogram produced by Lyon’s cochlear model for a real
speech /b / (child speaker, VOT 42.1ms) from the Nossair and Zahorian database;
(b) reduced 12   16 time-frequency matrix presented to the second-stage neural
network. The time bin width in (b) is 10.3ms.
VOT 42.1ms) by the computational model, and Figure 4.6(b) illustrates the reduced
spectrogram obtained by averaging nerve ﬁring probabilities into 12   16 time-
frequency bins. The results of labelling the reduced auditory spectrograms for both
the training and test data are given in Figure 4.7, again for 10 repetitions of stimulus
presentation and random initial weight settings. The training parameters were as in
Section 4.2.2 for the Lisker and Abramson stimuli.
In these results with real speech, the movement of the boundary with place of
articulation is clearly and appropriately replicated. One intriguing feature of the results
is that the network seems to have greater difﬁculty labelling the voiced tokens as such
than it does labelling the unvoiced tokens, especially for the velar sounds. This latter
observation may be due to a relative lack of unvoiced velar training examples (see the
histogram in Fig. 4.5(c)).Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 59
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FIGURE 4.7: Labelling curves for the real speech data in the child subset of theNossair
and Zahorian database.
4.3 Auditory-neural voicing identiﬁcation
At this point, with respect to the boundary shift effect for initial stops, we have
demonstrated the equivalence of our auditory/neural model with human and animal
listeners for both synthetic (Lisker and Abramson stimulus continuum) and real speech
(9 child speakers from the Nossair and Zahorian database). Although we believe that
this is in itself an exciting and thought-provokingﬁnding, we are mindful of the opinion
expressed by Kluender and Lotto (1999, p.508) that: “The occasional demonstration of
similar patterns of response data for speech and nonspeech analogs ... may no longer
be sufﬁcient. Instead, hypotheses about speciﬁc auditory processes must be generated”.
In light of this consideration, we now attempt to identify the precise auditory and/or
neural processes within our model that underlie the observed behaviour. In this way, we
can hope to generate further testable hypotheses of the kind envisaged by Kluender and
Lotto. As emphasised throughout this chapter, one outstanding feature of a software,
computational model as used in this work is the ease with which it can be modiﬁed to
explore its operating principles.
4.3.1 Removing the peripheral auditory system component
As we have a two-stage auditory/neural model, as depicted in Fig. 4.1, the ﬁrst and
most obvious question to ask is: what role does the auditory preprocessor play?
A direct way to address this question is (following Damper 1998) simply to replace theChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 60
auditory preprocessor, which attempts to mimic known details of auditory biophysics
and neurophysiology, by the simplest conceivable time-frequency analysis, namely
Fourier analysis using the fast Fourier transform (FFT).
Figure 4.8(a) shows the Fourier spectrogram for the 42.1ms VOT /b / token whose
auditory spectrogram was shown earlier in Fig. 4.6(a). This was produced using
MATLAB function spectrogram() with parameters segment set to 128 and
ntrans set to 1, i.e., 128-point FFT. Such a parameter choice gives a reasonable trade-
off between time and frequency resolution. Figure 4.8(b) shows the labelling behaviour
of theneural networkfor thecase where theauditorypreprocessor isreplaced byFourier
analysis. It is very obvious that correct simulation of the boundary movement with
place of articulation has been entirely abolished. Indeed, there is not really any voicing
boundary to move!
Why has this happened? We need to further consider the effect of the auditory
processor on the correct modelling of the boundary shift effect. The most striking,
obvious difference between the auditory and Fourier spectrograms is that the non-linear
‘cochlear’ frequency scale utilised by the former gives far greater prominence to the
low frequency content (below about 2kHz) than does the linear (hertz) frequency scale
employed by the FFT, Figure 4.9. We take this as strong circumstantial evidence that
the correct modelling of the ear’s frequency sensitivity (possibly including hair-cell
function) is important not just for mimicking the boundary movement effect, but for
there being any voicing boundary to move in the ﬁrst place.
Formally, we can challenge these assertions, and investigate the argument that the
resolution of the FFT data is too low, with the following two null hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4.3.1. The low frequency enhancement abilities of the peripheral auditory
system will have no effect on the model’s categorisation of initial stops.
Hypothesis 4.3.2. The low frequency enhancement abilities of the peripheral auditory
system will not enable the boundary shift effect.
To test these we will now present the results of a high-resolution FFT control
experiment.
4.3.2 High-resolution FFT
It is very possible that the failure to replicate the boundary shift effect with the above
FFT analysis could be due to loss of frequency resolution in the region emphasisedChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 61
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(b) Labelling curve for model with Fourier spectrograms
FIGURE 4.8: (a) Fourier spectrogram for real speech /b / (VOT 42.1ms) from
the Nossair and Zahorian database; (b) Labelling curves for model with auditory
preprocessor replaced by Fourier analysis. There is no obvious category boundary
and, hence, correct movement of boundary with place of articulation is effectively
abolished.
by the auditory model (i.e., below about 2 kHz). To test this possibility, as shown in
Figure 4.10(a), the number of CF bins was increased to 68 at each time step and the
number of network inputs was increased accordingly. This allowed for a far higher
resolution in the crucial low frequency region even without the enhancements provided
by the peripheral auditory system. Consequently, in Figure 4.10(b), the classiﬁcation
accuracy of the network, trained on the FFT data, increases but not to the point where
the boundary could be said to exist, except possibly in the case of the alveolar tokens.
Clearly then the enhancement of the region below 2kHz remains a key part of the
observed boundary shift effect.
We ﬁrst stated in Hypothesis 4.3.1 that the low frequency enhancement abilities of
the peripheral auditory system will have no effect on the model’s categorisation ofChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 62
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FIGURE 4.9: An illustration of the frequency enhancement present on the Bark scale.
(Traunm¨ uller 1990)
initial stops. Although the model was only trained on idealised end points we have
also selected idealised categorisation boundaries for each data set (Figure 4.11), as a
simple benchmark with directly plotted labelling curves, and we ﬁnd that the Euclidean
distance between the simulation and idealisations has been reduced from an average
of 2.94, for the high resolution FFT, to 1.40 for the peripheral auditory system. This
reduction in Euclidean distance can be attributed to the introduction of the boundary
shift effect, allowing us to reject null Hypothesis 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
4.3.3 Modifying the peripheral auditory system
Although the precise function of the outer hair cells in the mammalian cochlea
is unknown, it is generally believed that mechanical ampliﬁcation by hair cells is
necessary to enhance the sensitivity and frequency-selectivity of hearing (Jia and He
2005, p.1028). Thus, according to Moore and Oxenham (1998, p.109): “... many
experiments have shown that damage to the outer hair cells causes dramatic changes
in the mechanical responses of the basilar membrane to low-level sounds; the tuning
is broadened, and the sensitivity decreased”. In Lyon’s cochlear model, the role of the
outer hair cells is deﬁned by a set of automatic gain controls. By removing these, we
can investigate their role in the perception of initial stops. Because of the consequent
loss of tuning, we would expect onsets, e.g., initial burst and switch-on of voicing, to be
poorly represented.Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 63
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(b) Labelling curve for model with high-resolution Fourier spectrograms
FIGURE 4.10: (a) Anexample of the time-frequency representations oftheNossair and
Zahorian data, reduced, from the original 128 frequency channels, to 68   12 network
inputs; (b)Labelling curves forthe high resolution FFTdata generated fromtheNossair
and Zahorian database.
Figure 4.12(a) shows the auditory spectrogram of the /b / token featured earlier in
Fig. 4.6(a) when hair cells are removed from the model. Figure 4.12(b) shows the
reduced auditory spectrogram in this case, which should be compared with Fig. 4.6(b).
Comparing the two ﬁgures, the loss of detail for the model lacking hair cells is
obvious, as is the effect of reduced onset enhancement. Figure 4.13 shows the resulting
labelling behaviour of the model without hair cells, whereupon it is clear that there
is no real voiced/unvoiced boundary in evidence, and hence the boundary shift effect
is not correctly simulated. Thus, it seems that correct modelling of the ear’s onset-
enhancement ability is important for correct behaviour on the part of the model.Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 64
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FIGURE 4.11: An idealised step function for comparison against the high-resolution
FFT and peripheral auditory system.
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FIGURE 4.12: (a) Auditory spectrogram for real speech /b / (VOT approximately
41.2ms) from the Nossair and Zahorian database with hair cell simulation removed
from Lyon’s cochlear model; (b) An example of a reduced spectrogram for the real-
speech data with hair cell simulation removed from Lyon’s cochlear model.Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 65
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FIGURE 4.13: Labelling curve for real speech /b / (VOT approximately 41.2ms) from
the child subset of theNossair and Zahoriandatabase with hair cell simulation removed
from Lyon’s cochlear model. There is no clear voiced/unvoiced boundary in this case;
hence, the boundary movement effect is not evident.
4.3.4 Simpliﬁed model of perception of initial stops
To pinpoint the essential aspects of the auditory time-frequency representation
underlying the voiced/unvoiced distinction, we computed the differences between
bilabial, alveolar and velar spectra at 20ms and 50ms VOT. These are shown in
Figure 4.14. This reveals that the major differences occur for the four cells with
time indices 9 to 12 and CF index of 2. This is intriguing as it is within the vowel,
whereas our initial expectation was that it would be somewhere around the transition.
Furthermore, the pattern of values across these four cells seems to be speciﬁc to the
place of articulation. These features are worthy of further investigation with a reduced
set of network inputs. Accordingly, we state the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis4.3.3. The boundaryshift effect willoccur with bothrestricted and complete
inputs.
Hypothesis 4.3.4. The categorisation of initial stops will occur with both restricted and
complete inputs.
To test the hypothesis that this time-frequency region of the auditory spectrograms is
solely and entirely responsible for boundary placement, and hence for the movement
of boundary with place of articulation, we built a new model consisting of the auditory
preprocessor but with a highly-simpliﬁed, ‘skeleton’ MLP classiﬁer. This skeleton had
just4 inputs,takenfromthetime-frequencyregionofinterest, andwith5hiddenunitsasChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 66
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FIGURE 4.14: Differences of unvoiced/voiced auditory spectrograms forLisker and
Abramson stimuli at 20ms and 50ms VOT: (a) bilabial, (b) velar (c) alveolar.Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 67
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(a) Lisker and Abramson synthetic stimuli, 4 inputs to MLP
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(b) Nossair and Zahorian real-speech stimuli, 12 inputs to MLP
FIGURE 4.15: Labelling curves produced by new model with skeleton MLPs:
(a) Lisker and Abramson synthetic stimuli with 4 inputs to MLP, (b) Nossair and
Zahorian real-speech stimuli with 12 inputs to MLP.
before. Figure 4.15(a) showsthe labellingcurves for the Lisker and Abramson synthetic
stimuli produced by this new model. As can be seen, the essential characteristics of the
human and animal psychophysical data are evident in respect of boundary shift. The
absolute values of the boundaries are not precise, but this is to be expected given the
paucity of the synthetic data (generalisation testing uses just 21 tokens). In any event,
the results are comparable in quality to those for the full MLP classiﬁer (Fig. 4.4).Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 68
We take this to be a signiﬁcant and interesting result, effectivelyde-mystifying Nearey’s
“long-standing perceptual puzzle”, at least for these synthetic stimuli. There is,
however, a concern in the ﬁeld that the Lisker and Abramson stimuli are somehow
idiosyncraticand of merelyhistoricalinterest (cf. the demonstrationby Kluender(1991)
of different effects on different VOT series). So what about real speech?
A reduced or skeleton MLP for the Nossair and Zahorian data set was arrived at in the
following fashion. Starting with the same four time-frequency cells as above (time
indices 9 to 12 and CF index of 2), we ﬁrst ascertained that this was inadequate to
replicate the boundary shift effect for real speech. With some experimentation, cells
contiguous to these were then added as MLP inputs until an acceptable result was
obtained. Figure 4.15(b) showsthe labellingcurvesfor the Nossair andZahorian stimuli
with just 12 inputs corresponding to time indices 9 to 12 and CF indices 2 to 4. These
are not dissimilarto those for the full network (Fig. 4.7). Clearly, the requirement to use
12 inputs in this case (cf. 4 for the synthetic stimuli) is a reﬂection of the much higher
number and variability (both inter- and intra-speaker) of the real speech.
We formally compare the complete neural model (with means and standard deviations
shown in Figure 4.7) with the model operating over reduced inputs (Figure 4.15(b))
we ﬁnd that the different results have a signiﬁcance of   = 0.214, for a simple two-
tailed t-test, suggesting that any difference can be attributed to chance. This allows
to support the alternative hypothesis 4.2.1: a computational model combining low
frequency enhancement, a property of the peripheral auditory system, with a simple
neural abstraction will be sufﬁcient to reproduce the observed boundary shift effect in
the perception of initial stops.
Taken together, the results for both synthetic and real stimuli indicate that the shift
of voicing boundary with place of articulation can be explained by auditory processes
occurring at a particular time-frequency locality. There is little evidence in our work
that the Lisker and Abramson stimuli are in any way artifactual, or misleadingly
unrepresentative of real speech.
4.4 Discussion and summary
According to a recent paper by Kingston, Diehl, Kirk, and Castleman (2008), “On
examining how phonological feature distinctions are realised phonetically, one is
struck by the sheer number of distinct articulatory and acoustic correlates of any
minimal contrast” (p.28) such as voicing. It follows that there will be no shortageChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 69
of competing explanations of these phenomena, which Kingston, Diehl, Kirk, and
Castleman characterize as “associative” (the properties covary reliably), “gestural” (the
different properties arise from a single articulatory gesture) and “auditory” (the acoustic
properties have the same or similar auditory effect). In this work, by our approach
based on use of a computational auditory-neural model, we are most directly positioned
in the auditory camp. In particular, the approach has important potential (depending
on the ﬁdelity of the modelling) to capture the way that different acoustic properties
might produce the same or similar auditory effects. Further, the use of real speech as
input to the model ensures that acoustic properties necessarily covary realistically, thus
overlapping somewhat with the associative position.
In the past, “one important contrastive property” that those in the auditory camp have
used to explain the [voice] distinction has been the low-frequency property (Kingston
and Diehl 1994, p.441). This was previously described by Stevens and Blumstein
(1981, p.29) as “presence of low-frequency spectral energy or periodicity over a time-
interval of 20–30ms in the vicinity of the acoustic discontinuity that precedes or
follows the consonantal constriction interval” for voiced consonants. In the case of
voiceless consonants, this concentration of energy is absent. From this perspective, it is
interesting that correct functioning of our model (in terms of replicating the boundary
shift effect) is strongly reliant on frequency warping—from hertz to a pyschoacoustic
scale—that emphasises the low-frequency region. However, on the basis of more recent
experimental data, Kingston, Diehl, Kirk, and Castleman (2008) have argued for an
account of voicing in which the perceptually relevant property (albeit for intervocalic
rather than initial stops) is “the continuation of low-frequency energy across the vowel-
consonant border and not merely the amount of low-frequency energy present near the
stop” (p28). This is pleasingly convergent with our modelling results where we are
able to replicate the voicing boundary shift effect using just low frequency (close to f0)
information in the region of the consonant-vowel (in our case) border.
The claim of this chapter is that we have produced the basis for a sound explanation
of the “unexplained perceptual interaction between ... voicing and place” (Kuhl
1988, p.33). Further work is clearly needed—perhaps using non-speech analogues as
input—to tease out the precise mechanisms at play, but this work represents a very
promising start. Unlike real listeners in psychophysical studies, computer software is
straightforwardly modiﬁable, giving us the potential to understand its categorisation
behaviour in some detail. In the remaining paragraphs, we aim to detail some of the
shortcomings of the software modelling approach as well as contrasting it with some
competitor explanations of the voicing contrast.Chapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 70
First, we should make the main assumptions of our model explicit. In our approach,
segmentation of the input signals is a given, in as much as we construct by hand a zero
reference point for the tokens at the initial burst. This sort of assumption is seen in other
models (e.g., Nearey 1997); in any event, it should not be too problematic to detect the
burst automatically. There is also a closed-set assumption, i.e., the model only ever
has to deal with syllable-initial stops of English. However, given the current state of
knowledge of speech perception in general, and of causal links between acoustics and
audition in particular, some such restriction seems inescapable. Of course, the same
accusation could be leveled at almost any theory in the ﬁeld; they aim at explanation in
a severely restricted domain.
Another important consideration is that our model, in addition to the auditory
preprocessor, has a strong learning component, which needs to be justiﬁed and
understood. Kluender and Lotto (1994, p.508) warn: “With the suggestion that a
complete model include both auditory and learning processes ... falsiﬁability becomes
at risk ... part of the explanation of speech perception falls out of general auditory
processes, and the remaining variance can be ‘mopped up’ by learning processes”.
A similar argument against the use of learning (speciﬁcally, connectionist) systems to
model human performance has been made by Massaro (1988). This view seems to
be predicated on the idea that the learning process itself is part of the (explanatory)
model. However, this is not the case here. Rather, learning is simply an expedient for
ﬁnding appropriate parameters to map auditory representations to phonetic percepts;
a mapping that must happen somehow. Lacking the knowledge to model the actual
processes involved, which may not necessarily be learned in any event, we fall back on
a general learning mechanism to ‘plug the hole’. We are not suggesting that the brain
does back-propagation!
Let us now consider competitor accounts of the perception of initial stops, and
speciﬁcally the boundary shift effect. First and foremost, having modelled the effect
withreal speech data, webelievewe can dispensewiththeideathatboundarymovement
with place of articulation is artifactual, relying solely on the idiosyncratic nature
of the synthetic Lisker and Abramson stimuli. We believe that an explanation of
auditory and perceptual phenomena should be in terms of auditory and perceptual
processes. As Lieberman (1993, p.163) writes: “Subjects [often] behave as if they are
calculating complex probabilities. In fact, the actual mechanism may be surprisingly
simple”. Finally, in reviewing competitor accounts, it has been suggested that the
shift of boundary with place of articulation is explained by the aeroacoustics of speech
production; an auditory account is unnecessary. Certainly, there is an increase of VOT
in natural production as place of articulation moves back in the vocal tract, as seen inChapter 4 Interaction of place and voicing in the perception of initial stops 71
the data of Lisker and Abramson (1964, 1970) and Table 4.1. In natural productions,
VOT likelydepends upon the inertia of the articulators and, hence, the speed withwhich
closure can be released (Diehl and Kluender 1987; Kluender 1991). For bilabials only
the lips need move whereas for alveolars the tongue tip is involved and for velars the
more massive tongue body must move. Yet one should be careful of simply asserting
that ‘perception follows production’. Some differences in production are phonetically
distinctive and some are not. The question of why some aeroacoustic phenomena are
auditorily-salient and others are not is ignored by this putative explanation, but is a
central concern of our auditory/neural model.
It remains the case that computational modelling is a little used tool in phonetics
research. In this chapter, we have shown that it has much to offer in terms of exploring
the implications for speech perception of current knowledge of audition. Although
less well developed here, there is also great potential for generating hypotheses for
subsequent experimental test. To quote Kirby (2002, p.185): “computational modelling
will be the core of any future research framework for an explanatory linguistics”. This
thesis is now in a position to present a uniﬁed model capable of contributing to just such
a framework.Chapter 5
Modelling the cultural emergence of
speech
Ourclaiminthischapteristhatcomputationalmodellingcancontributetoaclariﬁcation
of the questions and issues raised so far. Our thesis has developed a range of tools and
methodologies to study speech at the phonetic level. Accordingly, in this chapter, we
have constructed a computational model (or ‘artiﬁcial agent’), through a uniﬁcation of
these tools, that is able to mimic some aspects of the structure of real human speech.
Crucially, this model construction requires us to ﬂesh out the detailed implications
of phonetic theory, so introducing an element of rigour absent in abstract thought
experiments. The agent is equipped with a biologically-plausible auditory system and
vocal tract, resulting in loosely constrained production and perception. Analysis of the
model/agent after training reveals that at no time does it establish symbolic phonetic
tokens via its cognitive abilities. Rather, complex auditory cues (as opposed to some
set of arbitrary, abstract labels) are sufﬁcient to enable the agent to reproduce the
perceivedspeechsounds. We inferfrom thisreproductionthattheagentiscapable ofthe
direct perception of speech through pattern recognition. After studying the acquisition
of a vowel systems and the attempted acquisition of a complete phonetic system we
present a population model of speakers and listeners, producing and perceiving ‘real
speech’, generated by the vocal tract of Chapter 3 and perceived by the auditory
system of Chapter 4. We ﬁnd that within the complex environment of ‘real speech’
populations of agents are able to converge upon a mutually agreed set of auditory
features through a simple process of speaking and listening. Additionally, this process
of cultural emergence takes place with agents that are only loosely constrained in their
articulatory and auditory abilities. This is in contrast to other phonetic theories that
often require stronger constraints on production and perception and the formation of
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idealised, abstract cognitive symbols.
5.1 Overview
In our opinion, detailedphonetictheories are amenable toa usefuldegree of test through
the construction of an artiﬁcial, computational agent system. First and foremost,
sufﬁcientisknownof articulatoryandauditoryprocesses tomodelthecompletecycle of
productionand perception and these aspects have been successfully modelledand tested
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. To be sure, knowledgeof central brain processes issadly lacking,
but there is still some scope for modellingthese in relativelysimple connectionistterms,
only provided we have available suitable and sufﬁcient training data in the form of a
database of speech sounds. Further, a computational model is highly ﬂexible in that
it is trivially easy to change software. This means that it is in principle possible to
implement a range of constraints on articulation and audition such as to cover the gamut
from symbolic to dimensional (Port 1990; Port and Leary 2005) theories of speech
perception. Viewed in this light, the more physically and physiologically realistic our
simulations of the vocal tract and the peripheral auditory system, the ‘weaker’ the
constraints. This is based on the assumption that the ‘strong’ constraints required to
render simple and transparent “relation[s] between physical and symbolic elements”
must come from more central brain processes. We remind the reader that many works in
this area (de Boer 2001; Oudeyer 2005b) trivialise the link between articulation, signal
and audition, for good reasons of computational convenience, and are hence implicitly
(and possibly unwittingly) strongly constrained theories. Only by moving away from
these damaging abstractions can we begin to investigate other phonetic theories.
To enable weak audition, the auditory system itself must be capable of speech
perception, rendering the signal suitable for our cognitive model, and it must be
biologically plausible. This is desirable not because biological plausibility is a good
thing in its own right but because our model needs to capture certain features of
production and perception. As stated by Dror and Gallogly (1999) “In the context of the
distinct types of contributions made by certain computational analyses, the biological
plausibility of those analyses is altogether irrelevant”(p.173). We have already shown
in Chapter 4 the vital importance of the peripheral auditory system to the perception of
speech. Accordingly, we will use Lyon’s cochlear model, detailed in Slaney (1998) and
Chapter 4. This auditory model will render the speech signal as 13 frequency bins at
each time step, taken as intervals of 10 ms.
The fact, detailed in Chapter 4, that our model seems able to distinguish differentChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 74
initial stops with information that can be found in the following vowel suggests that
we need to eliminate discrete phonetic tokens from our models and instead consider the
perception of multiple, high-dimensional, acoustic cues. We are in agreement with Port
and Leary (2005) who state “that a fundamental mistake of the generative paradigm
is its assumption that phonetic segments are formal symbol tokens” and would argue
that this complex view of speech perception warrants further investigation through the
adaptation of the classic computational models ﬁrst detailed in Chapter 2. Accordingly,
in this chapter we will develop two models. In the ﬁrst, an individual agent will be
trained on the reduced auditory inputs from the Lisker and Abramson data, selected for
its low variance, as detailed in Chapter 4. In the second, a population of agents will
communicate with each other, as detailed in Chapter 2, but will only perceive the same
four time-frequency bins.
Both the auditory and articulatory system need to be controlled by a suitable cognitive
architecture, one that is capable of learning to control the vocal tract and make sense of
the real speech signal. To achieve this, we will develop the SOM presented in Chapter 2
into the slightly more complex system detailed in Appendix B.2. This approach is
justiﬁed in light of the success of our and others’ previous implementations (Oudeyer
2005c). Thanks to our development of vocal and auditory models, the task facing our
neural architectures is only slightly more complex than in previous, highly abstract,
simulations of emergent phonology. The dimensionality of the auditory space will be
increased to 4 to represent the 4 time-frequency bins identiﬁed in Chapter 4 as being
crucial to the identiﬁcation of initial stops and the dimensionality of the articulatory
space will be increased to 9 to present complete articulatory targets for the 9 parameters
controlling the articulatory model.
The remainder of this chapter will be structured as follows. After a brief discussion
unifying the tools developed in previous chapters we will, in Section 5.3, detail a model
to test loosely constrained productionand high-dimensionalperception in an individual,
perceiving the end-point stimuli of the Lisker and Abramson data. After discussing
these results in Section 5.4 this individual is then placed into a population of speakers
in Section 5.5, testing their ability to converge on a shared system of communication.
The results of this work will then be discussed in Section 5.6.
5.2 True empiricism in language models
To capture ‘real speech’ and phonetic emergence we will take the system detailed in
Chapter 2 and add the vocal tract model of Chapter 3 and the peripheral auditory systemChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 75
ofChapter4. Havingestablishedthevalidityofpreviouswork, auniﬁcationoflinguistic
theory(Fowler1996; Nearey1997), vocal tract(Cook 1993), peripheral auditorysystem
(Slaney 1998), and population model (Oudeyer 2001) will be attempted. Details can
be found in Appendix B.2. Through this integration, we can enable the agents in
a population model to produce ‘real speech’ utterances. These not only introduce
a greater level of biological plausibility but also form the lowest level of reasonable
model abstraction given current linguistic theory, confronting the challenges of speech
perception and emergence.
The population interaction and neural model will initially be based upon our work in
Chapter 2. The dimensionality of each self-organising map will be adjusted to account
for the input from the auditory system and to enable the manipulation of the nine
different dimensions of the vocal tract. The vocal tract model is an exact replication
of Cook’s (1993) work. Accordingly, we refer the reader to his work for details of the
implementation.
Having deﬁned the vocal tract and neural models, the auditory system will be based
upon ‘Lyons Passive Long Wave Cochlear Model’ (Slaney 1998). This model has
been used successfully in previouswork, e.g., Aleksandrovsky,Whitson, Andes, Lynch,
and Granger (1996) and Chapter 4, we feel that it strikes the right balance between
abstraction and biological accuracy. It captures certain properties of the auditory
system, for example the role of outer hair cells on loudness recruitment, but through
necessity abstracts away from “factors such as displacement of the stereocilia due to the
inﬂuence of Brownian motion and stochastic resonance” (Ara´ ujo, Magalhaes, Souza,
Yehia, and Loureiro 2005, p.6).
We should not delude ourselves that the models used here represent a perfect reproduc-
tion of the human vocal tract and auditory system. For example, Faundez-Zanuy and
McLaughlin (2002) illustrate a number of problems when deﬁning an accurate model of
the airﬂow within the vocal tract. This leads to a call for greater accuracy in synthesis.
However, when dealing with an agent system, such as the one detailed in this chapter, a
balance has to be struck between accuracy and computational efﬁciency.
5.3 Modelling the emergent perception of real speech
Before we develop out population model, an individual agent is given the task of
learning the six end point stimuli from the Lisker and Abramson data using the reduced
input discovered in Chapter 4. As shown in Figure 5.3, the agent possesses an artiﬁcialChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 76
FIGURE 5.1: Illustration of the artiﬁcial agents studied in this chapter. Signals are
generated from the Lisker and Abramson speech database and from the utterances
of the agent. These are processed by the agent’s peripheral auditory system which
activates the auditory and articulatory spaces, which are self-organising maps (SOMs),
via weighted connections. Hebbian learning enables the agent to acquire a mapping
from audition to articulation, while the SOMs adjust to represent the perceived signal
and control the vocal tract. Once the validity of the individual agent has been
established we replace theLisker and Abramson database with the utterances of other
agents in a population model.
auditory system (Chapter 4) plus a model of the vocal tract (Chapter 3) as well as two
self-organising maps (SOMs), each of 500 nodes, connected to each other through
weighted links (Kohonen 1990). One SOM models the agent’s articulatory space, to
control the parameters of the vocal tract; and the other models the auditory space,
which adjusts to match the output from either its own utterances or the Lisker and
Abramson database. Thus, the weighted connections enable, through Hebbian learning,
the acquisition of a mapping from audition to articulation.
The model operates as follows. We randomly select an utterance from the appropriate
speech sound database, which is then processed by the peripheral auditory system
to produce an output that activates the auditory SOM. This in turn activates the
articulatory SOM whose output drives the vocal tract model to produce speech output.
The agent’s task is to match this output to what was initially heard. The difference
between the auditory representation of the initial sound selected from the database and
that of the agent’s uttered response forms the error signal for a Hebbian updating of
the weighted links from auditory to articulatory SOMs. We would argue in humans
that this error signal becomes internalised after a period of babbling and acquisition
and forms an understanding of the intentionality present within the continuous loop
of production and perception. As a result, the agent comes to learn which utterance
reproduces the perceived sounds within the Lisker and Abramson database or vowels
within the corresponding vowel space. In this system, production and perception areChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 77
tightly coupled, reﬂecting our view that this is essential to the proper understanding of
speech communication.
Given each individual agent, now equipped with the ability to produce and perceive
speech, we will create a population of agents to speak and listen to each other over
the course of a simulation. This follows on from work by Oudeyer (2001), in which
each agent simply speaks and listens, adjusting its SOM accordingly as it develops a
mapping from its own perceived auditory signal to the control of its articulators. By
forming a population of these agents and allowing them to speak and listen to each
other, Figure 2.4, a shared communication system can emerge.
Having developed this model we deﬁne an experimental framework in which to test it.
Each agent’s SOM is governed by a Gaussian width and learning rate. The learning rate
is set to 0.21 and the Gaussian width is 0.4, a reasonable set of parameters discovered
through experimentation. First in Section 5.4.1 we will test the abilities of an individual
to acquire the Lisker and Abramson stimuli from a reduced set of inputs before
developinga populationmodel inSection 5.5. Havingformed a populationof 10agents,
the simulation runs for 1250 iterations, giving the agents enough time to converge to a
stable phonetic system. These utterances are formed from 2 to 4 articulatory targets
selected from the chosen agent’s articulatory space. This presents the challenges of
co-articulation and segmentation to the listening agent. We also record the Euclidean
distance of articulatory SOM conﬁgurations and the level of clustering within each
agent’s SOM. Thisallowsus to measure the eventualphoneticsimilaritybetween agents
and the reﬁning of the lexicon from a set of essentially random articulatory gestures to
a discrete, culturally plausible set of phonetic tokens.
5.4 Results and analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst present the results of extensive simulations as described above,
showing that our artiﬁcial agents are capable of learning important aspects of speech
communication. We then analyse the results further to show that there are some
shortcomings in terms of sensitivities to parameter settings. These are reduced and
robustness improved in a theoretically well-motivated fashion by introducing goals
on the part of the agent to achieve effective communication by trading auditory
distinctiveness of its utterances versus the articulatory effort required to produce them.
We will use these exploratory results to test the following hypotheses.Chapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 78
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FIGURE 5.2: An example of auditory convergence for an agent trained on the four
time-frequency bins derived from the Lisker and Abramson data set. After training
there has been a signiﬁcant reduction in the Euclidean distance between the 500
randomly initialised points.
5.4.1 Reproduction of CV utterances from limited auditory input
We will ﬁrst test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.4.1. The agent developed in this chapter will be unable to reproduce the
initial stops from the limited auditory input. If this proves to be true then it will be clear
that the limited (non-phonetic) input is not sufﬁcient for perception.
In Figure 5.2 we present an example plot of an agent’s SOM converging to the four
reduced inputs, equipped with the peripheral auditory system detailed in Chapter 4, that
has converged on a number of auditory features presented by the four time-frequency
bins derived from the Lisker and Abramson data set. It is worth noting that althoughChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 79
the auditory space has not converged on each phonetic token the individual agent is still
able to partially reproduce each utterance with its own vocal tract.
In Hypothesis 5.4.1 we stated that the agent developed in this chapter will be unable
to reproduce the initial stops from the limited auditory input. To determine the level
of successful reproduction we measured the Euclidean distance between the formant
values of the Lisker and Abramson utterances and the agents’ articulations. The average
Euclidean distance (summed over F1-F4 with standard deviations in brackets) was
reduced from 132.8(80.49) Hz2 to 84.3(71.03) Hz2 after training with a signiﬁcance
of   = 7.8   10 6, for a standard two-tailed t-test, showing that this reduction was
signiﬁcant although not perfect.
5.4.2 Randomisation of auditory inputs
The convergence of the articulatory space, despite the lack of phonetic idealisations,
warrants further investigation.
Hypothesis 5.4.2. The articulatory space will still converge in the absence of any
meaningful auditory input. If proven this would establish a ﬂaw in our model as we
would expect the articulatory space to converge only in response to the auditory input.
Accordingly, we developed a control experiment where the individual agent was
exposed to random auditory input. As shown in Figure 5.3 the auditory space fails
to converge. It seems that a reduced structured auditory input is necessary for the
structured convergence of the articulatory space and the reproduction of the perceived
utterances.
Finally we investigated whether the auditory space’s convergence on acoustic features
was necessary for the successful convergence of the articulatory space, Hypothesis
5.4.2. We found that the articulatory space did not converge in the presence of random
auditory input and the difference in ﬁnal conﬁgurations (random auditory input versus
Lisker and Abramson auditory input) had a signiﬁcance of   = 5.3   10 9.
5.4.3 Removal of the peripheral auditory system
Hypothesis 5.4.3. The removal of the peripheral auditory system component of the
model will have no effect on the accuracy of the agents’ utterances.Chapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 80
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FIGURE 5.3: When presented with random auditory input the auditory space fails to
converge – the Euclidean distance between points is not reduced signiﬁcantly.
In keeping with the methodology detailed in Chapter 4 we replace the peripheral
auditory system with a high resolution FFT. As shown in Figure 5.4, the convergence
on the auditory feature set is not entirely complete. However, more detailed analysis
shows that this difference is not signiﬁcant. This suggests that the main effect of the
peripheral auditory system is in enabling the boundary shift, which is not captured in
this model.
In greater detail, we replaced the peripheral auditory system with an FFT analysis to
judge the effect on the accuracy of the agents’ utterances, as stated in Hypothesis 5.4.3.
We found that the Euclidean distance of the auditory features between the simulationChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 81
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FIGURE 5.4: An example agent equipped with the high resolution FFT detailed in
Chapter 4.
and the Lisker and Abramson data reduced from 1.08 to 0.80 with the introduction of
the peripheral auditory system. This result had a signiﬁcance of   = 0.49, suggesting
that this difference is not signiﬁcant.
5.4.4 Sensitivity to SOM parameter settings
InChapter2, theemergence ofrealisticvowelsystemsinartiﬁcialagentshasbeen found
to depend upon parameter settings, notably the width   of the Gaussian function used
in weight adjustment. Intuitively, the lower the sensitivity of the results to parameter
variation, the more robust we can take the simulation to be. Accordingly, we have
examined this sensitivity as depicted in Figure 5.5. This shows that learning fails, inChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 82
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FIGURE 5.5: Theeffect of a varying   value on the size of the ﬁnalarticulatory system.
As can be seen realistic phonetic systems are only obtained under a narrow range of
parameter values.
the sense that there is either no convergence or convergence to a single node, outside
of a narrow set of values around   = 0.2 (the value used in all simulations up to this
point). This vulnerability undermines the plausibility of the agent system and needs to
be addressed.
5.4.5 Articulatory effort and auditory distinctiveness
Chapter 2 has shown that by introducing further realism, by giving the artiﬁcial agents a
driveto minimisearticulatory effort throughsignal grounding, greater robustnesscan be
gained. Inanattempttoovercomethevulnerabilityinherentinourexistingagentsystem
(cf. Figure 5.5), we have added this feature to our simulations. We believe this addition
to be theoretically well-motivated. As stated by Lindblom (1990) in H&H theory
speakers seek to maximise by hyper-articulation the auditory distinctiveness of their
produced speech signal while minimising by hypo-articulation the articulatory effort of
production.
We introduce articulatory effort by adding the muscle model from Chapter 3 to the
current vocal tract. With thisadded feature, the agent’s utterance is produced as follows.
The 10 most highly activated nodes of the articulatory space are ﬁrst identiﬁed, and the
effort required to produce them is computed. The agent then selects the minimum-effort
utterance as its output.
Introducing auditory distinctivenesswithin our agent highlights a challenge for existing
articulatory theories (Liberman and Mattingly 1985; Fowler 1986): If we perceive the
gesture, why do we produce an acoustically distinct signal? But here, no discreteChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 83
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FIGURE 5.6: Sensitivity to parameter variation of a typical agent modiﬁed to
trade articulatory effort against auditory distinctiveness according to Lindblom’s
H&H theory. This extension enables us to sustain emergence of plausible phonetic
systems for a Gaussian width   over a wider range than hitherto.
phonetic tokens form within the auditory space – by focussing upon the reduced inputs
identiﬁed in Chapter 4 this simply wouldn’t be possible. If no phonetic tokens form
we cannot (as we did in Chapter 2) directly optimise the auditory space by pressuring
the auditory tokens towards dispersion. To overcome this problem, we might ask if
phonetic tokens need to sound distinct in themselves or just distinct enough to convey
the intended gesture. We adopt the latter standpoint. Auditory distinctiveness is then
introduced by considering the signal’s ability to convey distinct gestures, as follows.
At each time step, we take the auditory node maximally activated by the database
utterance, and generate 10 alternatives by random sampling around this node. Through
the mapping from audition to articulation, these alternatives will cause activation of
nodes (  10) within the articulatory space. Of these, we select that node that maximises
thedistancefromtheremainder asthe mostdistinctive. Finally,theset ofauditorynodes
over each time step of that utterance that provides the most distinct set of gestures
is selected. In this way, the tension inherent in H&H theory is achieved without the
formation of abstract phonetic tokens.
With these changes in place, we repeated the simulations detailed in Chapter 2 to give
the results shown in Figure 5.6. As can be seen, the new agents designed according to
H&H theory are more robust to parameter variation.Chapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 84
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FIGURE 5.7: By recording the Euclidean distance between the articulatory parameters
of two randomly selected agents a measure of linguistic similarity is obtained. We
can see how the articulatory parameters of each agent converge and diverge as they
negotiate and settle upon a ﬁnal shared set of articulatory parameters. The comparison
between an agent within the population and an agent removed from it remains stable
and distant.
5.5 Language without strong constraints
We now place individual agents into a population and instead of listening to utterances
selected from the Lisker and Abramson database, they listen to each other. By forming
this population we hope to reproduce the convergence seen in Chapter 2 in this more
complex model, so testing the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.5.1. In a population of agents the simulation will converge to a shared
set of auditory features and a set of articulatory tokens. By establishing a shared
communication system among a population of agents we will demonstrate that auditory
production and perception is possible without having to postulate the existance of
abstract phonetic tokens.
We can see from Figure 5.7 that another agent within a population would be able to
‘understand’ a givenutterance as both are equipped with similararticulatory prototypes.
The Euclidean distance between their articulatory prototypes has been signiﬁcantly
reduced moving from 30.5 at the beginning of the simulation to 15.55 at the end. The
fact that these similarities arise from the perception of other agents’ speech signals
suggests that each agent is able to decompose each utterance into an appropriate
articulatory gesture. The convergence of each agent’s articulatory lexicon into a limited
set of prototypes reinforces this view.
We can see from Figure 5.8 how the number of articulatory prototypes has reduced
from an initially random 500 possible utterances to a distinct set of approximately 18.Chapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 85
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FIGURE 5.8: The number of articulatory prototypes in a given agent’s SOM over time
By takingtheaverage of theentire populationit isclear thatthisbehaviourisreproduced
by all of the agents. The process of speaking and listening to itself causes a partitioning
of the articulatory space into a variety of distinct utterances. As is the case for the
individual agent, the auditory space remains dispersed, adjusting to match the auditory
features providedbythe peripheralauditorysystembutneverconvergingtoa distinctset
ofauditoryphonemes. Thepotentialfor auditorytokenstoemerge isa possibilitywithin
the model. Followingonfrom the resultsof Section 2.2, we couldexpect tosee a limited
set of phonemes, each one deﬁned by unique, invariant auditory features. However, this
does not happen in this model. The mapping from auditory space to articulatory space
drives a convergence within the articulatory space while the auditory system remains
dispersed, exploiting and perceiving the complex cues of the speech signal.
To consider the plausibility of the resulting systems, we compared a number of
convergences within the population of agents to the set of human phonetic tokens,
Figure 5.9. As we can see from these results both the human and artiﬁcial systems
have a similar shape, a clear cluster of ‘popular’ phonetic systems is followed by a long
tail of increasingly complex systems. It is clear that the average number of distinct
phonemes is smaller for the artiﬁcial models then the biological systems. We would
speculate that there are forces at work, driving greater phonetic diversity, that are not
captured by our current model.
Figure 5.9 was produced under ideal conditions. Like previous work (Oudeyer 2001),
this model is highly sensitive to parameter variation. As we can see from Figure 5.5,
a variation of the Gaussian width governing the SOMs of the agents has a dramatic
effect on the resulting phonetic systems. If the Gaussian width is too small, then no
convergence takes place. Conversely, a wide Gaussian setting results in only a single
articulatory gesture remaining within the population. This susceptibility to parameterChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 86
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FIGURE 5.9: A comparison of the number of simulated articulatory prototypes and
human phonetic systems. The human data were obtained from Tambovtsev and
Martindale (2007) and the simulated data from 150 runs of the model under ideal
conditions (  = 0.21).
variation remains as a weakness of the model and will be addressed in future work.
We nowturn our attentionto phoneticconvergence withinthepopulation. By measuring
the Euclidean distance between two randomly selected articulatory spaces we can
see how the population agrees on a ﬁnal shared system. The initial divergence after
convergence forms one point of interest. We view this as a form of uncertainty before
convergence; as each agent listens to others in the population they diverge away from
each other. Eventually however, all of the agents agree on a shared system resulting
in a ﬁnal convergence. This convergence can be seen in comparison to the Euclidean
distance between agents from different populations. As these two randomly selected
agents have never heard each other, their ﬁnal phonetic systems remain distinct.
We next considered whether a population of agents could converge on a shared set
of reduced auditory features and articulatory tokens (Hypothesis 5.5.1). We found
that the average Euclidean distance between auditory features, normalised to the range
[0–1] was reduced from 0.43(0.023) (for different populations) to 0.32(0.0165) with a
signiﬁcance of   = 1.3   10 6 for a standard two tailed t-test (for two agents from the
same population). While the articulatory prototypes where reduced from 1.33(0.0681)
to 0.75(0) with a signiﬁcance of   = 5.1   10 11.
5.6 Summary
In our analysis, it is important to emphasise a number of points. Firstly, agents do not
directly perceive articulatory gestures, they only hear the resulting auditory output. ThisChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 87
is possible because the manipulation of the artiﬁcial vocal tracts produces ‘speech’.
On hearing these utterances, no phonetic classiﬁcation within the auditory system
takes place, rather the auditory system detects multiple auditory cues derived from
the entire utterance and recovers the intended articulatory gestures. This is possible
because a mapping between auditory cue and articulatory gesture has been derived
through a process of Hebbian learning, activated when the agent listens to its own
articulations. This mapping is highly complex, as each auditory cue can contribute to a
number of probable gestures. Theﬁnal articulatory gesture is recovered by the weighted
interaction of the auditory cues. The gestures themselves are not discrete points, rather
they form basins of attraction, the size of which is deﬁned by the width of the Gaussian
placed over the recorded centre point. A ‘recovered’ articulatory gesture is idealised as
the centre point of the corresponding basin of attraction, allowing for variation through
co-articulation or incomplete Hebbian learning to be accounted for.
In the auditory space, we have considered the role of the peripheral auditory system
and we have shown that articulatory gestures can form the objects of speech perception,
discarding auditory objects of perception. This became possible once the nature of
the peripheral auditory system was considered. If the agents conversed in complete
abstractions and not simulations of real speech we would not have been able to
investigate these aspects.
Although the simulations presented in this chapter are admittedly simple and
preliminary, and we wish to avoid making inﬂated claims about their signiﬁcance for
understanding speech perception, we do believe that they offer interesting insight into
the controversy surrounding the competing theories. Most obviously, we have shown
that the computational implementation of a loosely-constrained agent system is able to
learn the useful ability to reproduce distinctive sounds, such as could form the basis for
aural communication. Further, we have argued that there are no obvious candidates for
abstract phonetic-like tokens within the system. Indeed, it can be argued that with an
input region reduced to four time-frequency bins it would be impossible for phonetic
tokens to form. What then are the objects of perception within our simulation, if not
symbolic? The obvious alternative to a symbolic, representational theory of speech
perception is the direct perception of complex acoustic cues, with symbols replaced by
implicit knowledge of the action-perception link between articulation and audition.
Thus, instead of viewing the speech signal as a static medium for direct perception, it
is important to emphasise that the vocal tract is controlled by a speaker with knowledge
and intention. The speaker has implicit knowledge of the perceptual apparatus of
the listener, since he/she is similarly equipped, and is therefore able to manipulateChapter 5 Modelling the cultural emergence of speech 88
the speech signal to exploit its properties—resulting in a loosely constrained signal.
He/she tacitly exploits the situation not to convey vocal tract gestures but to convey the
‘affordances’ present within the environment. This notion of affordances is central to
J. J. Gibson’s theory of direct perception in vision (Gibson 1979), which has a strong
link to Fowler’s direct realism theory of speech perception. According to Gibson,
“The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or
furnishes, either for good or ill” (p.127). For the concrete objects of visual perception,
this can be thought of as the purposes to which the object can be put, given that the
observer is an intentional agent with beliefs, desires, etc. However, the term seems
capable of extension to the less concrete domain of speech communication, where the
intentional nature of the participants is no less important. Again quoting Gibson, “The
richest and most elaborate affordances ... are provided by other animals and, for us,
other people” (p.135). Thus, when constructing a phonetic theory, we should consider
both the passive processing of perception and the speaker’s active process of creation.
The speaker is trying to create an affordance, and they will use any means available
(signal, context, gesture) to achieve this goal.
Speech is special, but not in the way that motor theorists believed it to be. It is
not special because of any active reconstruction of the gesture (e.g., by analysis-by-
synthesis);itisnotprocessedseparatelyanddifferentlytoothercomplexsounds. Rather
itisspecialsimplybecause itisproducedbya speaker. Thepointistrivialbutimportant.
Without it we must consider speech to be a passive object in the environment, and
the listener simply has to accept the signal ‘as is’ without any consideration of the
intentionality of the speaker. Accordingly, the signal must be strongly constrained to
facilitate direct perception, leaving no room for pattern recognition. This leaves current
direct realist theories open to attacks based on the observed lack of invariance—as
when the signal does not reﬂect the gesture—because the, apparently necessary, strong
constraints are broken.
When we return to the Gibsonian notion of the direct perception of affordances, the
role of speech perception becomes clear. “As Ludwig Wittgenstein knew, you cannot
specify the necessary and sufﬁcient features of the class of things to which a name is
given. They have only a family resemblance” (Gibson 1979, p.134). When applied
to speech, it is clear that instead of classiﬁcation through invariance we are forming
“family resemblances” through loosely constrained speech perception, allowing the
overarching affordance to be perceived and “to perceive an affordance is not to classify
an object” (Gibson1979, p.134). In speech communication,we donot classifyphonetic
objects and we do not classify articulatory gestures. But this does not mean we cannot
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an attempt to exploit and manipulate the complex web of affordances present in any
human social interaction.Chapter 6
Speech perception as non-symbolic
pattern recognition
Despite intensive ongoing research, our understanding of human speech perception
(like perception in general) remains largely incomplete, with many competing theories
and controversies surrounding it. When communicating by speech, we have the
strong intuition and impression that we are utilising a discrete compositional code,
in which concepts are transmitted from speaker to listener by stringing together basic
speech units that can be interpreted at differing hierarchical levels: phonetics and
phonology, syntax/grammar and semantics. This is the so-called code model of speech
communication (Blackburn 2007). However, the medium of transmission is sound
pressure waves in air, and these are inherently continuous. Hence, a central problem for
thescientiﬁc studyofspeech communicationistodeterminewhat are thebasic elements
of the discrete code, how they are signalled in the continuous pressure wave, and how
they are extracted by the perceptual system. Viewed in this light, the problem is one of
determining the objects of perception (e.g., Diehl and Kluender 1989); precisely what
is it that we attend to when we listen to (‘decode’) speech? But we should not forget
that speech communication is reciprocal; (virtually) every speaker is also a hearer of
speech. Although this sort of reciprocity is typically found in any animal signalling
system, where the source of the signal is an intentional agent (Dennett 1987), it is not
the case for perception in general. When we look at a table, for instance, it has no
intention to alter our beliefs, desires, or other aspects of mental content; it is just a table.
We are now in a position to explore inherent tensions in current phonetic theory:
speciﬁcally, the conﬂict between continuous production and discrete perception, and
that between passive direct perception and the notion of top-down hypothesis testing
that arises from the reciprocal awareness of intentionality.
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6.1 Overview
Current phonetic theory is divided by two points of contention: the link from
production-to-signal-to-audition, and the object of perception/cognition. Tradition-
ally, theorists have attempted to arbitrate between these contentions by conducting
experimental phonetics research, often in a search for ‘invariants’ that can be linked
to phonetic tokens or labels (Perkell and Klatt 1986). The underlying assumption
has been that specifying invariants in either articulation or audition automatically
indicate the object of perception/cognition. Yet very slowly, realisation has grown
that computational modelling offers an alternative approach, as exempliﬁed in the
work in this area of Liljencrantz and Lindblom (1972), Bladon and Lindblom (1981),
Lindblom, MacNeilage, and Studdert-Kennedy (1984), Protopapas (1999), Damper and
Harnad (2000), de Boer (2000a, 2001, 2003), Oudeyer (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) and
others. Typically however, this work has proceeded in an unembodied, abstract fashion
avoiding critical phonetic questions. Even when aspects of language are embodied
in robotic systems (Steels 1999; Roy 2005), this has been at the syntactic level —
giving little consideration to the physical production and perception of the underlying
phonetic tokens.
This situation persists because the study of phonetics faces two fundamental challenges
(Lindblom 1986b): invariance and segmentation. Currently no unique set of deﬁning
features for a given unit of language has been found. Although a listener will perceive
a distinct phoneme, we cannot deﬁne a set of acoustic features that will hold true for all
occurrences of that phoneme. Secondly, segmentation deﬁnes the fact that an utterance
cannot be unambiguously segmented into temporal non-overlapping chunks; therefore,
co-articulation presents a further barrier to acquisition. These challenges arise, either
through insufﬁcient data analysis — we haven’t yet found the acoustic properties that
consistently deﬁne a phoneme — or through a ﬂaw in the theories underpinning our
understanding of speech perception.
In phonetic research, there has long been a connection made between the perceived
constraints on signal and articulation and the neural correlates of speech perception. As
a result, those holding to an articulatory theory of speech perception look for specifying
invariants within articulatory gestures, while those following an auditory theory study
the constraints within the acoustic signal and/or its auditory representation. So-called
double-weak theory (Nearey 1997) suggests that this approach is not so straightforward
as boththe articulationandauditorysignalare looselyconstrainedand distinctlylacking
in specifying invariants. In this chapter, we ask what this means for the search for the
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realism. This theory combines the loosely constrained signal with the cognitive notion
of direct realism, i.e., we directly perceive the world through our senses unmediated by
symbolic representation. After investigating the basis for this theory in Section 6.2, we
consider existing evidence in Section 6.3 and discussed why current phonetic models
are ill-equipped to test this approach in Section 6.4 further justifying our alternative
model presented in Chapter 5. This chapter will now attempt to form an account of the
data presented in this work.
6.2 Theories of speech perception and direct realism
We will now use Nearey’s framework to map out the current state of of phonetic
research. In doing so we will expose current assumptions and deﬁne a place for our
alternative account.
6.2.1 Nearey’s framework: strong and weak relations
With this background in mind, we can now consider the various competing theories
of speech perception. Based on Nearey’s (1997) framework, we can classify these
into strong-articulatory, strong-auditory, double-strong and double-weak. Figure 6.1
contrasts three of these classes of theory schematically. According to Nearey, “the term
strong is taken to imply a simple, robust, and transparent relation between physical and
symbolic elements” (p.3241).
Nearey’s (1997) classiﬁcation system is useful as it clearly delineates the current
controversy and deﬁnes an alternative, namely the double-weak theory of production
and perception. Nearey assesses current speech perception theories on the ‘strength’
of their connections between the segments of speech: the signal, articulation and
perception. The theories that argue for a tightly-constrained connection between all
three aspects are considered to be ‘double-strong’ in nature; there is a clear mapping
from articulation to speech token to audition. By comparison Neary cites evidence from
both the contra-auditory (Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, and Studdert-Kennedy 1967)
and the contra-gesturalist (Diehl and Kluender 1989) camps which show that there is
a weak connection between the three aspects of speech. This ‘double-weak’ theory
contends that articulation is only ‘stylised’ by real-time physical constraints while the
resulting utterance needs to be reconstructed from multiple, variant acoustic cues. We
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(a) Strong-articulatory speech perception
(b) Strong-auditory speech perception
(c) Double-weak speech perception.
FIGURE 6.1: Conﬂicting phonetic theories use evidence of strong constraints on
articulation or audition to argue for different symbolic systems of perception. For
example, the existence of invariant acoustic speciﬁers would be taken as evidence for
the formation of abstract phonetic tokens during speech perception. See text for further
explanation of (a), (b) and (c).
Strong-articulatory theory (Fig. 6.1(a)) was historically the early front-runner in
the form of motor theory, forever associated with Liberman and his colleagues at
Haskins Laboratories (Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, and Studdert-Kennedy 1967;
Studdert-Kennedy, Liberman, Harris, and Cooper 1970; Liberman and Mattingly 1985;
Liberman and Mattingly 1989). Motor theory holds that the objects of perception are
symbolic, gestural tokens obtained (e.g., through analysis-by-synthesis) on the part of
the listener recreating the speaker’s intended vocal tract gesture using an innate, virtual
vocal tract synthesiser. (Schematically, this is depicted in Figure 6.1(a) as a vocal
tract symbol within the head of the listener.) Motor theory obviously emphasises the
fact that (almost) every human listener is also a speaker. In the ﬁgure, the assumed
strong constraints on articulation are shown as a one-to-one (straight line) mapping
from gesture to acoustic signal, whereas the assumed weak constraints on audition
are depicted as a one-to-many (multi-line) mapping. In other words, variability in
the acoustic signal (arising from the complex acoustic consequences of the gesture)
is unproblematic since the invariate gesture is recoverable. Although gestural theories
have been rather discredited by researchers in the ﬁeld of phonetics(Diehl and Kluender
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inﬂuence within cognitive science. According to Galantucci, Fowler, and Turvey (2006,
p.361), “The motor theory of speech perception ... is among the most cited theories in
cognitive psychology ... it is perhaps the only theory of speech perception recognized
outside the ﬁeld of speech”.
Strong-auditory theories, by contrast, assume weak constraints on articulation leading
to acoustic variability, but this is of little consequence as the variability is in irrelevant
aspects rather than the specifying features that enable the listener to recover a token
corresponding to that set of features. Hence, the object of perception is an abstract
(perhaps ‘phonetic’) token as depicted in Fig. 6.1(b). Strong-auditory theories include
Steven’s (2002) well-known quantal theory. According to this, articulations don’t have
to be precise in that perturbations of gestures will still yield an acoustic steady state (the
quantal region) corresponding to ‘distinctive’ features. Thus, gestural imprecision will
not affect perception of the intended token.
Double-strong theories (not depicted), as their name implies, hold that strong relations
hold between physics and symbol for both articulation and audition. An example of
such a theory is that of Stevens and Blumstein (1978, 1981), whereby distinct vocal
tract gestures give rise to robust and transparent acoustic consequences (e.g., the burst
spectrum for an initial stop consonant) that directly signals place of articulation.
Double-weak theories, Fig. 6.1(c), posit weak constraints on both articulation and
audition. Typical of the double-weak position are connectionist theories like TRACE
(McClelland and Elman 1986) and pattern recognition theories, such as the normal
a priori probability (NAPP) model of Nearey and Hogan (1986), that assume that
the task of extracting invariants from among the irrelevant statistical variation in the
acoustic signal can be delegated to a trained pattern classiﬁer. To a large extent, they
are a natural conjoining of the strong-articulatory and strong-auditory positions, more
so than double-strong theories because, according to Nearey, the evidence for “simple,
robust, and transparent relation[s] between physical and symbolic elements” is largely
absent. By comparison a double-weak standpoint holds that “only two conditions are
necessary for speech to operate as an effective communication system. First, a symbol
sequence must be encoded into gestures. Second, the acoustic output of those gestures
must provide the listener with auditory cues sufﬁcient to decode the intended symbol
sequence” (Nearey 1997, p.3243). In conjoining the two, however, it is necessary to
arbitrate on the conﬂicting issue of the object of perception: strong-articulatory theory
takes this to be vocal tract gesture, whereas strong-auditory theory takes it to be an
abstract, phonetic-like token. Nearey seems to assume without question that the latter
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similarity between pattern recognition theories of speech perception and the technology
of automatic speech recognition (ASR). In ASR, the goal is very typically seen as
the extraction of phonetic equivalence classes from the acoustic signal, and hence it is
natural for Nearey to think in exactly these terms. However, this is not essential. It
is possible to conceive of a double-weak theory in which the objects of perception are
gestures. This alternative seems to ﬁt better our modelling data, presented in Chapter 5.
Hence, wenowmovetodiscussingagesturaltheory, Fowler’s(1996)directrealism, that
is less susceptible to many of the charges made against motor theory by phoneticians
and speech scientists. The latter include the claim that “speech is special” in some
meaningful way that has implications for the science of perception (as opposed to being
a mere statement of the obvious), and that there exists an innate, virtual analysis-by-
synthesis system, required to accommodate the observation that those unable to speak
can still decode speech.
6.2.2 Direct realism
The direct realism theory of speech perception is due to Fowler (1996). Like
motor theory, it is both gestural and a product of Haskins Laboratory. Although
related to motor theory, however, it differs in a number of important ways.
Signiﬁcantly, speech perception is not held to be ‘special’ ... “and there is no
more reason to propose a role for the speech motor system in speech perception
than to propose an analogous role for the viewer’s locomotor system in visual
perception of walking” (Fowler 1996, p.1731). Rather, “listeners perceive
gestures not by means of a specialised decoder, as in the motor theory, but
because information in the acoustic signal speciﬁes the gestures that form it”
(http://www.haskins.yale.edu/CaseStatement/Haskinscase.pdf).
There is, of course, some sense in which this must be trivially true.
Figure 6.2(a) depicts this schematically. The theory is double-strong in that the acoustic
signal is seen as a direct, transparent link between gesture and perception. In this
schematic, the arrow in the listener’s head is intended to indicate implicit knowledge
of that link. Crucially, at no point is a symbolic token involved.
Direct realism faces various criticisms from within speech science, arising through its
association with motor theory, in that they are often treated as one and the same (e.g.,
Sussman 1989, Ohala 1996). Other criticisms are more speciﬁc. What is the force
enabling auditory distinctiveness if we only perceive the gesture? Surely H&H theory
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(a) Fowler’s direct realism
(b) Proposed double-weak direct realism
FIGURE 6.2: A comparison ofFowler’s direct realism and double-weak direct realism.
Thephonetic evidence suggests adouble-weak approach, while our ownwork proposes
a direct realist cognitive theory. The arrow in the listener’s head indicates implicit
knowledge of the link between production and perception. See text for further details
of (a) and (b).
distinctiveness? Fowler (1996) argues that the acoustic signal still conveys information
about the gesture, which accordingly must be sufﬁciently distinct. But it does not
follow that a distinct signal is evidence for a symbolic auditory representation. Another
obvious objection, levelled at both direct realism and motor theory, is that those who
can’t speak can still perceive speech. Motor theorists believe that positing an “innate
vocal-tract synthesizer” (Liberman and Mattingly 1985) can overcome this objection,
whereas Fowlerreemphasisesthat the direct perception of speech derivesfrom a general
theory of perception. She writes that this “inabilityto reproduce heard gestures does not
imply that they did not perceive gestures (any more than the typical person’s inability to
perform a triple axel implies that he or she cannot see them)” (p.1738). Direct realism
does not have to imply a motor theory of speech perception. It only needs to agree with
motor theory in the trivial sense — we obviously ‘perceive’ the vocal tract as it is the
source of the speech signal. It does not need to agree with the claim of motor theory
that actual tokens corresponding to vocal tract gestures are involved, e.g., to drive the
internal synthesiser used in analysis-by-synthesis. (This is the reason for the different
depictions inside the listener head in Figs. 6.1(a) and 6.2(a).) So where direct realism
can give theoretical insight is in determining the object of speech perception.
Such disagreements arise because Nearey’s classiﬁcation only considers the means
of production, the signal and perception of speech, whereas the major source of
disagreement among conﬂicting theories is the form of the cognitive tokens. Auditory
theories hold that these smallest units are resolved as idealised phonetic symbols,
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abstractions. Considered in these terms we can see that direct realism and motor
theory (lumped together in Nearey’s framework) are clearly different, as direct realism
considers the perception of speech to be direct “unmediated by processes of hypothesis
testing or inference making and unmediated by mental representations” (Fowler 1996,
p.1731) — articulatory or acoustic. Freed from the need to lump all gesturalist theories
into the strong-articulatory camp, we can see that direct realism is in fact a double-
strong gesturalist theory (as opposed to motor theory’s strong-articulatory gesturalist
approach). As clearly stated by Fowler: “phonological gestures are the public actions
of the vocal tract that cause structure in acoustic speech signals. By hypothesis, they
will be found to cause speciﬁers or invariants in the acoustic signal” (p.1731).
In thisthesis, we proposea viewinwhich speechis directlyperceived; whatis perceived
(in the trivial sense) is the vocal tract. Although this appears to agree with Fowler, our
view differs in important respects. We question Fowler’s na¨ ıve realism assertion that
invariant “specifying acoustic properties is what allows perception of the phonological
properties to be direct” (p.1731). By “na¨ ıve realism”, we mean the perceptual version
of folk psychology that holds that the perceived world is as common sense would have
it appear. We feel that this plays into the hands of a number of arguments against the
philosophy of direct realism. Rather we, like Nearey (1997), are “genuinely impressed
by the quality of the research by both auditorists and the gesturalists that is critical
of the other position” (p.3242). Given this, we take a double-weak standpoint to the
production and auditory perception of the speech signal. However, we do not believe
that this necessarily precludes direct realism. As Figure 6.2(b) shows, in this new
framework we can conceive of loosely-constrained articulation and perception coupled
with the direct perception of speech, leading to a new double-weak direct realism.
Perhaps there could be theoretical advantage to decoupling the constraints on speech
and the cognitive objects of perception.
Fowler contends that for direct realism to hold, perception must be “unmediated
by process of hypothesis testing or inference making and unmediated by mental
‘representations’ in the literal sense of mental stand-ins for real-world things” (Fowler
1996). We agree that the formation of these symbolic mental representations is strictly
unnecessary and in opposition to the wider theory of direct realism. However, we also
feel that by eliminating hypothesis testing we are in danger of forming a na¨ ıve realist
perspective and of discounting the work of various researchers (Nearey 1997) who have
failed to ﬁnd invariant speciﬁers at the articulatory and acoustic levels.
Whereas na¨ ıve realism holds that a perceived object always appears ‘as is’, unmediated
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indirectness and cognitive indirectness” (Morvan 2004, p.222). Causal indirectness is
perfectly compatible with direct realism and allows for the kind of pattern recognition
and hypothesis testing present in double-weak theories like NAPP (Nearey and Hogan
1986). Cognitive indirectness, however, holds out against direct realism by requiring
symbolic cognitive intermediaries between the object and the perceiver.
The nature of these symbolic cognitive intermediaries (gestural or phonetic) has been a
strong point of contention within phonetic science. However, it is clear that symbolic
intermediaries are not mandatory. The signal is not necessarily subservient to the
gesture and the gesture is not necessarily subservient to the signal. Both have equal
status because of the reciprocal nature of speech communication. The signal must
accurately convey the gesture as we understand speech through a tight coupling of
production and perception. But the speaker, as an intentional agent, adjusts the gesture
so as to produce a recoverable auditory signal, exploiting implicit knowledge of the
listener’s auditory system. Instead of the classical examples of directly perceiving a
passive environment (as in the visual perception of a table mentioned earlier), we are
faced with an intentional actor manipulating the distal objects of direct perception. The
implications of this new double-weak direct realism approach will now be explored.
We will ﬁrst consider existing phonetic and neuroscientiﬁc evidence before judging the
abilities of existing models to test this new theory.
6.3 Phonetic and neuroscientiﬁc evidence
Some key studies in experimental phonetics and neuroscience bear on the issues
discussed thus far. We will now examine each of these in turn.
6.3.1 Phonetic evidence
Careful reading of the literature reveals that certain key experiments are widely cited
both for and against the competing theoretical views detailed in Neary’s framework.
In keeping with tradition, we will consider a number of these and assess their
impact upon double-weak direct realism. We will mention shadowing response times,
trading relations within phonetic perception, and the McGurk effect. Our goal is to
highlight the important separation of cognitive aspects in terms of direct realism and
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Regarding shadowing response times, it has been observed (Porter and Lubker 1980)
that when completing response tasks, reaction times were signiﬁcantly faster then when
completing choice tasks — which require a simple decision to be made. It was then
determined that when repeating a perceived utterance (a choice task), reaction times
matched those of a simple response task. When interpreting these results, we are largely
in agreement with Fowler: The exploitation of our own gestural knowledge allows for
a tight coupling of production and perception, enabling a rapid reaction response, with
perception ﬂowing directly and seamlessly to production. There is no time-consuming
cognitive break where a signal is resolved into a symbolic phonetic-like token followed
by the choice of the correct gesture.
Trading relations describe a phenomenon whereby “settings for one acoustic property
could trade for settings of another acoustic property in the phonetic judgments of
listeners” (Nittrouer 2006, p.1800). This is in accordance with double-weak theory:
Via pattern recognition, a phoneme can be recovered from a variety of acoustic cues.
These trading relations allow the direct perception of the gesture to continue, because
the gesture is the source of the sound.
The well-known McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald 1976) shows — by setting
acoustic and visual information in opposition — that speech perception is not solely
acoustic. It has frequently been cited as support for motor theory, in that the visual (e.g.,
lip movement) information is essentially articulatory and could be seen as encoding
gesture. But equally, this can be seen as the articulatory dimension of a double-
weak theory. It is, of course, necessary to suppose that double-weak theory extends
to multiple channels of input. That is, the listener will use any available source of
information, auditory and visual, to perceive the gesture of the speaker directly (and the
speaker implicitly knows this).
This set of perceptual effects provides some evidence for the view of a loosely-
constrained signal coupled with direct realism, but the debate will no doubt continue.
However, one thing is clear. Any valid alternative should be in reasonable agreement
with current experimental evidence.
6.3.2 Mirror neurons and perception as action
Mirror neurons were originally identiﬁed about 20 years ago in primates when certain
neurons ﬁred both during the production of an action and the perception of the same
action by another actor (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). To many commentators, this
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century, and it has frequently been cited as strong supporting evidence for motor theory.
Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) point out that these mirror neurons are present in areas that
can be associated with the production and perception of speech in humans, charting the
development of Broca’s area from the primate’s F5 region. This could be evidence for
the (trivial) perception of gestures in others. Such mirror neurons ﬁre both when speech
is perceived and when speech is produced. This lends support to the notion that the
production-perception loop cannot be broken and resolved into previously postulated
symbolic tokens.
This can be coupled with a plausible account of the evolution of a biological capacity
for language, as stated by Rizzolatti and Arbib:
“...natural selection yielded a set of generic structures for matching action
observation and execution. These structures, coupled with appropriate
learning mechanisms, proved great enough to support cultural evolution
of human languages in all their richness. We hold that human language (as
well as some dyadicforms of primate communication)evolvedfrom a basic
mechanism that was not originally related to communication: the capacity
to recognize actions” (p.193).
The recognition of these actions does not necessarily mean that we form symbolic
gestural information through an innate vocal tract synthesiser as in motor theory, rather
perception could just as well proceed through direct realism.
As stated previously, although gestural theories cut little ice with the vast majority
of speech scientists, they still have had a clear inﬂuence within cognitive science —
mostly in the form of motor theory. Mirror neurons offer some reason as to why this
might be the case. Their existence clearly demands a theory that has a role for the
gesture. Double-weak direct realism allows us to move away from motor theory as
the default explanation yet provide some form of reconciliation between speech and
cognitive scientists. In unifying the cycle of production and perception, we are in
agreement with Ohala (1996) that “listeners who need eventually to speak out loud
utterances they hear others make would be aided by ﬁguring out what other speakers do
with their vocal tracts” (p.1718). To this end, sounds are optimised to be discriminated
andexploitedbytheauditorysystemandthissystemitselfiscapableof remarkablefeats
of discrimination for many types of sound. But, ultimately, when perceiving speech we
recognise an intentional agent performing an act that we can mimic, directly perceiving
the utterance and maintaining “speech perception in relation to the universal character
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6.4 Models and limiting abstractions
We propose a view of speech communication in which the speaker has the intention
to manipulate the Gibsonian-like affordances perceived by the listener. Far from a
notion of na¨ ıve realism, this view is dependent upon a recognition of the intentionality
of the speaker by the listener. This leads to a natural interpretation in terms of direct
perception of speech via complex pattern recognition, so conjoining Gibsonian direct
realism (popular among visual psychologists) with the current majority view among
phoneticians that speech perception is a process of loosely-constrained auditory pattern
recognition. Instead of forming cognitive representations of the external world (either
gestural or phonetic), our senses cause the direct perception of affordances through the
medium of the acoustic signal.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, shared phonetic systems can rapidly emerge, in abstract
computational models that attempt to capture a part of the wider development of
common human languages. Having proposed double-weak direct realism we will argue
that, because of their reliance on a number of unrealistic abstractions, current models
are insufﬁcent to test this new approach.
Work by a range of researchers (e.g., Oudeyer 2001; Cangelosi and Domenica 2002;
Smith, Brighton, and Kirby 2003; Tallerman 2005) has been vital in demonstrating
the utility of modelling phonetic evolution. However, when we consider their design
decisions in light of current phonetic theory, questions can be raised. We must be
careful, as although abstractions are necessary in any model, incorrect abstractions
could leave valuable scientiﬁc questions unanswered and undermine the validity of any
observed results.
Therefore, we have attempted to develop a theory to account for the results presented
in Chapter 5, which used the tools developed in Chapters 3 and 4 to produce a
model of phonetic emergence. This process of implementation demands detail; vague,
implausible mechanisms are swiftly exposed, either through biological implausibility
or computational impossibility.
To illustrate the interplay of theory, model and reality, Lindblom (2000) asks us to
consider the quantal assumption in linguistics and illustrates the possible dangers of
only considering the phonemes of the International Phonetic Alphabet, as “without
variation we cannot go from the operationally deﬁned to behaviorally real” (Lindblom
2000, p.303). With even the most basic abstractions coming under scrutiny,
the modelling approach needs to proceed carefully, justifying its abstractions and
considering the utterance in its entirety. We face “a growing realization that acceptingChapter 6 Speech perception as non-symbolic pattern recognition 102
FIGURE 6.3: The de Boer (2000a) model of phonetic emergence, explicitly capturing
a variety of forces behind the change and evolution of phonetic tokens.
the priority of form creates an impasse that unnecessarily deprives linguistics of
explanatory power” (p.305).
It seems that a theoretical division within the ﬁeld of phonetics remains due to a lack of
conclusive real world data. Given these difﬁculties, the modelling approach has a clear
role to play. When we consider our design decisions, a number of questions are raised.
What are the basic units of speech? How are these basic units represented within the
mind? Are there strong relations between the symbol and auditory signal or does the
listener perform pattern recognition on a loosely constrained output? Phonetic theory
shows us that these are signiﬁcant and current questions. However, current phonetic
models (e.g., Figure 6.3) abstract away from these challenges by deﬁning phonemes
as discrete points within a coordinate space. When considering current models of
speech emergence, it is clear that they follow the ‘double-strong’ theory of speech
(Stevens 1998; de Boer 2000a; Oudeyer 2001; Smith, Brighton, and Kirby 2003).
The mappings between production and perception are clear and direct, often involving
the direct perception of articulatory gestures. This direct perception abstraction does
have some basis in motor theory (Liberman and Mattingly 1985; Allott 1998), which
contends that some innate specialised module in the human mind is able to reconstruct
the distal articulatory symbol from the acoustic signal. Current models, however, have
not speculated as to the functioning of this innate module. This is for two reasons.
First, most models are constructed to reinforce a linguistic empiricist standpoint; they
seek to minimise the role of innate linguistic explanations. Second, the biologically
implausible abstraction of directly perceiving abstract symbols allows the functionality
of the module to be side-stepped; it becomes an implicit feature of the simulation.
For example, with respect to Oudeyer’s (2001) coordinate space model of speech
sound emergence, the maintenance of direct perception and the absence of an explicit,
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theory (Best 1995). Abstract coordinates pass directly from generation to perception.
How then are we to move from the current double-strong theories of speech perception
to the proposed double-weak approach? We would answer that we have attempted this
transitionas each agent in our simulationcomesto understand a speech signal, complete
with problems of pattern recognition and phonetic ambiguity, not simply perceiving a
direct abstraction, hopefully increasing our understanding of this alternative approach.Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
In this thesis, we have exploited the potential of computational modelling to
demonstrate the possible emergence of a shared communicaion system despite the
production of complex articulatory gestures and the perception of complex auditory
patterns. By carefully considering current phonetic theories, we have highlighted the
damaging abstractions, (e.g., the reduction of speech to a set of points leading to
an inherently double-strong perspective), present within current models of phonetic
emergence, Section 6.4.
The development of signal grounding from our initial work revealed the importance of
phonetic grounding and clearly motivated the need to capture the subtleties of speech
within our model. At the outset, the individual components of this approach established
two important points. First, by capturing a direct measure of articulatory effort, it
was shown that the two forces present within H&H theory are not always in direct
opposition to each other. Rather, the speaker exploits the subtle interplay of articulatory
effort and auditory distinctiveness. Given our direct measure, this interplay can now be
investigated. Second, the integration of the peripheral auditory system into the model
revealed the vital importance of the transformations present in the auditory system
when perceiving speech. The careful removal of current, damaging abstractions, e.g.,
Section 6.4, has led to a number of computational models with a role to play in future
research investigating non-symbolic theories of speech perception.
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7.1 Limitations and future work
Atthephoneticlevel,a numberoflimitationsremaininourmodelinthatthecapabilities
of the artiﬁcial vocal tract are never fully exploited. As a result we have been unable to
investigate a number of theories behind syllable formation, for example, MacNeilage’s
(1998) frame/content theory. To conduct this investigation in future work, our neural
model will have to be expanded to gain control of other aspects of speech, like the
glottal pulse, and not only the articulatory parameters.
An additional advantage of directly modelling articulatory effort is the fact that we can
now consider the emergence of consonants and, ultimately, the formation of syllable
structures. This is possible as with improvements to current articulatory models we
are no longer constrained by the deﬁnition of phonemes in terms of formant values,
resulting in the exclusion of everything that can not be formulated as a vowel. However,
this is only possible if we are able to obtain a measure of consonant distinctiveness—a
challenge for future work.
Beyond the phonetic level, the expansion of this work to other levels of language
description will not be trivial. To maintain grounding we would have to consider
more than the physical modelling of speech and develop robotic embodiment for
the agents as their utterances come to refer to objects in an environment. To move
from phonetics to semantics, we should consider the complex interactions of agent,
environment and signal. Researchers are beginning to address this challenge and there
is a new understanding that “cognition depends upon—is grounded in—the physical
characteristics inherited abilities, practical activity, and environmentof thinkingagents”
(Anderson 2003). Current work (Anderson 2003; Steels 2006, 2007; Roy 2007) is
attempting to build “a cross-modal bridge between language, perception, and action”
(Roy 2007) moving us from animal forms of ‘Cambrian Intelligence’ (Brooks 1999) to
increasingly human forms of ‘Neolithic Intelligence’ (Anderson 2003). We believe that
in future work, the results of this thesis can be developed to contribute to this current
challenge.
7.2 Summary of work
Developing symbol grounding towards the speciﬁc problem of phonetic perception and
emergence, we developed the concept of physical symbol grounding. Demonstrating
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reality of what it is trying to model, can lead to greater theoretical insights. Speciﬁcally,
the improved accuracy and robustness of our results led to a justiﬁcation for the
modelling of an increasingly accurate conception of production and perception of
speech. It was felt that by confronting the challenges of production and perception,
this modelling work could contribute to existing phonetic theories.
To do this, two investigative tools were added and justiﬁed: an articulatory vocal tract
simulation and a peripheral auditory system. For our vocal tract model, we used Cook’s
(1993) implementation by encasing it in a muscle model and deriving a direct measure
of articulatory effort. This enabled us to present a set of vowel systems based upon
Lindblom’s H&H theory. The biological plausibility of these systems lent support to
this theory and justiﬁed the use of this vocal tract in our ﬁnal multi-agent system.
Next, in developing the peripheral auditory system we produced the basis for a
sound explanation of the “unexplained perceptual interaction between ... voicing
and place” (Kuhl 1988, p.33). Further work is clearly needed—perhaps using non-
speech analogs as input—to tease out the precise mechanisms at play, but this chapter
represents a very promising start. This study crucially highlights the role of the
peripheral auditory system in any model that seeks to capture both the production and
perception of real speech. After developing each isolated component we were able to
progress to a uniﬁed model, testing the new theory of double-weak direct realism.
After developing our vocal tract and peripheral auditory system, we tested both the
perceptionof real speech andtheemergence ofa phoneticsystemamonga populationof
speakers. Through simply speaking and listening to each other, a shared set of auditory
features and articulatory tokens emerged among our agents. Within this model, each
agent’s vocal space converged to a shared set of gestures but the auditory space did not.
To develop this contrast, between audition and articulation, we consider phonetic,
neurological and phonetic evidence in light of these results. By isolating a single agent
and exposingit to speech, we were able to analyse its abilityto perceive complexspeech
signals.
In summary, we have progressively built up a model of speech production and
perception that does not assume the cognitive presence of “uniform letter-like units
(whether phones or phonemes),” but instead demonstrates the emergent possibilities of
“rich auditory patterns of speech plus any coupled visual, somatosensory and motor
patterns” (Port, forthcoming). At no point have we been forced to deﬁne symbolic
mappings between production and perception. We do not even have to perform
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for intended articulatory gestures to be recovered.
7.3 Wider implications and ASR
In this thesis we have argued that spoken language processing cannot be viewed as
the passive perception of an abstract signal. Rather, speech should be viewed as
an intentional act, which is comprehended as such by both speaker and listener. To
capture the wider implications of this comprehension, we propose that speech should
be placed in the context of a wide range of ‘interaction affordances’. Expanding upon
the direct realist position (Gibson 1979), namely the direct perception of environmental
affordances, these interactions are deﬁned as the set of affordances produced by an
intentional agent within the environment. As a result of this intentionality this set is
open to manipulation and as such require the perceiver to model the production in
order to allow direct perception to proceed. This has consequences for all aspects of
spoken language processing and we will demonstrate this by brieﬂy detailing a new
approach to automatic speech recognition (Moore 2007a) and considering wider aspects
of conversation.
In previous sections, we have highlighted the conﬂict between phonetic theory and
perceptual evidence. By considering the listener’s understanding of the speaker and
the speaker’s understanding of the listener we present a solution to this problem. The
current debate between modern phonetics and motor theory seems to rage over the
symbolic end points of phonetic perception. We propose that perception proceeds
through an unbroken loop between speaker and listener; perception is direct and
dependent upon the perceiver’s understanding of production. Furthermore, this act
of perception is not passive (as in, say, the direct perception of a table). Rather the
speaker possesses intentionality and exploits their knowledge of the listener and the
wider context to fulﬁl those intentions, manipulating the set of interaction affordances
and adjusting their signal accordingly. The difference between this and the direct
perception of a table is fundamental. A table attempts none of these things, it is just
a table.
To further illustrate this point, we can conceive of a three-level hierarchy within the
natural world:
1. Interactions within the environment: devoid of intentionality, interactions can
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2. Interactions between agents and the environment: proposedbyGibson(1979),
and extended to the realm of speech perception by Fowler (1996), an agent
directly perceives the affordances of the surrounding environment, i.e., what the
environment affords that particular individual.
3. Interactions between agents: each is aware of the other’s intentionality and so
seeks to adjust the set of affordances that they themselves present to the other.
The speaker, aware of the listener’s capabilities, adjusts their own articulatory
gestures to compensate and convey the desired intention. The listener aware of
the speaker as an intentional agent perceives the intended interaction affordance
through hypothesis testing over a weakly constrained signal.
Separately motivated and developed, the PRESENCE ASR system represents the
embodiment of this new approach. Moore (2007a) parodies the difference between
PRESENCE and traditional approaches to ASR as two different approaches to heating
a room. In theﬁrst, a thermostatisinstalledandthe systemadjuststheheatingaccording
to the deviation from the desired temperature. In the second, a wide range of factors
posea fundamentalchallengefor ourengineer: doorsare opened, peopleenter theroom,
ambient temperature changes over time. To account for this, sensors are ﬁtted to doors
and windows and a wide variety of statistical heating models are proposed to account
for noise and variance. Why has the speech community taken the second approach? We
propose that it is because we have not yet invented the ‘thermometer’.
Within the framework of interaction affordances, this ‘thermometer’ can be thought of
as an error signal derived from the intentionality of the listener. The participants of a
conversation are seeking to fulﬁl some purpose, taken from the set of currently available
interaction affordances, and it is the mismatch between the desired and the current
perceptual state that allows the listener to reﬁne, actively and continuously, the process
of perception. These reﬁnements are possible because the listener models the speaker’s
intentionality and conversely the speaker models the listener; far from traditional
symbolic conceptions of perception, this continuous recursive process establishes an
unbroken loop between perception and production.
Finally, we brieﬂy consider the wider implications of spoken language processing as
the exploitation of interaction affordances. For example, emotion can be seen as the
manipulation of the range of interaction affordances available to the agent. Within
conversation, my emotional state affects your emotional state and your emotional state
changes the set of interaction affordances that are available to me. In these terms,
emotion becomes a strategy for goal fulﬁlment when coupled with an understanding
of the space of possible actions afforded by another.Chapter 7 Conclusions and future work 109
In this thesis, we have adopted the view that spoken language understanding cannot be
divorced from the wider aspects of human behaviour. We contend that these aspects
can be conceived as the continuous, recursive manipulation of interaction affordances.
This has implications for all aspects of spoken language, from the role of emotion
as the manipulation of available interaction affordances to the theories underlying
fundamental phonetic perception. By separating ourselves from passive, symbolic
notions of perception and instead conceiving of speech as a continuous, shared, process
we reveal a wide range of promising research implications.
7.4 Conclusion
This work can be developed to consider the perception of real speech by obtaining an
error signal from a separate speaker model. At present, the agent’s own vocal tract
stands in for the speaker, and this is a reasonable abstraction as all of the agents are
identical, although in future work a richer understanding of feedback and intentionality
will have to be developed.
Despite these drawbacks, the development of double-weak direct realism has implica-
tions for both the engineering and scientiﬁc aspects of AI. At the engineering level,
some researchers (Moore 2007a, 2007b) are already considering the advantages of
‘closed-loop’ automatic speech recognition systems. If we build systems that have a
modelof the speaker and their intentionalitythen “The advantageof a negativefeedback
closed-loop control system is that it is capable of maintaining a controlled variable at
a prescribed value in the face of an inﬁnite number of possible disturbances” (Moore
2007b, p. 1178). Equipped with a model of the speaker and the environment, then ASR
systems can begin to perceive speech without suffering from the high level of variance
present in natural speech in noisy environments.
Scientiﬁcally, boththis newASR approach and current neurologicalevidence holdsway
as they account for such a wide variety of ﬁndings. There is now a danger of a growing
chasmbetweenphoneticsandtherestofthescientiﬁcworld; double-weakdirectrealism
seeks to bridge this gap. By providing a theory consistent with both bodies of evidence,
the complex auditory pattern recognition remains in play and those working in speech
and neuroscience can now consider an alternative to motor theory.
Starting with a fundamental consideration of AI, we have tested a new approach to
phonetics with a detailed computational model. We have challenged the connection
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investigated the subtle implications of H&H theory. In future work, the viability of
double-weak direct realism will be tested both by the success of a new generation of
automatic speech recognition systems and the implications of non-symbolic models of
cognition. We have provided a valid alternative to existing phonetic theories, driven
by detailed computational modelling. It is our hope that this body of work will form a
signiﬁcant contribution to both speech science and artiﬁcial intelligence.Appendix A
Removing ‘mind-reading’ from the
iterated learning model
The use of an iterated learning method, in which a culture’s language is produced by
successive generations of agents, allows language to be considered in terms of cultural
evolution. Iterated learning simpliﬁes a compositional language as the compression
of an object space. This compression is motivated by a poverty of stimulus as not all
objects in the space will be encountered by an individual in its lifetime. However, in
this methodology every agent has a complete understanding of the surrounding object
space, which weakens the comparisonsmade to natural language evolution. By deﬁning
each agents’ internal meaning space as a self organising map the meaning space can
remain personal and potentially unique. This strengthens the parallels to real language
as the agents’ omniscience and mind reading abilities are removed. Additionally, this
improvement causes the compression of the language to be motivated through a poverty
of memory as well as a poverty of stimulus. Analysis of this implementation shows
that a maintenance of a more compositional (structured) language remains. The effect
of an implicit generalisation parameter is also analysed and when each agent is able
to generalise over a larger number of objects a more stable compositional language
emerges.
A.1 Overview
The notion that language is a system of compression driven to adjust itself so that it
can be learnt by the next generation is a relatively new idea in the ﬁeld of linguistics.
However, a variety of simulations (Kirby and Hurford 1997; Kirby 2001; Kirby 2002;
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Kirby 2002; Smith, Brighton, and Kirby 2003) have illustrated its potential and provide
an alternative to established ‘innate’ accounts of language (Gillis and Durieux 1995;
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002). Currently, existing versions of this ‘iterated
learning’ (IL) model suffer from a number of criticisms, this paper will address some
of these and establish how current conclusions can remain valid after a number of
modiﬁcations.
In a general IL model, an agent selects an object from its environment and produces a
meaning-signal pair which is then perceived by a listener. This meaning-signal pair is
formed through a weighted connection between a meaning node and a signal node, it
is then used to adjust the weighted connections between the meaning space and signal
space of a listening agent. Through this means, a language evolves across a number
of generations. If each agent is only given the associated signal for a small subset of
possible objects, it is forced to generalise across the remaining object space, causing the
formation of a stable compositional language.
A.2 Criticisms of the iterated learning approach
In IL, the agent’s meaning space represents the mind of a person using a language.
However, in a range of areas this analogy breaks down. As each agent is created with
a perfect knowledge of the surrounding object space, this perfect knowledge is never
found in reality. We need to consider the nature of the object space and the agents’
ability to generalise across it. Also a learning agent directly observes each meaning-
signal pair; this introduces an element of ‘mind-reading’ as the learner now knows
exactly what the adult agent was thinking when he produced a signal. Obviously, this
weakens the IL implementation’s strength as a simulation of language evolution. Kirby
supports this clear criticism; “the ready availability of signals with meanings neatly
attachedtothemreducesthecredibilityofanyresultsderivedfromthesemodels.”(Kirby
2002)
We will now develop a new IL model to address these criticisms. We consider the
iterated learning approach to be a language,  , which is able to describe every object
found in the object space, N, through compression. This compression is possible by
forming a compositional language, which describes common features of objects in the
space.
As illustrated in Figure A.1(a), a compositional meaning node is able to deﬁne partially
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(a) The standard IL implementation,   is implicitly set to 1. (b) By halving the generalisation parameter twice as many
meaning nodes are needed by the compositional language.
FIGURE A.1: An adjustment of the previously implicit generalisation parameter
showing the effect on the level of compression that each compositional meaning node
can achieve.
determined by the number of values, V, in the object space, e.g., in Figure A.1(a)
each compositional meaning node is able to deﬁne partially four objects. This number
represents the strength of the generalisation parameter   and must be considered
signiﬁcant to the structure of the ﬁnal compositional language.
In Figure A.1(b), we can see how the compression value of each compositional node
can be halved. In order to understand the role of the environment in the emergence of
language we need to consider what happens when the generalisation parameter,   is not
equal to V. That is to say that generalisation becomes independent of the size of the
meaning space. To do this we will deﬁne the agent’s meaning space as a self organising
map and   as a radius around a selected object, removing the two stated criticisms of
IL and allowing us to develop a variable generalisation parameter.
A.3 Applying a self organising map to iterated learning
In the agents’ environment an example object can be deﬁned as:
xk ={ 1,2} (A.1)
forming a simple coordinate space. This can be deﬁned in the meaning space as:
m j ={ 1,2} (A.2)
or deﬁned as:Appendix A Removing ‘mind-reading’ from the iterated learning model 114
m 
j ={ 1, }
and
m 
j+1 = { ,2} (A.3)
In the above example, m j forms a holistic signal as this individual meaning node is
only capable of deﬁning one object. While the combination of m 
j and m 
j+1 will form
a compositionalsignal as features from the object space are deﬁned by the two meaning
nodes. These are then combinedto deﬁne an individualobject. These feature deﬁnitions
can then be used in other combinations to describe other objects. We will maintain
this aspect of traditional IL by redeﬁning generalisation as a variable radius around a
perceived object.
The weightings on the connections between the meaning and signal space determines
the mapping from meaning to signal and signal to meaning. The object space, N, that
each agent talks about is represented by a simple coordinate system and a subset of
these coordinates are drawn from the object space according to a uniform probability
distribution. Each object in turn is mapped directly to the appropriate meaning node in
the agent’s meaning space. The signals,li, are generated by mapping from this meaning
space to the signal space, and are represented as characters from an alphabet,  .A
signal li can then be deﬁned as:
li ={ (s1,s2,si,sl) | si       1   l   lmax} (A.4)
It is clear from Eq. A.4 that we need a sufﬁcient number of signal nodes in the signal
layer to express any of the nodes in the meaning space.
Formally, the object space consists of:
N ={ x1,..., xk,..., xn} (A.5)
where each element is given as:
xk ={ ( f1, f2,..., fF) | 1   fi   V} (A.6)
and F represents the number of dimensions in the object space and V represents the
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When required to produce an utterance, an agent will select an object, xk, and each node
in the meaning space, m j, competes to have the shortest euclidean distance from this
point. Formally, if we deﬁne the closest node as m(xk) then:
m(xk) = argmin
j
 x   m j , j = 1,2,···,l (A.7)
The winning node moves closer to the selected point, better deﬁning the object space
as a whole. In addition, a number of neighbouring nodes move closer to the object,
allowing the network as a whole to represent the experienced object space. The extent
to which these nodes move is determined by a Gaussian function, h j,k, centred around
the selected object (Haykin 1999).
h j,k = exp
 
 
d2
j,k
2 2
 
(A.8)
In order to form a compositional signal, we need to build valid decomposition sets from
the meaning space. This is governed by the generalisation parameter,  , which we
deﬁne as a radius centred around the speciﬁed object, xk. We can then deﬁne a set,
K(x), containing all of those meaning nodes which fall inside this radius. Formally
then:
 x | x   m j    | m j   K(x) (A.9)
Then considering all possible decompositions in turn the system will pick the
corresponding signal with the highest combination of weight values. According to:
g( li ) =
NS  
i=1
K(x)  
j=1
 (K(x)j) · WK(x)jNSi (A.10)
where “ (K(x)j) is a weighting function which gives the non-wildcard proportion
of x” (Kirby 2002), favouring compositional meaning nodes.
All meaning and signal nodes that correspond to a possible decomposition of the object
are activated, asi and amj. If two active nodes are connected the weight on that
connection is increased, whereas if there is a connection between an active node and
an inactive node the weight is decreased. Weights between two inactive nodes remain
unchanged. As shown by Oliphant (1999) this kind of learning is required for agents toAppendix A Removing ‘mind-reading’ from the iterated learning model 116
acquire a language system. The learning rule displayed by this Hebbian network can be
formalised as follows:
 wij =
 
   
   
+1 iff asi = amj = 1
 1 iff asi  = amj
0 otherwise
(A.11)
where  wij is the weight change at the intersection between si and m j, si   NS and
m j   NM.
While listening to each utterance, the weight values of the agent are adjusted allowing
it to form an understanding of its current language. This hypothesis then allows it to
generalise to objects it has not encountered before, resultingin a meaningfulexpression.
Therefore, a poverty of stimulus causes the language to generalise across an object
space. Additionally by having a limited number of nodes form the meaning space, the
agent does not have an inﬁnite memory resource to draw upon, forcing compression
through limited memory as well as limited stimulus.
Using this model, we will vary   in order to assess how this affects the stability, S, of
the ﬁnal compositional language, where
S =
Sc
Sc + Sh
(A.12)
The higher the value of S the more compositional the language. The value Sc represents
the proportion of compositional languages and Sh deﬁnes the proportion of holistic
languages (Kirby 2002).
As the meaning space is now able to learn the structure of the object space, each agent’s
meaning space can be undeﬁned at birth and the agent will need to learn the structure
of the object space as each object is encountered. Consequently, the meaning space
gradually comprehends the object space but also remains potentially unique to each
agent as a different subset of objects is encountered.
A.4 Results
First we run the new self-organising map and iterated learning (SOM-IL) implemen-
tation under the same conditions as the previous implementation, see Figures A.2(a),Appendix A Removing ‘mind-reading’ from the iterated learning model 117
(a) Stability of the resulting languages when each agent is
exposed to 10% of the object space.
(b) Stability of the resulting languages when each agent is
exposed to 20% of the object space.
(c) Stability of the resulting languages when each agent is
exposed to 50% of the object space.
(d) Stability of the resulting languages when each agent is
exposed to 90% of the object space.
FIGURE A.2: Under the new IL model results similar to the ones obtained in previous
implementations are maintained.
(a) Stability of the resulting languages when the previously
implicit generalisation parameter,  , is doubled and each
agent is exposed to 10% of the object space.
(b) Stability of the resulting languages when the previously
implicit generalisation parameter,  , is halved and each
agent is exposed to 10% of the object space.
FIGURE A.3: Previously unacknowledged generalisation parameter has a clear effect
on the language, with a greater generalisation ability leading to a higher level of
stability.
A.2(b), A.2(c) and A.2(d). Then we consider the effect of varying the generalisation
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(a) Densely populated, structured object space. (b) Unstructured object space.
FIGURE A.4: In a structured object space each meaning node can generalise over a
greater number of objects, this will affect the stability of the language.
A.5 Analysis
The results show that compositional languages emerge under a similar set of
circumstances to Smith, Brighton, and Kirby’s (2003) previous IL implementation.
Therefore, the requirements for a tight bottleneck and a structured meaning space
remain in this implementation. However, varying the generalisation parameter does
have an effect. The higher the generalisation value, the greater the stability, S, of the
compositional language and accordingly the lower the generalisation value, the lower
the stability.
The amenability of the meaning space to generalisation must be considered when
analysing these results. We need to explain why unstructured environments display
compositional languages with a low stability in an unstructured environment. Fig-
ure A.4 demonstrates that the potential generalisation of each meaning node is not as
effective as fewer objects are located in each generalisation area, the compositional
meaning node can only generalise across two objects in the unstructured object space.
A.6 Summary
Although,it can be argued thatthe SOM-IL meaning spaces are simplyanother example
of meaningless symbol shufﬂing, the meaning spaces within this system possesses
certain properties analogous to real cognitive spaces. Speciﬁcally, real meaning spaces
are limited in the amount of memory resource they have available. The human mind
does not have the capacity to deﬁne and understand everything in its environment.
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environment — forming a further motivation to generalise.
Additionally, each meaning space is unique to that individual; we all understand
different things and we all have different understandings of the same things. By having
the SOM deﬁne the object space throughout the course of the agent’s lifetime each ﬁnal
SOM conﬁguration could be potentially unique. Additionally, the learning displayed
by the SOM demonstrates the second property of a real meaning space, namely, change
over time with each new encountered object. It is clear that this is another property
of the human mind. This ever-changing meaning space also remains hidden from the
general population and the individual who possess the meaning space. In previous IL
implementations,meaning-signalpairs were presented for learning and by makingthese
meanings available to the listening agent, a form of ‘mind-reading’ was taking place.
This weakened the comparisons to real language evolution.
Signiﬁcantly, the poverty of stimulus encountered both in reality and in this simulation
has been shown to be essential in the evolution of a structured language. By improving
the realism of the meaning space simulation this requirement has been maintained and
further reinforces the validity of this approach.
However, this ﬁeld is in its infancy. There is a wide range of work still to be done and
many questions remain unanswered. The initial promise show by this approach should
lead to further fascinating pieces of research. The complex interplay of factors that
leads to the emergence of language still poses many unanswered questions.Appendix B
Detailed models
In this Appendix, we detailed the models used throught this thesis. We ﬁrst present
Oudeyer’sagentmodelbeforedetailingourown. Wethenpresentanarticulatorymuscle
model developed from Hill’s equations.
B.1 Oudeyer’s agent model
In Oudeyer’s work, each agent has an artiﬁcial vocal tract, an artiﬁcial ear (cochlear
model), and an artiﬁcial ‘brain’, or neural model. These will now be detailed in turn.
B.1.1 Vocal tract model
Following de Boer (2001), Oudeyer uses a vocal tract simulation controlled by three
parameters, namely lip rounding r, tongue height h and tongue position p. Each
parameter is constrained to reﬂect the anatomical range of the corresponding articulator
movement. We can derive formant values as follows:
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F1 = (( 392 + 392r)h2 + (596   668r)h + ( 146 + 166r))p2 + ((348   348r)h2
+ ( 494 + 606r)h + (141   175r))p + ((340   72r)h2 + ( 796 + 108r)h
+ (708   38r))
F2 = (( 1200 + 1208r)h2 + (1320   1328r)h + (118   158r))p2
+ ((1864   1488r)h2 + ( 2644 + 1510r)h + ( 561 + 221r))p
+ (( 670 + 490r)h2 + (1355   697r)h + (1517   117r))
F3 = ((604   604r)h2 + (1038   1178r)h + (246 + 566r))p2 + (( 1150 + 1262r)h2
+ ( 1443 + 1313r)h + ( 317   483r))p + ((1130   836r)h2
+ ( 315 + 44r)h + (2427   127r))
F4 = (( 1120 + 16r)h2 + (1696   180r)h + (500 + 522r))p2 + (( 140 + 240r)h2
+ ( 578 + 214r)h + ( 692   419r))p + ((1480   602r)h2
+ ( 1220 + 289r)h + (3678   178r))
Althoughitwouldbepossibletoproducesounds(i.e., syntheticvowels)exhibitingthese
formant values, which were then ‘heard’ by the ‘speaker’ and other agents, this is not
done in Oudeyer’s simulations or in Chapter 2. Rather, a short-cut is taken in which
auditory parameters are calculated from the formant values.
B.1.2 Cochlear model
A cochlear (ear) model, designed by Bo¨ e, Schwartz, and Vall´ ee, is employed to process
the formant values, placing the result in a 2-D auditory space. The model perceives
the ﬁrst formant directly and derives an ‘effective’ second formant, F2  (Carlson,
Granstr¨ om, and Fant 1970), as follows:
F2  =
 
         
         
F2 if F3   F2 > c
(2 w1F2+w1F3
2 if F3   F2   c and F4   F2   c
w2F2+(2 w2)F3
2   1 if F4   F2   c and F3   F2   F4   F3
(2+w2)F3 w2F4
2   1 if F4   F2   c and F3   F2   F4   F3
where c is as a constant of value 3.5 Barks (Chistovich and Lublinskaya 1979),
and w1 and w2 are deﬁned as:Appendix B Detailed models 122
w1 =
c   (F3   F2)
c
w2 =
(F4   F3)   (F3   F2)
F4   F2
The above equations assume frequency is represented on the Bark scale. Conversion
to this scale from hertz frequency is done using the following conversion formula
(Traunm¨ uller 1990):
fBark =
26.81
1 + 1960/fHz
  0.53
B.1.3 Neural model
The neural model is based on two self-organising maps (Kohonen 1990). The self-
organising map (SOM) deﬁning the articulatory space captures the conﬁgurations of the
vocal tract in terms of parameters r, h and p. The auditory space codes for the range of
acoustic cues in terms of the ﬁrst formant F1 and second ‘effective’ formant F2 . Each
agent’s neural model is then established by forming weighted connections between the
nodes of the auditory and articulatory spaces.
When activated, the jth node in the articulatory space produces a vector
vj = (rj,h j, pj) forming a point in [0,1]3 space coding articulatory conﬁguration.
A sequence of these vectors, v1,v2,...,vn where n is a random number between
2 and 4, is then fed to the vocal tract model. This produces an articulatory trajectory
(‘utterance’) of from 2 to 4 conﬁgurations. All remaining neurons are then modiﬁed
according to:
vk(t + 1) = vk(t) + Gk
 
vj
  
vj   vk(t)
 
 
   
   
k = 1..N,k  = j,
where N is the number
of neurons in each map
Each articulatory neuron is updated by a Gaussian activation function:Appendix B Detailed models 123
Gk(vj) = exp
 
d2
j,k
2 2
 
(B.1)
where d2
j,k =
 
 vj   vk
 
 2
This update mechanismcauses the nodes to converge on pointsin the articulatory space.
The location of these points of convergence is determined by the agent’s choice of
articulation and the utterances that it is exposed to. The articulatory space can then
be modiﬁed by the auditory space through the weighted connections between the two.
The connections between the perceptual neuron i and the articulatory neuron j are
characterised by the weight wi,j (initially random).
The auditory space is able to achieve a similar convergence, since on perceiving an
utterance a vector containingacoustic cues s (derivedfrom the ‘speech signal’) is placed
in the perceptual space and the neurons updated by:
vi(t + 1) = vi(t) + Gi(s)(s   vi(t))
The articulatory space is then further updated through the weighted connections by
characterising d2
j,k as:
d2
j,k =
N  
i
wi,jGi(s)
Taking the functional dependence of G()on s as implicit, for simplicity, the weights
are updated by a Hebbian learning rule:
 wi,j =   (Gi    Gi )
 
G j  
 
G j
  
where   is set to some small random number and
 
G j
 
represents the average gaussian
activation over the previous time steps.Appendix B Detailed models 124
B.2 Our agent model
Similar to Oudeyer’s work, each agent has an artiﬁcial vocal tract, an artiﬁcial ear
(cochlear model), and an artiﬁcial ‘brain’, or neural model. The cochlear model and
vocal tract are direct implementations of work by Cook (1993) and Slaney (1998).
Details and the differences to Oudeyer’s work are detailed and illustrated below.
The self-organising map (SOM) deﬁning the articulatory space captures the articulatory
conﬁgurations of the vocal tract in terms of eight parameters (r1 ...r8). The auditory
space codes for the range of acoustic cues determined by the output of the cochlear
model at each time step. Each agent’s neural model is then established by forming
weighted connections between the nodes of the auditory and articulatory spaces.
When activated, the jth node in the articulatory space produces a vector
vj = (r1j ...r8j) forming a point in [0,1]8 space coding an articulatory conﬁguration.
A sequence of these vectors, v1,v2,...,vn where n is a random number between
2 and 4, is then fed to the vocal tract model. This produces an articulatory trajectory
(‘utterance’) of from 2 to 4 conﬁgurations. All remaining neurons are then modiﬁed
according to:
vk(t + 1) = vk(t) + Gk
 
vj
  
vj   vk(t)
 
 
   
   
k = 1..N,k  = j,
where N is the number
of neurons in each map
Each articulatory neuron is updated by a gaussian activation function:
Gk(vj) = exp
 
d2
j,k
2 2
 
(B.2)
where d2
j,k =
 
 vj   vk
 
 2
This update mechanismcauses the nodes to converge on pointsin the articulatory space.
The location of these points of convergence is determined by the agent’s choice of
articulation and the utterances that it is exposed to. The articulatory space can then
be modiﬁed by the auditory space through the weighted connections between the two.
The connections between the perceptual neuron i and the articulatory neuron j are
characterised by the weight wi,j (initially random).Appendix B Detailed models 125
The auditory space is able to achieve a similar convergence, since on perceiving an
utterance a vector containingacoustic cues s (derivedfrom the ‘speech signal’) is placed
in the perceptual space and the neurons updated by:
vi(t + 1) = vi(t) + Gi(s)(s   vi(t))
The articulatory space is then further updated through the weighted connections by
characterising d2
j,k as:
d2
j,k =
N  
i
wi,jGi(s)
Taking the functional dependence of G()on s as implicit, for simplicity, the weights
are updated by a Hebbian learning rule:
 wi,j =   (Gi    Gi )
 
G j  
 
G j
  
where   is set to some small random number and
 
G j
 
represents the average gaussian
activation over the previous time steps. This increase in complexity allows us to
perceive complex auditory cues and produce articulatory targets for the artiﬁcial vocal
tract.
B.3 Muscle model
To develop our notion of articulatory effort we can capture the muscular effort, E, of
articulation by coding the muscles of the vocal tract according to Hill’s muscle model
(Umberger, Karin, and Philip 2003):
˙ E = ( ˙ hAM + ˙ hSL +˙ w) (B.3)
where ˙ hAM represents the activation and maintenance heat rate, ˙ hSL the shorten-
ing/lengthening heat rate, ˙ w represents the mechanical work rate. The maintenance
and activation heat rate can then be represented as follows:
˙ hAM = 1.28(%FT) + 25 (B.4)Appendix B Detailed models 126
Symbol Description
%FT % Fast Twitch
%ST % Slow Twitch
PCSA Cross Section
  Tension
TABLE B.1: The basic parameters for the muscle model.
As shown by Table B.1, the proportion of fast twitch muscles in the tissue under
consideration is determined by parameter %FT. The work rate of the muscle is then
determined by the force, f , and velocity of the muscle, v, divided by its mass, m:
˙ w = 
f.v
m
(B.5)
The term ˙ hSL varies, dependent upon whether the muscle is shortening or lengthening.
When shortening, ˙ hSL can be deﬁned as:
˙ hSL =  S(ST)   12
 
1   %FT
100
 
   S(FT)   12
 
%FT
100
 
where  S(ST) =
100
12   %ST
and  S(FT) =
153
12   %FT
When lengthening, hSL is deﬁned as follows:
˙ hSL =  L   12
 L = 4    S(ST)
To determine the force exerted by a muscle we consider the muscle’s maximum force
and modify the existing Hill’s constants, a and b. These constants are determined from
experimental evidence (Hill 1938):Appendix B Detailed models 127
f =
Fmax   b   0.2a
0.2 + b
(B.6)
The maximumforce of a muscle is thendetermined by itstension, , and cross sectional
area, PCSA:
Fmax =     PCSA (B.7)
Vmax =
Fmax   b
a
(B.8)
b = 12a (B.9)
a = 0.1 + 0.4   %FT (B.10)
where Vmax represents the maximum velocity of the muscle.References
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